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The purpose of this investigation was to carry out
a systematic analysis of Massachusetts case law in order
to identify basic concepts of the law of contract, and to
synthesize provisions of Massachusetts General Laws re-
lating to the formation and execution of contracts in
public higher education. One hundred sampled cases in-
volving the law of contract and public higher education
were analyzed to determine the most frequently litigated
areas of contract law, thereby identifying primary domains
of needed quasi-legal training for the education profes-
sion .
vi
vii
The premise or implicit hypothesis of this study
is that faculty and administrative personnel in public
higher education need to know basic concepts of the law,
but the majority of them have not had formal educational
preparation in the field of law. Thus, a marked dichotomy
exists between what is and what should be. This is the
problem that this research has addressed.
School law research, a subset of historical research,
was utilized in this dissertation. Historical research was
the approach of choice, since it allowed the focus of this
study to be on the development of law of contract in the
Commonwealth
.
The process employed was an analysis of basic contract
case law and a synthesis of it from the referenced cases.
The data reported are a tri-parte presentation: (1) a
briefing of 100 cases in higher education and an analysis
of them in relation to the area of the law of contact which
is in issue; (2) citations of the Massachusetts General
Laws which relate to the study; and (3) basic concepts of
the law of contract.
Major findings of the study are: 1. Contract litiga-
tion in higher education and the law of contract goes back
to the early nineteenth century (1819) . 2. There are
recurrent issues within the law of contract that have deep
historical roots. 3. Sixty percent of contract litigation
Vlll
according to this sample emanate from faculty. The other
forty percent are almost evenly divided between students
(twenty-two percent) and institution-initiated (eighteen
percent) actions. 4. Fifty—eight of the cases involved
Performance and Breach." Of these, fifty— five percent
were in a combination of two categories (of eight)
—
"Expressed or Implied" and "Offer and Acceptance."
Six major conclusions are derived from the analysis
of the data: 1. Legal history informs on pertinent issues
relative to contract law and public higher education.
2. The cognitive content of quasi-legal training for
faculty and administrative personnel in higher education
should be primarily in seven areas: (a) Performance and
Breach, (b) Offer and Acceptance, (c) Expressed or Implied,
(d) Capacity, (e) Fraud, Mistake and Duress, (f) Illegali-
ty and (g) Consideration. 3. Quasi-legal education is
needed for all professional personnel in public higher
education. 4. Preventive quasi-legal education for all
professional personnel, those who contract with profession-
al personnel (administrators) , and to a lesser degree
students, would enhance the internal harmony of institu-
tions of higher education. 5. Quasi-legal education
programs should begin to focus on student-initiated liti-
gation. 6. Elimination of misunderstandings of contractu-
al relationships would reduce both monetary and human
IX
costs
.
On the basis of the principal findings,
dations are made that further studies be ini
two areas: (1) collective bargaining, and (
initiated litigation.
recommen-
tiated in
2) student
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this investigation has been to carry
out a systematic analysis of Massachusetts case law in
order to identify basic concepts of the law of contract,
and to synthesize within the parameters of this study pro-
visions of Massachusetts General Laws relating to the
formation and execution of contracts in public higher
education. One hundred cases involving the law of contract
and public higher education were analyzed to determine the
most frequently litigated areas of contract law, thereby
identifying primary domains of needed quasi-legal training
for the education profession.
Delimitations
This study was delimited to: (1) one area of the
civil law
,
i.e., the law of contract; (2) individual
contracts vis-a-vis collective bargaining contracts; (3)
contract law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; (4) liti-
gation in higher education involving contract issues; (5)
Massachusetts General Law which relate to the formation
2and execution of contracts by faculty and administrative
personnel in public higher education.
Basic Assumptions
In the formulation of this problem and its implicit
hypothesis, three basic assumptions were made. They are:
(1) public higher education is interfaced with professional
education; (2) inter-agency contacts are negotiated by
agents of institutions of public higher education to pro-
vide clinical facilities for use in professional education;
and (3) the effect of the economy on public higher education
of the Commonwealth will necessitate improved management,
increased productivity, and cost control.
Definition of Terms
Since the law, as other professions, has a vocabulary
peculiar to itself, the definition of terms is incorporated
into the treatise when necessary for the purpose of clarity.
Other terms are listed in Appendix I.
Research Methodology
School law research, a subset of historical research,
was utilized in this study. Historical research was re-
quired to trace the development of the law of contract in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
3School law research was used to demonstrate the
effect on educators and administrators of public higher
education of the concept of "legalism" as it exists today,
i.e., as an enabling mechanism to understand the present
in light of the past.
An understanding of the history of education(including legal history) is important to theprofessional worker in this field. It helps himto understand the how and the why of educational
movements that have appeared and in some cases,
continue to prevail in the schools. It helps to
evaluate not only lasting contributions, but also
the fads and "Bandwagon" schemes that have appeared
on the educational scene, only to be discarded.^
An understanding of the development of the law of
contract is important to the faculty and administrative
personnel in public higher education. It helps them
understand the how and why of the "legalism" of today's
society and its educational input, which is beginning to
be noticeable. In some instances, "legalism" is prolifera-
ting critical issues in public higher education. Such know-
ledge will also help the educator to evaluate not only what
is the law, but also the basic fallacies which often surround
law related controversy. The level of knowledge required
by administrators and faculty in public higher education
today is not an indepth one, but a working one.
1 John W.
Prentice Hall,
Best, Research in Education (New Jersey:
Inc.
,
1970)
,
p. 96
.
4Need for and Significance of the Study
Higher education is diversified and pluralistic.
Two different fractions of society control it: (1) the
public sector and (2) the private sector. At the same time,
two forces affect it, namely, internal and external forces.
The internal forces are its component parts: the trustees,
administrative personnel, faculty, classified personnel
(other professional and non-professional employees)
,
and
students. The external forces are the federal, state, and
local government, as well as private and public accrediting
(approving) agencies.
The external forces, through the medium of statutory
and regulatory power ("police power"), have imposed controls
over the internal forces in the operation of the business
of higher education. Since the law is defined as the study
of man and his interaction, the law directly affects both
the control groups and the forces affecting them.
Both the decision-making process and the decision
makers are affected by the law. One area of the law is
especially significant as an operational tool in the "modus
operande" of higher education, i.e., the law of contract.
Major factors have directly influenced the use of contract
law in higher education and in doing so have highlighted
the need for and the significance of this study. These
5factors are: (1) the proliferation of laws impinging
on contract relations; (2) evidence of escalation in the
number of legal cases which involve issues of higher educa-
tion; and (3) the dollar and psychic costs of litigation.
The Proliferation of Laws
Impinging on Contract Relations
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution
empowers the federal government to regulate whatever moves
in or affects interstate commerce. Accordingly, the federal
government through the National Labor Relations Board, has
regulated labor and management relations in higher
education. The contract of employment (individual con-
tract) is a prerequisite to and inherent in the relation-
ship of labor and management.
The federal government through financial controls has
influenced, and in some instances regulated: (1) hiring
practices (non-discrimination); (2) privacy of records; and
(3) student conduct (student loan programs) through the
following legislation which ramifies into contract negotia-
tions :
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
200 Od) . This law applies to all colleges and universities
which receive federal financial assistance for any purpose.
It prohibits discrimination in, exclusion from, or denial
6of benefits of programs receiving such financial assist-
ance
.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
20p0e) - as amended in 1972. This legislation applies non-
discr iminatory standards to the colleges or universities as
an employer. It covers employment of faculty, as well as
non-professional personnel.
Title IX of the Higher Education Amendment of 1972
(20 U.S.C. 1681-1683)
. This law provides for non-discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex.
Educational Amendments of 1974 (20 U.S.C. 821) . This
legislation sets forth the "Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Acts of 1974, "which allows the parent (or student
who is of majority age) to inspect and review all official
records, files, and data directly related to children (or
self)
,
including all material that is incorporated into
the cumulative folder.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . This law provides for
non-discrimination on the basis of handicap.
Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. 206 Id).
This legislation requires "equal pay" for "equal work," re-
gardless of sex for all employees who are covered by the
Federal Labor Standards Act. It includes institutions of
higher education.
7The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
—
-
9 U ' S ,C * 621 ) • This law prohibits discrimination in em-
ployment because of age.
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Order 32 F.R.
14303 and Executive Orders 11246 and 11375
. These execu-
tive orders (laws) require non-discrimination in the ad-
ministration and performance of federal contracts over
$10,000. In addition to compliance assurances, they require
that affirmative action plans be filed by private institu-
tions which have more than fifty employees.
Specific legislation in the Commonwealth which has
affected contract law in higher education is as follows:
M.G.L., Ch. 15 sec. 19B . This statute provides for the
indemnification of public officials. Questions of personnel
liability have arisen for trustees, administrative personnel,
and employees of institutions of higher education.
M.G.L.
,
Ch. 180 A, added by Chapter 886 of the Acts of
1975 . This statute authorizes trustees in the management of
institutional endowment funds to appropriate and use capital
gains, realized and unrealized. This legislation clarifies
the right of trustees in the exercise of individual contracts
in the operation of institutions when budgets are restricted.
M.G.L.
,
Ch. 225, sec. 13K . This law requires notice of
termination of student contracts, requiring tuition refunds
8applying to proprietary schools.
M. G . L
.
,
Ch. 69 , sec . 3 1C . This statute requires
disclosure of accreditation of non-accreditation status of
the school after the student is accepted by an instiution.
Escalation of Legal Cases Involving Higher
Education
Litigation involving colleges and universities has
increased during the past few years. The number of court
decisions involving faculty employment increased this year
over the previous years. Non-renewal of contacts of employ-
ment, coupled with retrenchment procedures, reflect the
national trends in higher education. Decreased birth rates,
inflation, and lack of military evasion incentives contribute
to the fact that enrollments in colleges and universities
are not equal to the "Golden Years" of the sixties. Issues
of the seventies revolve around affirmative action and non-
discrimination. Higher education has been forced to choose
alternatives to meet the growing social and economic pres-
sures. Institutions have reorganized their offerings and
educational priorities. Therefore, legal issues relative
to the law of contract with respect to the contract of em-
ployment have been frequently introduced in the courts.
The unique status of faculty members in their relation
to the institution of higher education has complicated the
9issues and resulting disputes which have arisen in re-
lation to the law of contract. It should be noted that
the issues have been determined in the courts by applying
the law of contract to the facts of the case
.
Case law involving the law of contract and higher
education is a dramatic omen of the inclination of citizens
to seek redress through the courts.
Contracts of employment have not necessarily been
clear documents in higher education. As case law demon-
strates, the terms of employment for faculty may arise
from express or implied agreements, faculty handbook, or
statutes. Under these contracts, faculty may be classified
as tenured or non-tenured. The two leading cases in higher
education based on non-renewal of a contract are: (1) Board
2 3
of Regents v. Roth
, and (2) Perry v. Sinderman . These
cases held:
The due process clause of the Constitution does
not require that a non-tenured professor receive a
hearing or written response prior to the non-renewal
of his contract unless he can show that the non-
renewal was a deprivation of an interest in "liberty"
or that he had a "property interest" in continued
employment
.
4
^Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
^Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972).
4Perry v. Sinderman.
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The courts have also held that a contractual rela-
tionship exists between the student and the institution
regarding academic matters. The institution determines the
criteria for successful completion of courses, programs, and
for graduation. If the student does not meet the criteria,
he may be dismissed. if the institution of higher education
fails to meet its standards, then the student may seek
judicial relief in an action for breach of contract.
The court has noted that in academic dismissal cases,
the student has the legal right to be advised of his aca-
demic deficiencies prior to termination. He does not have
a legal right to due process (notice and hearing) . With the
advent of "consumerism" in society and this concept being
applied to the student-faculty relationship in higher educa-
tion, the need for faculty to be aware of basic contract law
is even more significant.
Mahavongsanan v. Hall^ is a case which well demon-
strates the need for a quasi-iegal understanding of the law
of contract by faculty and administrative personnel in higher
education (Re: pp. 72-74 ). In this case, the plaintiff,
a graduate student, contended that the bulletins and cata-
logs of the university in effect at the time she enrolled
constituted a contract and that the university should be
ordered to grant her a degree. She completed the required
^Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 592 F. 2d 448 (1976).
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course work but failed the comprehensive examination on
two occasions. She held that the examination requirement
came into effect after the date of her enrollment and should
not apply to her. Issues all were in relation to contract
law. The student won in the federal district court but
the federal court of appeals reversed the district court's
decision
.
In relation to the student's charge that the univer-
sity breached its contract with the plaintiff, the court
held:
. . . implicit in the student's contract with the
university on matriculation is the student's agree-
ment to comply with the university's rules and
regulations, which the university clearly is en-
titled to modify so as to properly exercise its
educational responsibility.
The Dollar and Psychic Cost of Litigation
Values in society in the seventies have changed. Edu-
cators have integrated within themselves and the system of
higher education the changing societal values. Faculty and
administrative personnel have taken on the "consumerism"
value system of this decade. The growth in size of institu-
tions of higher education, the shift to the public institu-
tions, and the trend toward consolidated coordinating agen-
cies have affected decision making and, consequently, the
individual contract of employment of faculty and administra-
12
trative personnel in higher education. They have also
affected the individual contracts for learning. Because
of these factors, institutions of higher education are
making substantial changes in the system of internal
governance. "Accountability" is the issue of the day.
The courts have reinforced the continuation that institu-
tions and individuals who provide educational services must
be "accountable" to one or more groups in relation to their
behavior
.
Coupled with "accountability" is the currently pre-
dominant value of the preservation of substative constitu-
tional rights, as well as statutory rights. Though educa-
tors are not litigious by nature, they have reverted to the
courts for resolution of constitutional and statutory issues
arising in their employment. The cost of such controversy
is high. In the majority of cases the educator has borne
the financial burden of the litigation personally. In the
light of the individual's value, the importance of the
issue--at least at the outset--is held to outweigh the
dollar cost. In addition to the monentary expenditure, how-
ever, litigation has also imposed a psychic price on the
litigee. William Van Alstyne clearly puts this forth when
he said:
.
. . the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff-
teacher and is often exceedingly difficult to carry;
13
off other institutions who sue theilaunder their linen in public.
6
Xn this period of economic recessiion, the purpose of
higher education remains the production of knowledge.
However, the nature of the production is presently unsure.
Higher education today is being challenged to be what it
claims to be rather than what it is. Intellectual capacity
cannot continue to increase at the expense of the ability
to understand, relate to, and emphathize with other people.
It is necessary that consumers, as well as educators, re-
spond to the human condition" in addition to achieving
technical and conceptual requirements of an educational
program.
At the same time, America's institutions of higher
education have evolved into massive business enterprises
with priority issues challenging the structure and process
£William W. Van Alstyne, "The Rights of Teachers and
Professors," The Rights of Americans: What They Are - What
They Should be
,
ed. by Norman Dorsen (New York: Vintage
Books, 1971)
,
p. 558.
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of decision making in United States higher education:
(1) institutional independence, (2) the role of the board
of trustees and the president, (3) collective bargaining,
(4) rules and practices of academic tenure, (5) student
influence on the campus, and (6) the decision-making
process. Priority issue #4 is relevant to this research.
Colleges and universities grew rapidly in size and
complexity in the 1950's and 1960 's. The management of the
escalating enterprises became full-time jobs. In this pro-
cess, two distinct management systems developed: (1) the
collegial model and (2) the business management model. In
the collegial model, administrators have been appointed
from the faculty ranks. The business model has infiltrated
the ranks of collegiate administration with individuals
whose primary training has been in management. To the ex-
tent that the business model has taken hold, the condition
to which this study is addressed has been mitigated, but
there is little evidence of "professional" managers taking
over higher education. The traditional route to institu-
tional leadership through the academic ranks still prevails,
that is, higher education is still dominated by the colle-
gial model. In this model, the administrators have come
from the academic ranks and have not necessarily been
equipped with the "tools" to perform their administrative
^Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, "Governance
of Higher Education: Six Priority Problems" (April 1973)
.
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tasks. Among the tools they lack is legal knowledge,
particularly with reference to the execution of contracts.
Administrators within the collegial model need to
have a quasi-legal understanding of the law, as well as
excellence in their academic disciplines. Excellence
only m academia, for an administrator in higher education
in 1978, is not logical in our legal society. Whatever
the merits of the collegial model—and there are presumed
to be many—the management of higher education by "gifted
amateurs" without augmentation of their academic training
is no longer feasible.
In the 1970's, the fluid labor market, new techno-
logical jobs, diversified life styles, and economic pres-
sures have affected educational needs. Tenure quotas,
faculty retrenchment, restricted budgets, increased work
loads and phase outs of educational programs have been im-
posed by the administrative hierarchy with little or no
consultation with those affected. Faculty have been re-
garded as employees and their traditional academic value,
namely, tenure is under attack.
Faculty, and in many instances administrative per-
sonnel, have secured their employment and maintained their
status under the individual employment contact which in
public higher education led traditionally to the statutory
16
based tenure system. Academic tenure has been challenged
for diversified reasons since its inception in 1915. it
was in that year that the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors was formed to protect the academic community
from unfair and arbitrary practices. During its first
year, the committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the
American Association of University Professors was involved
with eleven cases of alleged infringement of academic
freedom.
In 1973 the Commission on Academic Tenure in higher
education issued a report entitled "Faculty Tenure" which
indicated that an estimated ninety-four percent of all
faculty members in American universities and colleges were
serving in institutions which conferred tenure. 8 The
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, in 1973, reported
that by 1990 the percentage of teachers with tenure could
be up to 90 percent. Therefore, this Commission predicted
a widespread tendency toward " judicalizations" of the issues
on college and university campuses.^ 8
g Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education,
"Faculty Tenure" (March 1973).
9 . .Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, "Priori-
ties in Action" (October 1973).
10
Ibid.
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Two major responses appear to be arising in response
to the attack on tenure. These responses tend to be in-
herent in response to the changing roles and relationships
in higher education, namely: ( 1 ) faculty unionization and
(2) substitution of term contracts for tenure commitments.
Unions tend to facilitate a bargaining process which
is an orderly, neutral mechanism for resolving issues into
a bilateral mutual binding agreement enforceable under law.
Unionization in the United States demands separation of
management and employee, the latter being the faculty.
Faculty cannot be both the employer and employee.
The term-contract system is a means by which an
institution issues contracts for a specified period.
After this period, the professor's employment would be
terminated unless another agreement were negotiated.
Therefore, irrespective of the alternative accepted,
it is necessary for faculty and administrative personnel
in public higher education to have a quasi-legal knowledge
of the basic concepts of the law of contract to ensure
their economic well being in 1978. Employment for faculty
and the inherent academic freedom so valued by education
will conceivably in the future be terms of a contract, be
it individual or collective.
Institutions of public higher education cannot
function effectively and safely without their employees
18
having a working knowledge of the law of contract or the
legal structure of their employer. While professional
legal counsel is available to institutions to oversee the
legal aspects of their major operational functions, there
is often no such provision for avoiding or resolving minor
disputes which may be equated to hidden cancerous lesions
which will cripple and can ultimately kill an institution.
It should be noted that since the sixties, with the
surge of focus on students' rights, college educators and
administrators have recognized the need for a constant flow
of legal information. At the outset of that decade, in a
litigation known as the Dixon Case (Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education )
,
11 due process rights for students in
institutions of public higher education were ajudicated.
Facts
:
Several Alabama State college students
Par"ticipated in a sit-in at a lunch grill. Some
of the students were expelled while others were
placed on probation. The disciplinary action was
imposed on the students without their receiving
notice of the charges against them. They also did
not receive a hearing prior to the disciplinary
action. Judgment was for the defendant Alabama
State Board of Education in the United States
District Court and the plaintiff students' appeal.
Issue Does due process require that students re-
ceive notice and some opportunity for a hearing
before they are expelled for misconduct in a tax
supported college?
Decision: Yes.
11-
.
Dixon v.
2d 150 (1961)
.
Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.
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Reasoning
:
(1) in the disciplining of colleae
danger to the
6 considerations of immediate
security whTch
U
=i
1C
^°r ° f peril to the national
,
i should prevent the Board from ex-
F 1SaSt thS fun<^amental principles of
tht U
by giving the accused students notice ofe charges and an opportunity to be heard in theirown de fense (2 ) The State cannot condition a pr^vi-
rioht ^ Jenu^ciatlon of the Constitutionalg to procedural due process.
This case is relevant to this study as this decision
triggered the beginning of a chain of legal decisions.
Today students in general are aware of their legal rights.
They take a wide variety of issues to court. Studies of
the colleges' responses to student litigations show that
college administrators and attorneys have been unprepared
to answer issues raised by students
. The organizational
behavior of the institutions of public higher education has
become that of crisis management, stemming in a large part
from minimum knowledge of legal parameters.
Legal reporting systems have developed over the past
decade to publish up-to-date legal decisions. These ser-
vices cover all aspects of the law from basic civil law
to taxation. Information is voluminous and not readily
accessible to the educator or administrator in reference
to a single, specific topic-issue or area of the law, not
to mention a specific jurisdiction. More significantly,
little information is available as to how the law relates
to the operation of institutions of public higher education
and the contractural rights of administrators, faculty and
20
students within these institutions.
The
—
ted States District for the Western District-
of Missouri sitting en banc (45 R.R.D. 133) issued a signi-
ficant and comprehensive statement on the relationship be-
tween the courts and education:
Education is the living and growing sourceof our progressive civilization, of our open
repository of increasing knowledge, culture andour salutary democratic traditions. As such, edu-cation deserves the highest respect and the fullestprotection of the courts in the performance of itslawful missions.
There have been and no doubt in the future there
will be instances of erroneous and unwise misuse ofpower by those invested with powers of management
and teaching in the academic community, as in the
case of all human fallible institutions. When such
misuse of power is threatened or occurs, our political
and social order has made available a wide variety
of lawful, non-violent, political, economic, and
social means to prevent or end the misuse of power.
These same lawful, non-violent, political, economic
and social means are available to correct an unwise
but lawful choice of educational policy or action by
those charged with the powers of management and
teaching in the academic community.
It should be noted here that erroneous misuse of
power can be actualized in the making of unconstitutional
contracts--illegal contracts—fraudulent contracts, etc.
The courts have long since declared that the rela-
tionship of enrolled students to a private institution is
contractual. Similarly, Krawez v. Stans established the
contractual nature of transactions between enrolled stu-
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dents and the agents of public institutions. 12
Federal Narcotics Agents and a Nassau
Facts
:
r'nnnfv , T
w"" n ai
United ftat« m® q
“estloned midshipmen at the
the ut S Merchant Marine Academy concerningse of marijuana on the campus. The ques- 9loners acting as agents for the Academy assured
freely
U
"
e
since
hat
tH
heY °°Uld be " fr^k" Yand "speakt , no hing they said would be held
uS
1
nf
t them * After the midshipmen admitted their
from°thrAcidly.
0" CamPUS
’ theY Were susPer)ded
Issue: Does an offer made by authorized agents ofan institution, and the acceptance of that offer
y students, constitute a binding contract betweenthe institution and the student?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : As agents, the questioners were authori-
zed to make promises to the students concerning the
use of their statements. They told plaintiffs thatif they spoke freely, nothing they said would be
used against them. Plaintiffs, by speaking freely,
accepted this offer, and a contract was made. The
Academy is bound by this agreement. It cannot use
as evidence in disciplinary proceedings admissions
made by plaintiffs to the agents.
Arbitrary dismissal of the midshipmen on the basis
of immune testimony manifested blatant ignorance of funda-
mental concepts of law. The monetary costs of such ignorance
are considerable; the emotional costs to individuals and
the damage to the reputation of the academy are incalculable.
Krawez v. Stans in a sense is the epitome of the
problem. Ignorance of basic legal principles precipitated
unnecessary expenditure of public monies and did irreparable
damage to individuals acting in good faith. The signifi-
12Krawez v. Stans, 306 F. Supp. 1230 (1969).
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cance of this study lies in its modest substantive con-
tribution to the means for eradicating legal ignorance
and ultimately avoiding the consequences of such ignorance
that the public can ill afford and will not abide.
CHAPTER I I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Background research pursuant to the present investi-
gation proceeded along several lines, including a computer
search for extant studies, surveys of interpretative litera-
ture in academic and business management, law-related educa-
tion literature, contract law (in general), landmark cases
in contract law, and seminal commentary on basic and contract
law. The initial inquiry was generally useful insofar as it
reinforced the researcher's implicit hypothesis— that
faculty and administrators in higher education need quasi-
legal knowledge beyond what presently characterizes the
profession of education. In particular, elements of the
literature justified the researcher's focus on substantive
aspects of contract law, supported the election of an his-
torical case study methodology, and—by omission--revealed
the potential of the current study for contributing sig-
nificantly to the literature.
Computer Search
An ERIC computer search was used to initiate the
investigation. The researcher was unable to find explicit
treatment of the subject of her inquiry . Only fifteen
23
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research projects which involve the law of contract existed
at the time of the undertaking of this study.
The researcher categorized these fifteen studies into
four areas: (1) due process, (2) tenure, (3) collective
bargaining, and (4) other. This categorization was as
follows
:
(1) Due Process
"Termination and Due Process"
"The Process that is Due"
"The Case of the Expectant Professor and
Other Mysteries"
(2) Tenure
"Security of Tenure: The Position of Academic
Staff in English and Welch University
Institutions
"
"Academic Freedom, Professional Responsibility,
and Tenure in the Utah System of Higher
Education, Statement of Policy Adopted by
the State Board of Regents, December 20, 1973"
(3) Collective Bargaining
"Resources on Academic Bargaining and Governance"
"Collective Bargaining Comes to Campus"
"Collective Bargaining on Campus"
"Dues Check Off and Union Security Study"
"Grievance Procedures in Higher Education
Contracts
"
(4) Other
"The College Catalog as a Contract"
"Recent Development in Two Year Community
College Law: Student, Faculty and Tort"
"First Level Management: Legal Implications
and Responsibilities for Selection and
Retention of Faculty"
25
|i
® 1kliography of School Law Dissertations"
Policy, Documents, and Reports of the
American Association of University
Professors
"
The investigator postulated that though the law of
contract is inherent in these studies, only one in the
Other category treats of the law of contract per se.
This study is termed: "The College Catalog as a Contract."
Sections of the substantive law of contract are applied to
the dictum of the catalog in this study, establishing its
relationship to the present investigation, since "Catalogue"
issues cluster around the area of Offer and Acceptance of
the law of contract.
The three studies in the "Due Process" category relate
to the constitutional right of faculty to due process. The
research projects categorized under "Tenure" and "Collective
Bargaining" focus on specific statutory rights and contribute
nothing to the researcher's investigation. Similarly, the
ERIC Clearinghouse maintains a file of faculty contracts
and faculty handbooks. These are objective manifestations
of the form of the contract and the terms of the inherent
descriptors, which contribute nothing to the understanding
of the substantive law of contract and, therefore, to this
study
.
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Literature of Academic and
Business Management
Since the focus of this study is on the individual
contract and collective bargaining, as the name implies,
leads to a group contract, that is, a contract in behalf of
all members of a bargaining unit, collective bargaining
contracts lie outside the scope of this study. Moreover,
since the statutory law and precedent which control collec-
tive bargaining are distinct from the common law, statutes,
and precedent that control individual contracts, collective
bargaining contracts are not within the delimitations of
this study. Therefore, the aforementioned publications do
not make a contribution to this research.
In the area of business management, since 1968 five
general works have been published. They are: (1) Friedman,
Contract Law in America: A Social and Economic Case Study;
(2) Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts: Cases and Materials ;
(3) Gordon and Kurzman, Gordon's Modern Annotated Forms of
Agreement ; (4) Cappola, Law of Business Contracts ; and
1
3
(5) Wincor, Law of Contract . These works are broad m
scope and a minimum of eight years old. Contract law in
many instances has been modified or changed by legal deci-
sions rendered between the publication of these works and
13 Paul Wasserman et al., Encyclopedia of Business In-
formation Sources (Detroit: Gale Research Co.)
,
p. 177.
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the current investigation. Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts
:
C_ases and Materials, as a case study approach, informs the
methodology of this study. Four handbooks and manuals have
also been published which are subject to the same variables,
namely scope and age.
Literature of Education
A review of the literature in education reiterates
the need for this study. The literature does not share
information on specific aspects of the law but focuses on
failure of the faculty and administrators in higher educa-
tion to know it. Schimmel in his article, "The Bill of
Rights and the Public Schools: Change and Challenge,"
indicates that educators today have hidden agendas--lessons
in legal hypocrisy based on their own lack of information.
He alleges that educators seem to be doing everything they
can--except teaching the way the courts have applied the
Constitution to the classroom and applying the Bill of
14
Rights to students and teachers m the schools.
A Legacy of the Past
Why don't most educators teach and apply the Con-
stitution? One reason is that many do not under-
stand when or how the Bill of Rights is applicable
to the schools. This is because these rights did
not apply to them when they were students and
14 David Schimmel, "The Bill of Rights and the Public
Schools: Change and Challenge," Social Education (Virginia
National Council for Social Studies, April 1975), p. 209.
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because they learned almost nothing functional
about the subject during their schooling. Even
courses which taught the history and principles
of the Constitution rarely considered their
application to the public schools. Thus, since
many teachers and administrators have had almost
no education or personal experience in this area,
they are poorly prepared to apply the Bill of
Rights in the schools today
«
15
Schimmel further indicates that one reason that the current
legal decisions are not found in the school curriculum is
that many teachers do not know about the cases, or if they
do, they do not know where to find them. A second reason
he identifies is that educators see these decisions as con-
troversial. Thirdly, he points out that educators see
themselves as having few rights and students as having so
16
many
.
Faculty and administrators in public higher education
must change the self-concept that Schimmel suggests that
they have, i.e., that they have few legal rights.
Schimmel 's findings reiterated the need for this research,
since an understanding of the law of contract transmits to
the faculty and administrators an understanding of their
inherent rights, thus fulfilling their own need for security.
The end result will be that this self-concept will change.
I5 ibid.
16 Ibid
. ,
p . 273
.
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Fischer and Schimmel in their text, Civil Rights of
Teachers
, indicate that:
It is paradoxical that in schools, whichhave as one of their major purposes preparation
citizens for effective participation in a
democracy, civil rights have never been con-
sistently applied.
One reason for this inconsistency is that
teachers are generally unaware of their rights.
A recent survey in Massachusetts, for example,
indicated that the law gives teachers a much wider
range of freedom of speech and action than most
teachers realize. Some even believe that they
voluntarily give up many of their rights when they
sign their teaching contracts . 17
Fischer and Schimmel have concentrated on the civil
rights of teachers. These rights emanate from the consti-
tutional law vis-a-vis the law of contract. Therefore,
their findings do not directly contribute to this investi-
gation .
In pursuing the justification for this study, the
researcher found that many of the grievances filed on
faculty contracts were based on violation of the terms of
the employment contract with which administrative personnel
were not familiar. Specific terms with bilateral rights
(management and labor) in a contract directly affect the
management of any institution of higher education.
Following the reasoning of Fischer and Schimmel, when
^ 7 Louis Fischer and David Schimmel, The Civil Rights of
Teachers (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. xi
.
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faculty become aware of their contract rights, civil
rights in education will be more consistently applied.
The strength of an institution will be reinforced by in-
creased knowledge of faculty and administrative personnel
in relation to the law of contract. The ability to re-
spond and to account is in direct ratio to the level of
understanding.
"Governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed." This
statement in the Declaration of Independence is predicated
upon the conviction that "all men are created equal."
From this belief, it follows that each person has the right
to live his life according to his own philosophy and has a
right to an equal voice in decisions which affect the whole
community. These principles of consent and political
equality facilitate the conception of democracy as a system
which embodies the ideal of equality and political power
1
8
among all members of the community. This equality of
power recognizes the dignity of the person and provides
him with the opportunity to develop his powers and per-
sonality while advancing his own interests. The law of
contract is a medium for the maintenance of the equality of
power.
18Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism:
A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown and Company) , p. 83.
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Rule by law is one of the crucial meanings of
America. Our constitutional tradition created a political
system for us that preserves human liberties and at the
same time permits us to respond to changes in our con-
ditions. One of the most sacred rights granted to us by
our forefathers in the Constitution is the right to dis-
cuss our law. The problem arises in these United States
that the issue is not the right to do but the failure to
know how to so do.
Jethro K. Liberman indicates:
Perhaps the most encouraging by-product of the
constitutional crises that Richard Nixon threatened
to provoke was the reawakening talk about con-
stitutional law—not merely in the law schools but
at the dinner tables and in the streets.
1
9
Liberman goes on to say:
But there is much more to be done. Aside from
the lawyers themselves, who constitute something
less than one-fifth of one percent of the popula-
tion, the American public is schooled in law only
when one of its members needs to write a will, buy
a house, recover from an automobile accident, sue a
doctor, or separate from a spouse. This is not
sustained, sophisticated, or sensible education.
William W. Van Alstyne, Professor of Law at Duke
University's School of Law, has written on academic freedom
and other aspects of constitutional law. He is the former
19Jethro K. Liberman, Milestones I 200 Years of
American Law : Milestones in Our Legal History (Minnesota:
West Publishing Co.), p. xvii.
20
Ibid
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General Counsel to the African Association of University
Professors. In his article, "The Rights of Teachers and
Professors," he indicates that the protection and imple-
mentation of the substantive law in education will cut
down on the recourse of educators to the procedural aspects
of the law. Knowledge of the substantive law of contract
will assist faculty and administrative personnel in avoid-
ing the inconvenience and stigma of the litigation process
that Van Alstyne relates to by fortifying them with the
tool to use the constitutional pre-termination procedural
due process to their advantage, thus negating the need to
go on to court litigation
.
21
Justice Frankfurter said, "The history of liberty
has largely been the history of observance of procedural
2 2safeguards." Frankfurter's point is well taken in
education
.
Suppose, for instance, that a public school
teacher on annual contract simply fails to receive
any notice that his teaching contract is being re-
newed for the coming year. Or suppose that an
assistant professor in a state college receives
notice that his three-year contract is not being
renewed and, upon inquiry to learn the reason, is
advised that it is contrary to institutional prac-
tice to provide a statement of reasons. Or suppose
that a full professor in a state whose legislature
has neither adopted a tenure system nor even dele-
gated authority to the state regents to provide for
one receives notice in midyear that his service
21
Ibid.
,
Van Alstyne.
22McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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u
lnate the f°l lowing June. in each casehhe teacher may believe that one of the reasonssignificantly contributing to his terminationinvolves a standard forbidden by the Bill ofRights possibly retaliation for a projected extramural utterance, a disfavord political affilial™or something similar. 1 ,
Here it is interesting to point out that fear is an
emotion arising from the unknown. How many teachers would
be afraid to question the reasons—not to mention the
justification for the above mentioned actions? The pro-
cedural safeguards to the substantive rights of the faculty
are embedded in the history of liberty that Frankfurter
speaks to.
Law of Contract
A review of case law serves as a good foundation to
assist the reader in understanding the need to undertake
this study
, Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America
said, "There is hardly a political question in the United
States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial
one. In the United States, the law permeates the whole.
Frankfurter stated, "The law touches every concern of man,
nothing that is human is alienated to it." Transferring
the words of Frankfurter to the activities of daily living,
we conclude that the law affects our lives personally and
23
Ibid., Van Alstyne.
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and professionally from the proverbial "cradle to the
grave." The law is concerned with the conditions of one's
conception
, legitimate or illegitimate, and one's intra-
uterine life. The interruption and/or continuance of
intrauterine life is a legal matter today. Following
birth and during the process of life, the law concerns
itself with our health, education, and welfare. Finally,
the circumstances of our death and disposition of our
material assets concern the law. The purpose of the law
is to protect its citizens. Educators as citizens should
be aware of the implications of the law as it affects one's
rights, the rights of others, and one's profession.
This charge is more relevant to educators today than
ever before because the only way that the law will lose
its face in a democracy is when the people themselves have
no understanding of it. We are living in an age in which
more and more educational issues are being resolved in the
courts. The courts have in essence become an important
factor in shaping policies in higher education.
In order to understand the effect of the concept of
"legalism" as it exists today, the researcher studied the
historical development of the law of contract. This in-
vestigation assisted the researcher in understanding the
how and why of the "legalism" of today's society and its
educational movements in the courts.
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Historically
, English law (which came aboard the
first English ships to reach the American coast in 1606)
was the cornerstone of American jurisprudence. English
law was not
, however, implemented per se in America.
Historical differences in the founding of the colonies af-
fected the law.
In Massachusetts, and the other colonies, where the
Puritans dominated the political structure, the role of
the church in politics took precedence. So too in the
crown colonies the law was not the same as law in the states
that began as proprietary colonies. The common law tra-
dition was one of the significant factors in the resentment
and alienation that led to the breach with England. The
Anglo-American system of law attempts to achieve flexi-
bility by using precedents that arise from changing con-
ditions in society, thereby following the old adage that the
law should be a guidepost not a hitching post. Our system
of law makes provisions for dealing with problems as they
arise. One of its greatest advantages is that by examining
the principles that are derived from past experience, one
can foresee with considerable accuracy the places where
difficulties are likely to occur.
Operational guidelines are set forth by the Constitu-
tion for educators both substantively and procedurally
.
Substantively, the Constitution has provided for the adoption
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of effective, valid rules and regulations. Procedurally
,
it has handled disciplinary actions concerning faculty,
employees and students. Case law has repeatedly demon-
strated that procedural problems would not have come before
the court if more attention had been paid to the substantive
law.
Landmark Cases
One of the major cases contributing to the develop-
ment of the American common law system in the Supreme
Court was the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward
(1819): The Sanctity of Contracts
. Through this case,
the basic concepts of contract law contributed to bringing
the American system of the law to life. 24
In 1974 members of the American Bar Association were
invited by the West Publishing Company to vote on what
they as individuals believed to be the major milestone cases
in the first two hundred years of law in the United States.
The purpose of the survey vote was to organize the major
identified cases into a commemorative text in celebration
of the United States Bicentennial and the one hundredth
year of the West Publishing Company as a law book publisher.
The eighteen cases which received the highest number of votes
24Trustees of Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton 518 (1819) .
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in the balloting were compiled into the commemorative
volume
.
25
What is significant to this study is the fact
that the Dartmouth College case, a contract case, ranked
eighth in importance by rank order in the national poll.
The Dartmouth College case in 1819 set the stage for the
development of the private corporation.
A series of early nineteenth century cases decided
the g-aPctltY ...° f Contracts . Nine years before the Dartmouth
College case in 1810, Fletcher y. Peck held the inviola-
bility of contracts. In this decision, the Supreme Court
held that the original grant of land was a contract. The
purchasers, in good faith, were entitled to keep what they
paid for. Fletcher v. Peck is a significant case not only
for contract law but it was the first time that a court
struck down a state law as being unconstitutional.^^
Facts
:
Fletcher conveyed land to Peck. The deed
contained a covenant that the title had not been
impaired by any later act of Georgia.
In a suit on the covenant, it was alleged that,
because of undue means practiced on members of the
legislature which made the grant, a subsequent
legislature had passed another statute which annulled
and rescinded the Act by which the original grant had
been made, and reasserting title to the land on behalf
of the State. Defendant pleaded that he and all the
intermediate holders after the first grantors were
purchasers without notice. Judgment was given for the
Defendant
.
25
Ibid., Liberman.
^Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810).
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Stat^
Se
h°T^Wi^hin the Constitution
, ,
u e ates w ich declares that no stateshall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto lawor laws in pairing the obligation of contract?
Decision ; Yes.
Reasoning
: (1) a contract is a promise between twoor more parties, and it is either executory or executedAn executory contract is one in which a party bi^ds
under ^which^t-h
3 partlcular thing. This was the lawch t e conveyance was made by the governor.A contract executed is one in which the object of acontract is performed. Blackstone says this differsin nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgiaand the purchasers was executed by the grant. An
executed contract, as well as one which is executory,
contains obligations binding on the parties. A grantm its own nature amounts to an extinguishment of the
right of the grantor. It implies a contract not to
reassert that right. A party is, therefore, always
estopped by his own grant. (2) A grant is an executed
contract, the obligation of which continues. Since
the constitution used the general term contract,
without distinguishing between those which are executing
and those which are executed, it must be construed to
comprehend the latter as well as the former. A law
which annuls conveyances between individuals, and
declares that the grantors should stand of their
former estates, notwithstanding those grants, would
be as repugnant to the Constitution as a law dis-
charging the vendors of property from the obligation of
executing their contracts by conveyances. It would be
strange if a contract to convey was secured by the
Constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained
unprotected. (3) The estate having passed into the
hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, with-
out notice, the State of Georgia was restrained, either
by general principles which are common to our free
institutions, or by the particular provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, from passing a law
whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises
purchased could be constitutionally and legally im-
paired and rendered null and void.
In 1812, the second Supreme Court contract case was
New Jersey v. Wilson . In this case, Chief Justice Marshall
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voided a state tax on the land as an impairment of the
new owner's contract right. 27
Facts : Under an arrangement embodied in an Act of
the New Jersey Colonial Legislature in 1758, for the
settlement of claims by a tribe of Delaware Indians,
it was agreed that certain lands shall not hereafter
be subject to any tax. An Act of the New Jersey State
Legislature repealed the exemption in 1804. Taxes
were levied on the lands.
Issue : (1) Did a contract exist?
(2) If a contract existed, is it violated by
the Act of 1804?
Decision : (1) Yes.
(2) No. Act of 1804 is invalid as a viola-
tion of the contract clause.
Reasoning : All requisites to the formation of a con-
tract are found in the proceedings between the then
colony of New Jersey and the Indians. The subject was
a purchase on the part of the government of extensive
claims of the Indians, the extinguishment of which
would quiet the title to a large portion of the
province. A proposition to this effect is made, the
terms stipulated, the consideration agreed upon (which
is a tract of land with the privilege of exemption
from taxation) ; and then in consideration of the
arrangement previously made, one of which this Act of
Assembly is stated to be, the Indians execute their
deed of cession. This is a contract clothed in forms
of unusual solemnity.
The Dartmouth College case in 1819 set the stage for
2 8
the development of the private corporation.
Facts: By a royal charter issued in 1769, corporate
powers and privileges were granted to the ''Trustees
of Dartmouth College," authorizing the trustees to fill
all vacancies in their own body. By a statute of 1816,
the State of New Hampshire undertook to increase the
27New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (1812)
.
^Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
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of this act
, and brought thirLt^r^orde? ?o°re-10nS
of^he^ COrp°rate seal and other articles and recordsf the corporation which were in the possession ofpersons holding under the Act of 1816. A special
valid?h
f
°f S® defendant was conditioned upon they o the Act of 1816. On this verdict the
Defendant?
Urt ° f Hampshire 9ave judgments ' for the
I ssues ; (1) Is this contract protected by thetion of the United States?
(2) Is it impaired by the acts underDefendants hold?
Constitu-
which the
Decision ; (1) Yes.
(2) No. Judgment for Plaintiff.
Reasoning ; (1) This is a contract to which the donors,the trustees, and the crown (to whose rights and obliga-tions New Hampshire succeeds) were original parties.
It is a contract made on valuable consideration. It is
a contract for the security and disposition of property.
It is a contract on the faith of which a real and per-
sonal estate has been conveyed to the corporation. It
is then a contract within the letter of the Constitu-
tion, and within its spirit also, unless the facts that
the property is invested by the donors in trustee, for
the promotion of religion and education, for the
benefit of persons who are perpetually changing, though
the object remains the same, shall create a particular
exemption which takes this case out of the prohibition
contained in the Constitution. (2) Although a particular
and a rare case may not, in itself, be of sufficient
magnitude to induce a rule, yet it must be governed by
the rules, when established, unless some plain and
strong reason for excluding it can be given. It is not
enough to say that this particular case was not in the
mind of the Convention when the Article was framed, nor
of the American people when it was adopted. It is
necessary to go further, and to say that had this par-
ticular case been suggested, the language would have
been varied as to exclude it, or it would have been made
a special exception. The case, being within the words
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of the rule, must be within its operation likewise,
unless there be something in the literal construction
so obviously absurd or mischievous, or repugnant tothe general spirit of the instrument, as to justify
those who expound the Constitution in making it an
exception. (3) The crown was bound by this contract
and could have made no violent alteration in its
essential
. terms
,
without impairing its obligation.
(4) In this case, the will of the State is substituted
for the will of the donors, in every essential opera-
tion of the college. This is not an immaterial change.
The founders of the college contracted not merely for
the perpetual application of the funds which they
gave to the object for which those funds were given,
they also contracted to secure that application by
the Constitution of the corporation. They contracted
for a system which should retain forever the govern-
ment of the literary institution they had formed in
the hands of persons approved by themselves. This
system is totally changed. The Charter of 1769 exists
no longer. It is reorganized, and reorganized in such
a manner as to convert a literary institution, molded
according to the will of its founders, and under the
control of private literary men, into a machine entire-
ly subservient to the will of government. This may be
for the advantage of literature in general. It is not
according to the will of the donors, and is subversive
of that contract on the faith of which their property
was given.
The year 1819 saw three cases of constitutional signi-
ficance. Sturges v. Crowinshield held that a state bankrupt-
cy law that discharged debtors who had contracted their debts
before the law was passed was an unconstitutional impairment
,
.
29
of the contract between the debtor and the creditor
.
Facts: Plaintiff is a payee on two promissory notes.
Defendant
,
who is maker of the notes, pleaded that he
was discharged of his obligation under a New York bank-
ruptcy statute which was enacted after the notes were
made. Plaintiff contends: (1) that New York had no
power to pass bankruptcy laws; and (2) this New York
statute impairs the obligation of control.
^Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheaton 122 (1819).
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Issue : is the statute invalid as applied to contractin existence when it was passed?
s
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the
opinion of the court said:
What is the obligation of a contract? And
what will impair it?
. . . The law binds him to
perform his undertaking, and this is, of course,
the obligation of his contract. In the case at
bar, the defendant has given his promissory note
to pay the plaintiff a sum of money on or before
a certain day. The contract binds him to pay
that sum on that day, and this is its obligation.
Any law which releases a part of this obligation
must, in the literal sense of the word, impair
it. Much more must a law impair it which makes
it totally invalid, and entirely discharges
it . . . The plain and simple declaration, that
no State shall pass any law impairing the ob-
ligation of contracts, include insolvent laws
and all other laws, so far as they infringe the
principle (the inviolability of contracts) the
Convention intended to hold sacred, and no
farther . . . the distinction between the obliga-
tion of a contract, and the remedy given by the
legislature to enforce that obligation, has been
taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of
things. Without impairing the obligation of the
contract, the remedy may be certainly modified
as the wisdom of the nation may direct.
Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment
for not performing his contract, or may be allowed
as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the
State may refuse to inflict this punishment, or
may withhold this means, and leave the contract
in full force. Imprisonment in no part of the
contract, and simply to release the prisoner does
not impair its obligations.
McCulloch v. Maryland declared the power and supremacy
of the federal government at a time in which the historical
question was : What was the extent to which our federal
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government could act and dominate the states? 30 America
at this time was divided into two camps: (1) Supporters
of a political group that supported the adoption by the
state of the Constitution; and (2) supporters of a political
group that favored a state in which there was a government
of the people.
An aotion in debt by the Defendant in error
Facts
:
-r—
r- —
‘-'i '-“c uci a m:
under"an Act of r*"*
° f th® United States, established
Congress, was doing business in Mary-land, without the authority of the state. McCulloch
c
J
shler
.
in the bank. He issued notes on behalfof the bank without complying with the requirements
of a Maryland statute which governed the issuing of
notes, fees for same and penalties if fees not paid.
Issues: (1) Does Congress have the Constitutional
power to incorporate the Bank of the United States?
(2) May the bank and its branches claim to be exempt
rom the ordinary and equal taxation of assessed
property of the states in which they are located?
Decision : (1) Yes.
(2) Yes.
Reasoning : (1) In addressing the issue, does Congress
have the Constitutional power to incorporate the Bank
of the United States, the court indicated that the
conflicting powers of the general and state governments
must be brought to light and their respective supremacy,
when they are in opposition, must be settled. It then
declared the power and supremacy of the federal govern-
ment :
If any one proposition could command the universal
assent of mankind, we might expect that it would be
this—that the government of the Union, though limited
in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.
This would seem to result necessarily from its nature.
It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by
all; it represents all; and acts for all. Though any
one state may be willing to control its operations, no
30McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
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state is willing to allow others to control them.
The nation, in those subjects on which it can act,
must necessarily bind its component parts. But
this question is not left to mere reason: the people
have, in express terms
,
decided it by saying, 'this
Constitution,' and the laws of the United States,
which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the
supreme law of the land, and by requiring that members
of the state legialture, and offices of the executive
and judicial department of the state shall take the
oath of fidelity to it.
The government of the United States, then, though
limited in its powers, is supreme, and its laws, when
made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the
supreme law of the land, and 'anything in the Constitu-
tion or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. '
The court continued its reasoning and concluded by
saying: 'The act to incorporate the Bank of the United
States is a law made in pursuance of the Constitution,
and is a part of the supreme law of the land.
'
(2) Using the basic premise that the Constitution, and
the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme, the
court held that 'The states have no power by taxation
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any
manner control, the operations of the Constitutional
laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the general government. This is, we
think, the unavoidable consequences of that supremacy
which the Constitution has declared.
'
Two out of three of these landmark cases, at a time
in which the power and supremacy of the federal court was
being tested, were contract cases.
The Dartmouth College case rested on the proposition
that once a state gives a specific power to a private party,
it cannot change its mind later. The Dartmouth College case
still has validity today for Dartmouth College. It held that
the grant of the corporate right was a contract. This
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corporate grant was held to be property, and property,
the court said, cannot be taken away from the rightful
owner
.
^
From the Dartmouth College case on, the bulk of the
Supreme Court decisions which involve the law of contract
are relevant to the issue of the limitation under the
"contract clause" upon actions by state legislatures in
respect to pre-existing contracts.
With the advent of the "due process" provisions
of the Constitution, issues also arose involving the "due
process" clause in the economic field. Gelpcke v. City of
Dubuque
,
in 1863, applied the contract clause to retro-
32active decisions of the courts. However, despite this
declaration and others, the contract clause does not apply
to retroactive decisions by the courts.
Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan (1924) held that:
It has been settled by a long line of decision
that the provisions of Section 10, Article 1, of
the Federal Constitution, protecting the obligation
of contracts against state action is directed only
against impairment by legislation and not by judgments
of courts.
The 1926 decision in Appleby v. City of New York
clearly demonstrates the court's delineation of the law of
3
1
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
"^Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall 175 (1863)
.
33Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263, U.S. 444 (1924).
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contract in approaching the Constitutional issue.
questions we have to determine are, first
cnn=£
her
i-
a oontract
’ second, what was its proper"construction, and thirdly, was its obligations imnair-
court’
3 quent le9islation as enforced by the state
' 34
In 1935, the Supreme Court treated the national fiscal
power as it had treated the state regulatory power by read-
ing a reservation of power into private contracts.
Contracts, however, expressed cannot fetter theConstitutional authority of the Congress. Contracts
may create rights of property, but when contractsdeal with a subject matter which lies within the
control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity.
Parties cannot remove their transactions from the
reach of dominant constitutional power by making
contracts about them
>35
The finality of state court decrees was the basic issue
in the Irving Trust Co. v. Day (1942) . In this decision,
the Supreme Court held:
When this court is asked to invalidate a state
statute on the grounds that it impairs the obligation
of a contract, the existence of the contract and the
nature and the extent of its obligation become federal
questions for the purposes of determining whether they
are within the scope and meaning of the Federal
Constitution, and for such purposes finality cannot
be accorded to the review of the state court. ,,
J b
This decision, as do others, reiterates the fact that
the scope of the review under the contract clause is broad.
^Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1924).
35
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240
(1935)
.
"^Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942).
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Although the Constitution contains no express
provision limiting the federal government's power to im-
pair contractural obligations, the concept of "due pro-
cess" contained in the 5th Admendment is flexible enough
to provide such protection, as in the protection against
the taking of property without just compensation contained
in the 5th Amendment.
In 1978, legal literature relative to the law of
contract may be divided into three categories: (1) primary
sources; (2) search books/finding tools; and (3) secondary
materials
.
Primary sources of the law, by definition, are those
recorded rules of human behavior which will be enforced by
the state. They include: (1) statutes passed by the
legislature; (2) decisions of the courts; (3) decrees and
orders of executives; and (4) rules and regulations of
administrative bodies. Federal and state statutes and
appellate court decisions are the most important primary
authorities. The primary sources of the law relevant to
this study range in time from the first enactment of our
law making bodies to the most recent decisions, statutes,
and rulings. A current decision may be based on a precedent
many generations old.
The Massachusetts General Laws and the Massachusetts
Decisions served as the primary sources of the law for this
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study. They are the keystone for the information and
edify the methodology.
Seminal Works
The investigator has made reference to Simpson and
Alperin, Summary of Basic Law
. 2d ed., vol. 14, of the
Massachusetts Practice Series. Dean Frank L. Simpson has
been an outstanding researcher in Massachusetts law. His
studies contribute directly to the substance and form of
this research. The Restatement of the Law of Contract,
Second
,
was utilized by the researcher. The Restatement is
a secondary source of legal information. This work lacks
legal authority in the legal sense but has a persuasive
influence in the law making process, as it has been prepared
and published during the last thirty years under the
auspices of the American Law Institute. The Restatement
,
Second
,
contributes to the substance and form of this study.
Summary
An implicit hypothesis underlies this research
undertaking, namely, that faculty and administrative person-
nel in public higher education need to know basic concepts
of the law (on a quasi-legal basis)
,
but the majority of
them have not had formal educational preparation in the
field of law. The scope of the study was delimited to the
knowledge of basic concepts of one field of law, i.e., the
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law of contracts. A comprehensive study of the litera-
ture and research projects indicates that this problem
has been only treated peripherally. Only fifteen research
projects which involve the law of contract existed at the
time of the undertaking of this study. There was only one
indirectly related project. The researcher found no evidence
the substantive law of contract has been researched.
What, from a research point of view, is interesting
to note is that issues of due process, tenure, grievance
procedures in higher education, and collective bargaining
the other topics researched to date. These comprise
a focus on the procedural aspects of the law rather than
the substantive. The inherent core of the procedural issue
is the substantive right which has not been adequately
researched. Van Alstyne has indicated that the protection
and implementation of the substantive law in education will
cut down on the recourse of educators to the procedural
37
aspects of the law. Recourse to the procedure (i.e.,
litigation) involves monetary and psychological costs that
public higher education can ill afford. Ergo, the focus
of this research is on the substantive aspects of the law
of contract, particularly with a view to determining the
comparative frequency of litigations emanating from the
substantive law of contract. The findings of such analysis
37
Ibid., Van Alstyne.
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inform the quasi-legal training of higher education
personnel
.
CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Faculty, and in many instances, administrative per-
sonnel, have secured their employment and maintained their
status under the individual employment contracts which in
P^klic higher education led traditionally to the statutorily
based tenure system. Academic tenure has been challenged
for various reasons since its inception in 1915. It was in
this year that the American Association of University Pro-
fessors was formed to protect the academic community from
unfair and arbitrary practices. During its first year, the
committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American
Association of University Professors was involved with
eleven cases of alleged infringement of academic freedom.
This traditional academic value (tenure) is still under
attack. The intensity of the attack has increased with
every year of its existence.
Two major responses appear to be arising in response to
the attack on tenure. These responses tend to be inherent
in rejoinder to the changing roles and relationships in
higher education, namely: (1) faculty unionization and
(2) substitution of term contracts for tenure commitments.
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Irrespective of the alternative accepted, it is necessary
for faculty and administrative personnel in public higher
education to have a quasi-legal knowledge of the basic con-
cepts of the law of contract in order to know their respec-
tive rights and responsibilities. Employment for faculty
and the academic freedom so valued by education will
inevitably continue to be in terms of a contract, be it
individual or collective.
Institutions of public higher education cannot function
effectively and safely without employees having a working
knowledge of the law of contract or the legal structure of
their employer. While professional legal counsel is avail-
able to institutions to oversee the legal aspects of major
operational functions, there is often no such provision for
avoiding or resolving minor disputes, which may be equated
to hidden cancerous lesions that will cripple and can ulti-
mately kill an institution.
Legal reporting systems have developed over the past
decade to publish up-to-date volumes of legal decisions.
These reporting services cover all aspects of the law from
basic civil law to taxation. While information is voluminous,
it is not readily accessible to faculty or administrative
personnel with reference to a single specific topic, issue,
or area of the law, not to mention a specific jurisdiction.
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More significantly, little information is available as to
how the law relates to the operation of institutions of
public higher education and the contractual rights of admin-
istrators, faculty, and students within these institutions.
Preliminary investigation suggested that this informa-
tion voids—or more precisely, the inaccessibility of legal
information to laymen— is a root cause of the mounting inci-
dence of unnecessary litigation in higher education, with a
consequent toll in monetary and human cost. Acting on the
premise that quasi-legal education of professionals in higher
education is the most practicable intervention for the reduc-
tion of litigation, the researcher has undertaken a twofold
investigation: first, to determine what aspects of the law
of contract should be the focus of a program of quasi-legal
education; second, to identify basic concepts of the law of
contract
.
Procedures Used
Once the researcher identified the goal and, subse-
quently, the purpose of this investigation, she explicitly
defined the following objectives:
(1) to use current case law to present information
on the ramification of contract law in the
field of education;
(2) to trace the sources of the common law which
form the basis of the law of contract in the
Commonwealth;
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(3) to report the statutory provisions of the
Massachusetts law which relate to Higher
Education in the Commonwealth and the con-tractual powers of its constituents, and
(4) to identify concepts from the law of contract
as established by statutory and case law in
the Commonwealth.
The overall approach the researcher decided upon to
meet the established objectives is the utilization of con-
scious testimony (primary sources of the law) as the research
dfita . Thus, school law research was the methodology of
choice
.
The rationale for this approach for the procedures to
be used in collecting and treating the data is based on the
fact that school law research is an application of the his-
torical research methodology. The interpretation of legal
problems involves an expertise that few graduate students in
3 8
education possess. The researcher's legal and educational
background gave her the required expertise for this type of
research
.
The means and modes of action to meet the established
objectives were:
(1) to thoroughly review and analyze the research
in higher education in relation to the law of
contract to date;
(2) to review and analyze literature in higher edu-
cation in relation to the need for this study;
38 Ibid., Best, p. 111.
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(3) to research the case law in relation to:
a. the historical development of the law of
contract
,
b. constitutional law as it affects the law
of contract,
c. cases specifically relating to issues in
higher education;
(4) to research the Massachusetts General Laws in
relation to higher education and contract
powers and analyze same;
(5) to research and analyze 100 cases in higher
education which involve issues in the area of
the law of contract;
(6) to synthesize concepts from the law of contract
integrating the statutory powers in higher
education;
(7) to organize data from #6 above for faculty
and administrative personnel in public higher
education
.
Data Sources
Sources of data for the purpose of this research are
the "conscious testimony" or the primary sources of the law.
Primary sources of the law may be defined as those recorded
rules of human behavior which will be enforced by the state.
Primary sources of the law include: (1) the Constitution of
the United States; (2) statutes passed by the legislature;
(3) decisions of the courts; (4) executive orders and direc-
tives; (5) treatise; and (6) rules and regulations of admin-
istrative bodies. Within the primary sources of the law,
the federal and state statutes and appellate court decisions
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are the more important authorities of the law.
American law has a number of characteristics which
should be recognized for its research significance. The
law is:
(1) subject to constant change through new
decisions (approximately 30,000 a year) and
new statutes (approximately 10,000 a year)
which require regular and prompt supplemen-
tation and updating;
(2) marked by a search for certainty and stability;
(3) derived from many governmental agencies
(judicial, legislative, and executive) and
from a variety of jurisdictions (federal,
state, county, and local)
;
(4) composed of different components, i.e., relative
authority (binding, persuasive or no legal
force)
.
The primary sources of the law relevant to any problem may
range from the first enactment of our law-making bodies to
the most recent decisions, statutes, and rulings. Thus, the
law may vary greatly in its range in time. A current deci-
sion may be based on a precedent which is many generations
old (this precedent is repeatedly demonstrated in Chapter II)
.
The primary sources of the law retain their legal effect
until they are expressly overruled or repealed. Thus, in
Chapter II, the sources of data for this study are focused
on the constitutional law as it affects the law of contract
and case and statutory law as primary data bases.
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One hundred cases in higher education in which legal
issues relate directly to the law of contract are analyzed
(see Chapter IV) to: (1) determine the most frequently
litigated areas of contract law, thereby identifying primary
domains of needed quasi-legal training for the education
profession; and (2) demonstrate the application of the law
of contract to facts of the case. These cases, as previously
indicated, uphold the common law precedent and demonstrate
the concept that the primary sources of our law-making bodies
relate to the most recent decisions, statutes, and rulings.
The legal reasoning and basic legal concepts set forth in the
three nineteenth century cases are commensurate with those
of the present court's decisions in the seventy-eighth year
of the twentieth century.
The body of the study (Chapter IV) uses as the primary
source of data the Massachusetts General Laws, the Restatement
of the Law of Contract
,
and the case law.
Method of Gathering Data
The methodology in relation to the review of the litera-
ture requires little comment, since it is synthesized in
Chapter II. Though the review of the literature is delimited
to the law of contract, the methodology utilized demonstrates
that the literature of the American law is rich and varied and
has a distinguished human story.
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The primary sources of the law contain the rules of
human behavior by which society is governed. The legal
literature, as demonstrated in Chapter II, reflects the
continual struggle for justice and order which is a part of
the cultural heritage of men.
Diverse finding tools have been used by the author in
researching the body of the law involved in this study.
They are: (1) Digests of Decisions ; (2) Advance Sheets ;
(3) Shepard's Citations : (4) Black's Law Dictionary ;
(5) Massachusetts General Laws and Massachusetts Laws,
Annotated ; (6) Restatement of the Law of Contract ; (7) Phrase
Books ; (8) Looseleaf Services ( U.S. Law Week and Supreme
Court Bulletin ) ; and (9) Indexes .
The process employed was an analysis of basic contract
case law and a synthesis of it from the referenced cases.
The data reported in Chapter IV are a triparte presentation:
(1) briefing of 100 cases in higher education, and an analy-
sis of them in relation to the area of the law of contract
which is in issue; (2) citations of the Massachusetts General
Laws which relate to the study; and (3) basic concepts of
the law of contract.
CHAPTER I V
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
Introduction
The body of this chapter is a triparte presenta-
tion. (1) briefing of 100 cases in higher education in-
volving contract issues, and an analysis of them in re-
lation to the area of the law of contract which is in
issue to provide the data bases for determining the most
frequently litigated areas of contract law, thereby identi-
fying primary domains of needed quasi-legal training for
the education profession; (2) citations of the Massachu-
setts General Laws which relate to the study; and (3)
basic concepts of the law of contract.
Higher Education
The researcher investigated current litigation in
the field of higher education which involved the law of
contract. Word and phrases: (1) Colleges and Universities
and (2) Contracts were cross-referenced. During this
process, 100 cases were selected. The investigation was
further restricted to cases decided in the 1966-1977
period. One hundred sampled cases involving the law of
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contract and public higher education were analyzed to
provide the data base for determinining the most frequently
litigated areas of the law of contract, thereby identifying
primary domains of needed quasi-legal training for the
education profession. There was no logical way to justify
inferences other than to brief selected cases sufficient
in number to be a representative sample. These cases
demonstrated typical contract litigation and served as a
means of measuring different elements of contract law.
The analysis of the 100 cases in higher education
which relate to higher education and the law of contract
further confirms the need for this study, as well as
demonstrating the application of the concepts of the law
and contract to the facts in issue. These cases are cate-
gorized according to emanation of issues: (1) student,
(2) faculty, and (3) institution. These cases include de-
cisions from both the state and federal courts. State
court decisions are primarily those from the appellate
court which is usually termed the supreme court of the
state. Since the supreme or appellate court is the highest
court of the state, its decision carries more weight as
precedent value. The delivery system of public higher
education is an agency of state government, and therefore,
must guarantee students their rights under the Constitution
of the United States. In litigations involving higher
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education, three Constitutional Amendments and three
Federal Acts have been most frequently used by students
and faculty. They are as follows:
Constitutional Amendments
Amendment. Congress shall make no law re-spectrng an establishment of religion, or pro-hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging thereedom of speech, or of the press; or the rightof the people peaceably to assemble, and to petitionthe Government for a redress of grievances.
Fourth Amendment. The right of the people to besecure m their person, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-tion, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Fourteenth Amendment
. All persons born or naturalizedin the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of theState wherein they reside. No State shall make or
eniorce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without the process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Federal Acts
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C.A. 1983) . Every
person who, under cover of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, or any State or
Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
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Education Amendments Act of 1 972-
of Sex Discrimination^ “ Title IX Prohibition
|g-ctl°n 901; (a) No person in the United States shall
b
from Participation in, be denied the
anv Pdnr^
f
' °r be sub
^ ected to discrimination undery e ucation program or activity receiving Federalfinancial assistance ... y
Educational Amendments of 1974 (20 USC 821)
--TheEducational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.
Family
Section 438 (a) (1) No funds shall be made available
under any applicable program to any state or local
educational agency, any institution of higher educa-tion, any community college, any school, agency
offering a preschool program, or any other educationalinstitution which has a policy of denying, or which
effectively prevents, the parents of students attending
any school of such agency, or attending such institu-
tions of higher education, community college, school,
pre-school, or other educational institution, the
to inspect and review any and all official
records, files and data directly related to their
children, including all material that is incorporated
into each student's cumulative folder, and intended
for school use or to be available to parties outside
the school or school system and specifically inclu-
ding, but not necessarily limited to, identifying
data, academic work completed, level of achievement
(grades, standardized achievement tests scores) at-
tendance data, scores on standardized intelligence
aptitude, and psychological tests, interest inventory
results, health data, family background information,
teacher or counselor rating and observations and
verified reports of serious or recurrent behavioral
patterns Each recipient shall establish ap-
propriate procedures for the granting of a request
by parents for access to their child's records within
a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than
forty-five days after the request has been made.
The Rehabilitation Act of 197 3--Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Handicap
Section 504: No otherwise handicapped individual in
the United States, as defined in Section 7(6), shall
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
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participation in, be denied the benefits of, orbe subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal assistance.
The Federal Court System
The federal courts include the District Courts,
which are the main courts of original jurisdiction, the
Courts of Appeals, to which cases are appealed from the
District courts
,
special courts as the Custom Court and
the Court of Claims and the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court is the highest court in the
land
.
Jurisdiction of the court varies according to the
court. A decision of the United States District Court ap-
plies only to that district. A decision of the United
States Supreme Court applies to the nation. The Judicial
Circuits are as follows:
First : Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico,
Rhode Island
Second : Connecticut, New York, Vermont
Third : Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virgin
Islands
Fourth: Maryland, North Carolina South Carolina,
Virginia, West Virginia
Fifth : Alabama, Canal Zone, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi
Sixth: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee
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Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Guam,
Hawaii, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon,
Washington
Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas,
Utah, Wyoming
The District of Columbia is a separate Judicial
Circuit.
Case Analysis
One hundred cases are presented by related areas in
higher education to show the application of the law of
contract to the issues in question.
Student Related
Various issues relative to the law of contract as
applicable to students in higher education have been litiga
39ted since the nineteenth century in the United States.
Though this research is limited to the 1966-1977 period,
respectively, the researcher points out the Middlebury
3 9
In the student, faculty and institution related
categories, one 19th century case is briefed in each area
to indicate that issues relative to the law of contract
have been litigated well over a century in Higher Education
Seventh :
Eighth :
Ninth :
Tenth
:
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College v. Chandler case which in 1844
case in higher education. 40
was a contract
Defendant was sent to plaintiff collegewhen a minor by his father. Defendant's fathersupported him as well as communicated with thecollege s president during his first year at the
vear
e
It‘thp
efe
^
ant ' S father died durin<? his secondy a e college. He was supported by funds
allow
h
+-hp>
f Sr
^
S eState * The college continued tot e defendant to matriculate and now suesfor accounts due.
Isjsue: Were the items charged in the plaintiff's
account actually furnished upon the defendant'simplied contract to pay?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The court used the legal premises of thelegal right of a minor to bind himself for necessaries
in this case. It held:
An infant may bind himself for necessaries.
And the reason assigned was, that without this
power he might be exposed to perish or want.
But though this was the alleged ground on
which the infant's obligation was placed, yet
the law has never limited its definition of the
term necessaries to those things which are
strictly essential to the support of life,
as food, clothing, and medicine in sickness.
The practical meaning of the term has always
been in some measure relative, having re-
ferences as well to what may be called the
conventional necessities of others in the same
walks of life with the infant, as to his own
pecuniary condition and other circumstances.
Hence, a good common school education, at the
least, is now fully recognized as one of the
necessaries for an infant.
The court then reasoned to the need of an infant for
higher education and held:
4 0Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vermont 686
(1844) .
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Now it does not appear that extraneous
circumstances existed in the defendant's
case, such as wealth or station in society,
or that he exhibited peculiar indications ofgenius or talent, which education for him
more than for the generality of youth in
community. And we, therefore, consider that
such an education should not be ranked amongthose necessities, for which he could, as aninfant, render himself absolutely liable by
contract.
The contractual theory is the most prevalent and
readily accepted relationship which is held to exist be-
tween the student and the institution. This theory holds
that the student agrees to abide by the rules and regula-
tions, and standards established and published by the
institution. In return, the institutions will offer a
degree to those who met the established standards. In
Green v. Howard University
,
the court held that statements
in a catalog of a private institution constitute a contract
and, therefore, relieves the institutions of affording
students with "due process," specifically notice and hear-
41
mg.
Facts : Howard University was a private institution,
party supported by federal funds. In its catalog,
Howard University stated that the University reserved
the right to deny admission to and to require with-
drawal of any student at any time for any reason
deemed sufficient to the University. Students con-
ceded this right to the University.
When the head of the Selective Service System of
the United States was invited to speak at the Univer-
sity, students caused a disturbance. The students
who participated in the disturbance were sent formal
41Green v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (1967)
.
67
letters informing them that they would not bepermitted to return to the University for the
subsequent academic year. The University acted
without giving the students the opportunity of
notice and hearing.
Issue ; Do statements in a private university catalogconstitute a contract which therefore relieves theinstitution of the need to afford students with "dueprocess," specifically notice and hearing?
Decision : Yes
.
Reasoning : The procedural safeguards and the privileges
accorded by the Constitution of the United States are
confined to judicial and quasi— judicial proceedings
whether in the court or before administrative agen-
cies. These safeguards are directed solely
against governmental action,
Jones v, Vassar College
,
in 1969, upheld the right of
the private college to govern itself in any manner it may
choose so long as there is an absence of arbitrary or
capricious action. In this case, the court held that a
drastic change in the rules and regulations by a private
college did not constitute a breach of an implied contract
42
with a student or his parents.
Facts : Students at Vassar College, through their
elected representatives, had the responsibility for
enacting and enforcing undergraduate social regula-
tions. This responsibility was derived from the
Constitution of the Vassar College Student Government
Association. The Student Government enacted new rules
which allowed the female students who lived in each
corridor of the residential halls to decide whether
or not they wished limitations to be placed on the
hours during which they might entertain male guests
in their rooms. The president of Vassar College had
the power to veto. He did not exercise it over this
student enacted legislation. He therefore gave ap-
proval to the change in these rules and regulations.
42Jones v. Vassar College, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 243 (1969).
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Th0 plaintiff is the mother
students who claims that the
s breach of implied contract
of one of the female
new rules constituted
D°es a ?«tic change in a private college'ssocial rules and regulations constitute a breach ofan implied contract with the student or his parents?
Decision: No.
Reasoning : Private colleges and universities aregoverned on the principle of academic self regulation
which is free from judicial restraints. Mere specu-lations as to the projected hypothetical consequences
of conduct complained of is insufficient for judicialinterference
.
Krawez v. Stans was a case involving Midshipmen at the
Merchant Marine Academy. 43 It held that an offer made by
authorized agents of a public institution of higher edu-
cation, and the acceptance of that offer by students,
constitutes a binding contract between the institution and
the students. (Re: Chapter 1 for Case Brief.) This case
clearly pointed out that there is and can be contracted
relationships between public institutions and students.
The receipt of state funds by a private institution
of higher education from a contract with the state calling
for the operation of various programs or courses of study
does not involve that institution in a "state action" sub-
ject to the provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act was
44
the decision in Powe v. Miles.
43Krawez v. Stans, 306 F, Supp. 1230 (1969).
44
Powe v. Miles, 407 2d 73 (1968).
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Facts: Alfred University in New York is a privateinstitution. Alfred University students held ademonstration during an R.O.T.C. drill ceremony
which caused disruption and alteration of the
ceremony. The demonstrators were suspended for
one semester following "due process" procedures as
established by Alfred University. The students now
sue seeking relief in court. They allege that the
Ceramics College operated by the university under
a contract with New York State was sufficient to
make the university an instrument of the state for
the purpose of the Federal Civil Rights Act.
Issue ; Does the receipt of state funds by a private
institution form a contract with the state which calls
for the operation of a College of Ceramics involve
the institution in a "state action" subject to the
provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act?
Decision : The court held no with the exception of
the College of Ceramics.
Reasoning : There is no evidence of the slightest
contract between the State of New York and the
specific action taken against the students. If state
financial aid alone were the test, construction and
many other enterprises with extensive contracts with
the state would be charged with 'state action.' The
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court but with the
exception of the College of Ceramics. It reasoned:
The very name New York State College of Ceramics at
Alfred University identifies the college as a state
institution. Thus, students enrolled in the College
of Ceramics can regard themselves as receiving public
education and are entitled to be treated by those in
charge in the same way as their counterparts in other
portions of the state university. Therefore, action
against students in the College of Ceramics constitutes
state action.
A medical student sued the University of Miami and
raised the issue: can a private college or university
specify the terms under which it will graduate students? In
the University of Miami v. Militana , the courts held in the
affirmative in regard to this issue by stipulating that
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promotion from one class to another is clearly within the
discretion of the faculty’s promotion committee. 45 it
further held that the terms and conditions for graduation
are offered by the publication of the college at the times
of the enrollment of the students. These terms and condi-
tions have some of the characteristics of a contract.
Facts ; A University of Miami medical student was
promoted to the fourth year of study on probation,
subject to a satisfactory work and re-examination
in two subject areas. The student was dismissed for
academic failure as he did not complete work in one
of the subject areas. Conditions for promotions were
outlined in the university's catalog. The student
sues to require the university to promote him. The
student won in the lower court and the university now
appeals the judgment.
Issue : May a private college or university determine
the terms under which it will graduate a student?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : The court held that the terms and conditions
for graduation are spelled out by the publications of
the college at the time of enrollment and have some
of the characteristics of a contract. It said:
'
. .
.
promotion from one class to another is clearly
within the discretion of the faculty (Promotions
Committee) .
'
An interesting application of contract law was made
4 6
in Healy v. Larson . This case has relevance to all
Student Service Departments of institutions of higher educa-
tion.
4
^University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d
701 (1966).
46Healy v. Larson, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 625 (1971).
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A prospective student consulted with the
i vri/ii- /-» •«. Tl t •
Facts:
_
Dean, Director of Admissions, Acting President?Guidance Counselor and Chairman of the Mathematics
epartment about his proposed course of study, prior
° hl
f
enrollment in Schenectady Community College.When the student applied for graduation, he was deniedclearance as he had failed to take the proper
credits within the area of concentration leading tohis degree. He claimed that he had completed all
of the courses which he was advised to take.
May a student be denied his degree becauseIssue
:
he failed to take the proper credits within his area
of concentration if he has successfully completed all
requirements that were outlined to him by the proper
officials in prior consultations?
Decision: No.
Reasoning : There is an implied contract between the
college and the student that if the student complies
with the terms set forth by the college for gradua-
tion, he will obtain the degree sought. The court
further indicated that additional requirements may
not be placed on him by proper officials. In this
case, the court pointed out that the contract theory
is valid in private colleges and there is no reason
why it should not also apply to public institutions
of higher education as well.
Begley v. The Corporation of Mercer University was an
• • 47
action m contract for breach of contract. it was an
athletic bound case.
Facts : Mercer University, a private institution, signed
a high school basketball player, to a financial grant
in aid. Prior to the signing of the contract, the
assistant coach checked Begley's grade point averge.
He found that Begley had a 2.9 predicted grade point
average. The National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion required a 1.6 grade point average of participa-
ting athletes. Mercer University belonged to the
National Collegiate Athletic Association. Several
47 Begley v. The Corporation of Mercer University,
367 F. Supp. 908 (1973) .
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months after the signing of the student financialgrant in aid contract, officials of Mercer Sn^versitvlearned that Begley's grade point average was
Y
graded on a 8.0 system, while the National CollegiateAthletic Association recognized 4.0. Mercer Univlrlity
repudiated the contract with Begley who sued forbreach of the contract while seeking monetary damages.
is an institution of higher education which
Issue
:
voids an athletic scholarship contract, ir^light^ofnew information, guilty of breach of contract?
Decision No.
Reasoning : The assistant coach erred in assuming thatBegley s grade point average was based on a 4.0 system.The terms of the contract clearly expressed the intent
of the parties that a 1.6 grade point average was tobe maintained in return for the scholarship aid.
From the commencement of the contract, Begley was
unable to comply with the relevant stated condition
of a 1.6 grade point average. Therefore, he was unable
to perform his part of the contract and he was not
entitled to the performance of the contract by Mercer
University.
ln Mahavongsana v. Hall
,
plaintiff won a court
judgment which ordered the Georgia State University to
4 8grant her a degree.
Facts : The plaintiff was a graduate student in the
Master's program at Georgia State University. She
completed the required courses for her degree. She
failed the comprehensive examination on two different
occasions. The plaintiff, a citizen of Thailand,
claimed that the examination became a requirement
for the degree after she had enrolled in the program
and, therefore, the requirement could not apply to her.
She further held that the bulletins and catalogs of
the university in effect at the time she enrolled as
a student constituted a contract and that the defendant
university should be ordered to grant her her degree.
She also claimed violation of her due process rights.
48Mahavongsana v. Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381 (1975).
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The defendant held that the catalog had a reserva-t °n
^2
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Whea the university catalog doesr , w ere the student received noticeof the required examination only two weeks prior to
n£
e aXaminatl°n and Slx weeks prior to her completionof course work for the degree?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning ; The court held that the catalog and bulle-tin in effect at the time that the student enrolleddid constitute a contract. The court ordered thedefendant university to grant the degree because;
In order to be properly prepared for the
examination, plaintiff would have had to
take other and further course work and that
notice given was neither designed to inform
plaintiff of the course work required nor did
it permit plaintiff the time necessary to take
such course work prior to the examination.
Withholding the degree from plaintiff because
of her failure to satisfy the examiniation
requirement is
,
in the absence of adequate
notice with respect to the scope and depth
of the examination
,
a deprivation of a valua-
able property right without due process of law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 1, Paragraph 3, of the Constitution
of the State of Georgia.
The University appealed this decision in Mahavong -
sana v. Hall, (529 F. 2d 448), United States Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1976.
Facts and Issue: Same as lower court.
Decision
:
No.
Reasoning : Misconduct and the failure to attainthe standards of scholarship cannot be equated. Ahearing may be required to determine charges of 'mis-conduct. A hearing may be useless or harmful infinding out the truth concerning scholarship. Thereis a clear dichotomy between a student's due process
rights in disciplinary dismissal versus an academicdismissal. The court pointed out that the plaintiff
with ample notice was allowed to take the examina-tion for the second time. She was also offered a
special tailormade program. she was not treated
arbitrarily or capriciously. She was not denied
procedural or substantive due process. Implicit
in the student
' s contract with the university upon
matriculation is the agreement to comply with the
university's rules and regulations, which the
university is clearly entitled to modify so as to
properly exercise its educational responsibility.
In the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., v,
State University of Stony Brook
,
the court held that a
collective bargaining agreement between a union and a
state university cannot be construed to deny a student
organization the right to invite speakers from a rival
union where the purpose of the meeting is other than
• • 49
organizing employees. The court said:
If the contract between C.S.E.A. and the state
precludes the University from granting equal
use of its facilities to outside organizations
for purposes unrelated to union organization
efforts, it is a fortiori discriminatory and
cannot stand.
In an action in tort and contract, three contract
issues arose in the Brown v. Wichita State University
49 .Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. v.
State University of Stony Brook, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 927
(1974) .
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case. This case was a tort liability case but also
gave rise to the following contract issues: (1) did
the agreement between the Athletic Director and Golden
Eagle constitute an enforceable contract binding the
university, (2) did the plaintiffs have rights under the
contract as third party beneficiaries, and (3) could the
university claim sovereign immunity under Kansas statute?
Facts: In the summer of 1970, the Athletic
Director of Wichita State University entered into
a contract in behalf of the university with Golden
Eagle Aviation, Inc. to transport the football
team to away games during the season. The avia-
tion service was to provide a qualified flight
crew under the terms of the agreement, and the
university was to lease a Douglas DC 6-B from a
third party as well as to provide liability
insurance for the passengers as required by the
federal regulations. The football team departed
,
for the Utah State game in two Martin 404 planes.
One of the planes crashed into a mountainside after
an intermediate stop. It was later proven that
the crashed plane was 2,900 pounds in excess of
the allowed take-off weight. There was no written
contract for the lease of planes. The university
had not purchased the passenger liability insurance.
The plaintiffs are either the survivors or the
representatives of the deceased. They allege a tort
action in negligence as well as a breach of implied
and expressed warranty and strict liability. They
also claim, as third party beneficiaries, the failure
of the university to obtain the liability insurance.
The defendant university held that the Athletic
Director did not have the authority to bind the
university. He only had the power to obligate the
Physical Education Corporation and that the contract
under question was between the Physical Education
Corporation and the Golden Eagle Aviation Corpora-
tion. The university further held that the statute
requiring the approval of the Board of Regents for
^Brown v. Wichita State University, 540 P. 2d
66 (1975).
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the contract
“itLr? Sc?a^s? lained by the diversity IT
Issue ; 1
.
2 .
3.
Decision
:
Did the agreement between the AthleticDirector and Golden Eagle constitute an
enforceable contract binding the
university?
Did the plaintiffs have right under the
contract as third party beneficiaries'5Could the university claim sovereignimmunity under Kansas statues?
1. Yes
2
. Yes
3 . No
Reasoning ; The Physical Education Corporation wasthe agent of Wichita State and that Mr. Katzenmeyer,
as an officer of the corporate agent, had the impliedpower and authority to bind the principal—WichitaState University. Wichita State is subject toliability for any negligent acts of its corporate
agent. The Physical Education Corporation was a
mere instrumentality of the university. The
university cannot purposely delegate to a corporate
entity, or otherwise, its responsibility for conduct-ing intercollegiate athletic activities, directly
control that corporate agent, and then disclaim any
liability. The court said:
The provisions of KSA 1974 Supp. 76-721 fix
a method of procedure intended to secure order,
system and dispatch in contracting with state
educational institutions. Its provisions are
directive, and as such, require implementing
rules or regulations by the Board of Regents.
No policy, rule or regulation by the Board of
Regents has been cited or furnished to this
Court regarding contract matters and none can
be found in Kansas Administrative Regulations.***
However, absent any rules and regulations, Wichita
State cannot use the statue to deny the validity
of the Aviation Service Agreement following
execution and partial performance. Common honesty
forbids repudiation now.
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Eden v. Board of Trustees of State University
found that although the state is generally not subject
to the same rules governing estoppel as an individual is
in a situation which is justified by the facts and
pertinent to prevent injustice, the doctrine of estoppel
may be applied against the state, as in this case, from
arguing its lack of capacity to contract with a student
his or her admission to an academic program.
Facts : The State University of New York at
Stony Brook established a new School of Podiatric
Medicine. Students were accepted for admission
for the first class. The students were notified
that they had to "suspend" their "plans to
inatriculate at Stony Brook in the coming academic
year." The reason given was an alleged fiscal
crisis. Students sue claiming that they had acquired
a vested contractual right to be admitted to the
entering class. The defendant university claimed
that it acted in good faith due to a fiscal crisis.
Issue : May students under New York State law ac-
quire a vested contractual right for admission to
a school when they have received written acceptance
for admission especially where there is inadequate
evidence of a fiscal crisis to justify the abro-
gation of the contractual obligation?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : There could be no doubt that the univer-
sity's acceptance of the applications of the students
satisfies the classic requirement of a contract. In
the face of the existing contracts with petitioners,
there was no rational basis for State's conclusion
that saving money for future years justified the
failing to open the school for the 1975-76 academic
year. The evidence was undisputed that the deferment
decision would not save money but would result in a
51Eden v. Board of Trustees of State University,
374 N. Y. S. 2d 686 (1975)
.
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Miller v. Long Island University was a student housing
case which turned on an issue of contract law. 52
Fa^s; Long Island University, a private institu-
eo°?' t!f
0rmed
^
wo students that their housing
c ntracts were being terminated. The universityinformed the students, one of whom was a para-
Y
plegic, to seek other housing accommodations. Theuniversity s housing contract has a clause whichstates that any violation of college regulations
may result m termination of the contract. The
^
ere notified that the university was takingaction under this clause even though no formal
c arges were made against them. An appeal was madeby the students to the university's president to no
avail. The students sue claiming that they were
never notified of the charges against them nor granted
a hearing, thus their constitutional right to dueprocess was violated both on a national and statebasis.
.
They also allege deprivation of "equal
educational opportunities."
Isjsue: May a private university terminate a stu-
dent s housing contract without notice and hearing
to the students?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : Students in private institutions of higher
learning are not clothed with the protections of the
United States Constitution and amendments except when
racial discrimination is practiced against them and
probably where irrelevant standards of ethnic back-
ground or sex are used to exclude them from full
participation in a university which benefits from
state aid or tax exemption.
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Miller v.
(1976) .
Long Island University, 380 N. Y.S. 2d
DeMarco v. University of Health Sciences held
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that a college may grant a degree to a student who has
been arbitrarily dismissed for non-academic reasons and
when on readmission, he achieved the academic requirements
in effect at the time of his dismissal. 53
Facts : Plaintiff on his application to the
Chicago Medical School in 1941 indicated that hehad never attended another medical school, when
he in fact had been dismissed from a non-accredited
medical college in Massachusetts. Plaintiff claims
that he thought the question related to the issue
of transfer credit. At the end of his third year
at Chicago, he ranked 23 in a class of 58. He was
within six weeks of completing his senior year when
the medical college learned that he had attended
another medical school and dismissed him. Officials
of the Chicago Medical College discussed with him,
prior to his dismissal, the fact that he was the
only student who failed to make a contribution of
$500.00 to the school.
Plaintiff attempted over the years to be re-
admitted to the college. In 1968 or early 1969, he
met with the college president who indicated the
high cost of educating returning students. He pointed
out that every returning student was expected to
contribute to the college. Plaintiff agreed to
contribute $40,000.00 and eventually paid $20,000.00
of that pledge. Plaintiff was readmitted in 1970 with
the following stipulations: (1) he take specific
course work and (2) take the National Board Examina-
tions. Plaintiff failed Part 1 of the National Boards
and then filed suit claiming that the National Board
Examinations requirement was unfair. He alleges
that he met the academic requirements of the 1941
Bulletin of the college which comprised his contract
with the college. The lower court found for the
plaintiff and ordered the college to grant his degree.
The college appealed claiming that the court cannot
mandate the awarding of an academic degree because
this is a faculty prerogative.
2d 356
5
3
_ MDeMarco
(1976) .
v. University of Health Sciences, 352 N.E.
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Issue: May a court order the college to grant adegree to a student who had been arbitrarily dis-
missed for non-academic reasons and when on re-
admission he achieved the academic requirementsin effect at the time of his dismissal?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : Withholding a diploma conferring the
of Doctor of Medicine is a unique injury.
The courts will take cognizance of it. The 1941
contract provided for the issuance of a diploma
at successful completion of the academic program
as stated in the catalog. The evidence established
the plaintiff earned the degree. It was proper for
the court to order the mandatory injunction.
The court went on to say:
The 1970 requirement whereby the plaintiff
was required to demonstrate current knowledge
of medicine by passing Parts 1 and 2 of the
National Boards was not responsive to the in-
justice done to him in 1944, when he was
dismissed or in later years when he was
denied re-admission, and reflects the inequitable
use of power by the school. The extra re-
quirement of demonstrating current medical
knowledge was arbitrary and unreasonable, in
light of the fact that the examinations have
never been required for a degree then or now.
It is recognized a school is entitled to enter
into a special degree program with a student
with whom there has been no previous history of
bad faith; however, in this case the school
admittedly acted in bad faith as stated by Dean
Levitt
.
A 1976 Supreme Court case dealt with the issue of
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of a
private contract. 5 ^
Facts: The parents of Michael McCrary and Conlin
Gonzales were unable to enroll their respective
children in programs offered by two private schools
in the State of Virginia. The children were denied
54 Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
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admission because they were black. Both schools
advertised by mail and the telephone directly.
• ^?
laint
i
f fS resP°nded to these advertisements.Neither school had accepted a black student for
any of its program. Plaintiffs (children throughtheir parents) filed a class action alleging thatthey were prevented from enrolling in the schoolm violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The district
court and the Court of Appeals held that 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1981 makes the schools' discriminatory ad-
mission policy illegal and enjoined the defendant
and member schools of the Southern Independent
School Associtions from discriminating against
applicants for admission on the basis of race.
Issue: 1. Does 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 prohibit
private commercially operated non-
sectarian schools from denying admission
to prospective students because they are
black?
2. If yes, is it constitutionally valid?
Decision : 1. Yes
2 . Yes
Reasoning : (1) The racial exclusion practiced by the
Fairfax-Brewster School and Bobbe ' s Private School is
a classic violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. The
parents of Conlin Gonzales and Michael McCrary sought
to enter into a contractual relationship with Bobbe '
s
Private School for educational services. Gonzales'
parents sought to enter into a similar relationship
with the Fairfax-Brewster School. Under these
contractual relationships, the schools would have
received payment for services rendered. The prospective
students would have received instruction in return
for those payments. The educational services of the
Fairfax-Brewster School and Bobbe ' s Private School
were advertised and offered to the general public.
Neither school offered services on an equal basis to
white and non-white students. (2) 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1981 is constitutionally valid. From this principle
it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment
right to send their children to educational institu-
tions that promote the belief that racial segregation
is desirable, and that the children have an equal
right to attend such institutions. It does not
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follow that the practice of excluding
minorities from such institutions istected by the same principle.
racial
also pro
The acceptance by a private school of an admission
application fee creates a contractual obligation on the
part of the school to evaluate the credentials of the
applicant according to the admission criteria published
in the school's bulletin and brochure.
Facts : Plaintiff was rejected applicant to
Chicago Medical School (private institution)
.
Plaintiff claims that the school did not evaluatehis application and others according to the
entrance criteria which was printed in the school'sbulletin and brochure. He further claims:
. . .The prospective students' familial
relationship to members of the school's
faculty and to members of its board of
trustees, and the ability of the applicant
or his family to pledge or make payments of
large sums of money to the school
was a basis of criteria for admission. Steinberg
holds that a contract was created between him and
the school when the school accepted his $15.00
application fee. This contract was breached when
the school claims that a contract did not come into
being as the school's bulletin and brochure do not
constitute offers.
Issue : Does the acceptance by a private school,
such as Chicago Medical School, of an admission
application fee create a contractual obligation
on the part of the school to evaluate the credentials
of the applicant according to the admission criteria
published in the school's bulletin and brochure?
Decision: Yes.
Reasoning : On the basis of contract law, the court
pointed out that the school's bulletin and brochure
was an invitation to make an offer. The student's
response was an offer and the school's retention
55 Steinberg v.
2d 586 (1976)
.
Chicago Medical School, 354 N.E.
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°f t:he application fee was an acceptance of thatoffer. it reasoned:
We believe that he and the school enteredinto an enforceable contract; that the school's
obligation under the contract was stated inthe school's bulletin in a definite manner
and that by accepting his application fee—
a
valuable consideration—the school bound itself
to fulfill its promises. Steinberg accepted
the school's promises in good faith and he was
entitled to have his application judged accord-ing to the school's stated criteria.
In the area of academic affairs, Lyons v. Salve
Regina College held that various college documents
,
such
as the college catalog and other publications which relate
to procedures to be followed by a student in appealing
grades and academic decisions constitute a valid contract
between the college and the student. 56
Facts : Lyons (P) was a fourth year nursing student
at Salve Regina College. She accompanied an ill
friend via ambulance to Boston. Lyons therefore
lost three classes and two clinical experiences.
Lyons holds that an instructor assured her that the
only result of her absence would be that she would
receive a grade of "Incomplete" for the course.
Lyons subsequently completed the course, took the
examination. She received an F grade. She appealed
the F grade according to the college's Academic
Information and Registration Material for 1975 which
provided for a Grade Appeals Committee consisting
of a three-member Grade Appeals Committee whose
recommendation would be made to the Dean of Students.
Lyons had received almost all A's and B's in her
courses. She was also President of her class. By
a 2-1 vote the Appeals Committee recommended an
"Incomplete" grade instead of an F to the Dean who
overruled the Committee and denied her appeal. As
a result of this decision, plaintiff Lyons was
dropped from the School of Nursing but was allowed
56Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 442 F. Supp. 1354
(1976) .
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to cbange her major
. she has graduated fromcollege with a degree in Psychology. Plaintiffclaims that the Dean’s decision constituted a
slttt ? hfntraCt ' Published college materials
is ^%feCSn,mend;tion of the (Appeal) Committee
tL fcl?e Dean of Students/Associate Dean of
stated^h^Vh the . Dean
'
s written guidelines itated that the decision of the Committee wasfinal
.
Issue
:
Decision
:
Do various college documents
,
such as
the college catalog and other publica-
tions, which relate to procedures to
be followed by a student in appealing
grades and academic decisions constitute
a valid contract between the college
and the student?
In determining whether or not the terms
of a college rule or regulation are am-
biguous and/or to determine the intent
of the parties in interpreting the
underlying rule or regulation, may a
court examine written procedures and/or
memorandas of college administrators?
1 .
2 .
Yes
Yes
Reasoning ; (1) The written procedures and memorandum
by the Dean intended that the Committee's decision
would be final. The court indicated:
. . . the college will not have fulfilled its
contractual obligation to Lyons until it gives
her the opportunity to meet its requirements
for a nursing major.
(2) The defendant's action in refusing to abide by
the deicsions of the Appeals Committee constituted
a breach of contract. In making this finding, the
court reasoned:
the court is not, as defendants contend,
arbitrarily imposing the legal technicalities
of a commercial transaction upon what is essen-
tially an academic dispute. Rather, the court
is simply holding that the college, as another
promissor must abide by procedures to which it
has bound itself and its students, until such
time as it seems fit to change those procedures.
(This case is in hearing on appeal.)
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A suit in higher education which involved students
who borrowed funds under the guaranteed Student Loan
Program and schools who administer financial aid programs
was based on contract issues, 57
Facts: Plaintiff, American Training Services, Inc.,
is a New Jersey corporation which is in the business
of providing vocational training on a contract
basis in several fields. Defendant is a Tennessee
corporation. Plaintiff and defendant entered into
a contract in which the defendant bank agreed to
finance the . tuition loans of plaintiff's students.
Both plaintiff and defendant qualified for participa-
tion in the Federal Guaranteed Student Loan Program.
In compliance with the Federal Guaranteed Student
Loan Program, defendant paid plaintiff the proceeds
of each loan that the defendant made to a student
as payment for the student's tuition. Plaintiff
was to periodically notify defendant of students'
withdrawals. A pro-rated portion of the unused
tuition was to be paid by the P to the D bank to be
applied to the student's note. This refund was to
accompany the notice of withdrawal. American Training
Services (P) held that the bank was not handling the
loans properly and filed an action in tort for negli-
gence and in contract for breach and ceased sending
the withdrawl refunds to the bank though it forwarded
the notices of withdrawal. Defendant bank filed a
counter suit against plaintiff for recovery of
the refund payments. Plaintiff held that the with-
drawals were caused by the defendant's negligence in
handling loan applications and the refunds were the
subject of a set-off against amounts due to plaintiff.
Plaintiff also rejected the notion that the repayments
were accrued to the students.
Issue : May the American Training Services (P) use
the refunds for unused tuition as a set-off against
the defendant?
Decision: No.
57American Training Services, Inc. v. Commerce
Union Bank, 415 F. Supp. 1101 (1976).
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Reasoning : The refund of unused portions of
tuition when a student withdraws are due and pay-
^kle to the student. Any refund payments are
legally owed to the student who has withdrawn and
form the basis of a set-off against amounts
claimed to be due to ATS by C.U.B. as a result of the
latter's alleged negligence or breach of the
contract
.
Commonwealth v. Howell, 181 A. 2d 903 (1962).
Facts : Defendant appeals from an order of the
Philadelphia County Court which required him to pay
college tuition for his minor daughter from the
proceeds of an insurance policy which he maintained
for that purpose. Both appellant and his wife are
college graduates. Appellant is a pharmacist and
operates his own drug store. Appellant's daughter
was born in 1943. In 1952, a child's educational
endowment policy was issued to appellant by the
North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, to
mature in ten years in principal sum of $1,500.00.
Appellant concedes that this policy was designed
"to send the child to college." On graduation from
high school in 1961, the daughter expressed a desire
to continue her education at Temple Community College.
The policy's value was then in excess of $1,000.00.
Originally, appellant's wife petitions the court
for support. The lower court scheduled a hearing
for September 21, 1961, which was limited to the
issue of tuition. Judgment was given to wife.
Appellant contends in this appeal that the ownership
of this policy, even though coupled with the intention
as the time of issuance to use the proceeds from it
for the daughter's college education does not "amount
to a valid and binding agreement or voluntary offer
such as can be enforced by the court."
Issue: Is this insurance policy in question one which
"amounts to a valid and binding agreement or voluntary
offer such as can be enforced by the courts?"
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : (1) A parent is not liable for the support
of a child attending college in the absence of an ex-
press contract , and unless the circumstances warrant
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it. On the other hand, where there is an agreementto support, which it is within the contemplation
o the parties, a father may be liable to support
and furnish his child with a college education.
It
The
J
i
P
Stant situation falls within the exception
outlined by President Justice Rhodes in the Martin
case. Although the educational insurance policy
may not be an express agreement to support, its
existence is clearly a circumstance which warrants
the action of the court below. Order affirmed.
In Abrams v. New School for Social Research
, the
court affirmed that a doctoral candidate in psychology
who had failed two oral examinations and who, pursuant
to agreement with school, submitted to interviews with
evaluators who rejected student's proposed dissertation
and thus disqualified student from a third oral examina-
tion could not recover from school earnings while
engaged in pursuit of degree or for alleged wrongful
58deprivation of opportunity to further pursue his studies.
Facts : Doctoral candidate in psychology who was re-
quired to withdraw from school brought action for
damages for earnings lost while engaged in pursuit
of degree and for alleged wrongful deprivation of
opportunity to further pursue his studies. The
Supreme Court, New York County, George Postel, J.
,
denied school's motion for summary judgment dismissing
the complaint and school appealed. The Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, 50 A.D. 2d. 778, 377 N.Y. S. 2d.
74, reversed and dismissed the complaint and student
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the record
established that procedures employed by school to
effectuate additional review procedure after the
student had failed two oral examinations were in
accordance with the school ' s agreement with the stu-
dent .
"^Abrams v. New School for Social Research, 390 N.Y.S.
2d 818 (1976)
.
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Issue: Was a contract breached?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The institution had agreed to permitthe plaintiff, a doctoral candidate in psychology
who had failed two oral examinations, to take a third
examination
,
provided that two of three socialpsychologists favorably reviewed his dissertation
proposal. Plaintiff voluntarily submitted to separateinterviews with two evaluators and both rejected hisproposal after an independent review. Hence, plaintiff
was required to withdraw from the institution. The
record establishes that the procedures employed to
effectuate this additional review procedure were in
accordance with the institution's agreement with
the plaintiff. The resolution of this case does not
turn on any disputed issues of act and the Appellate
Division properly directed the entry of a judgment
dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
In Tanner v. Board of Trustees of University of
Illinois
,
the court set forth the following rule of law:
Although University of Illinois is under discretionary
and not mandatory duty to issue degrees to persons
participating in its curricula, it cannot act
maliciously or in bad faith by a student who fulfills
its degree requirements.^
Facts : A thesis committee composed of five professors
from the department was formed to evaluate plaintiff's
dissertation and to conduct comprehensive oral and
written examinations of the plaintiff. In December
1972, plaintiff completed the written examinations
submitted by two members of the committee and, in
March 1973, he completed a written examination sub-
mitted by a third member of the committee. Although
plaintiff completed his oral examination and submitted
his dissertation to a committee member in August 1973,
he was informed in December 1973 that he would have to
be re-evaluated in a single, written examination, but
that the university thereafter informed him that the
S 9 . _
Tanner v. Board of Trustees of University of
Illinois, 363 N.E. 2d 208 (1977).
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examination would be in two parts, both oral and
written. In June 1975, plaintiff was informedby George Russell, vice Chancellor and Dean of theGraduate College, that the thesis committee, the
examinations and dissertation submitted by plaintiff
were all unacceptable because the committee was neverformally recognized by the Graduate College, and thathe would have to be re-evaluated. On July 25, 1975,plaintiff commenced his action in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, seeking a writ of mandamus compellingthe university to issue him a Ph.D. degree in
Business Administration, or alternatively, $100,000.00damages for breach of an implied contract to issue
the degree. The university was granted a venue trans-
fer to the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial
Circuit, Champlain County, on September 29, 1975, and
on February 13, 1976. That court dismissed the
complaint, finding that no set of facts could be
proved to support plaintiff's stated theories of
mandamus and contract.
Issue : 1. Does an action of mandamus stand?
2. Does an action stand for damages on a
theory of implied contract?
Decision : 1. Referred for repleading.
2. Needs to be filed in Court of Claims.
Reasoning : (1) Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
and should not be issued unless the plaintiff demon-
strated a clear right to the writ and a clear obliga-
tion on the defendant to perform the act sought to
be performed. Although we recognize that the univer-
sity is under a discretionary and not a mandatory duty
to issue degrees to persons participating in its
curricula, the university may not act maliciously or
in bad faith by arbitrarily and capriciously refusing
to award a degree to a student who fulfills its degree
requirements. The case is remanded to the trial court
for repleading on plaintiff's mandamus theory. (2)
Action for money damages against University of Illinois
on theory of implied contract had to be filed in court
of claims.
In Basch v. The George Washington University, a class
action by students against the University, the court laid
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the following procedures: (1) Whether given section
of university bulletin becomes part of the contractual
obligations between students and university depends upon
general principles of contract construction, including
principle that document must be viewed as a whole, but
terms are to be given their common meaning, and principle
that court should view language as would reasonable
person in position of the parties, 60 (2) Viewed as a whole,
the language of university bulletin at most expressed
expectancy by the university regarding future tuition
fi 1increases, and not any promises susceptible of enforcement.
Facts : Appellants represent a class of approximate-
ly 500 students attending the medical school in all
four current classes. Prior to their acceptance
of the university's offer to attend the medical
school, each of these students received a copy of
The George Washington University Bulletin: School
of Medicine and Health Services. While the language
of the bulletins received by each class varied some-
what, all of the parties agreed that those differences
were insignificant, and that only the language on
the 1974-1975 bulletin need be considered for purposes
of this action. That bulletin specifically set the
tuition rate for the 1974-1975 academic year at
$3,200, but went on to state that:
Academic year tuition increases have been
estimated as follows: 1975-76, $200; 1976-77,
$200; 1977-78, $200; 1978-79, $200 . . . Every
effort will be made to keep tuition increases
within these limits. However, it is not pos-
sible to project future economic data with
certainty, and circumstances may require an
adjustment in this estimate.
1364
6
°Basch v. George Washington University, 370 A.
(1977).
6
‘*'Basch v. George Washington University.
2d
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Appellants aver that their decision to attend the
was based
'
in part, in reliance onthese estimates. Subsequently, on January 17, 1975the university issued a Statement on Tuition Rateswhich provided: ^
The Board of Trustees of the George WashingtonUniversity has approved a tuition of $5000
^ear ( two semesters) for the fiscal year1975-76 for all candidates for the degree ofDoctor of Medicine in the School of Medicine
and Health Sciences. This increase in tuition
rate was necessitated by the anticipated impact
of inflation and on the projection of a recently(mid-December) proposed decrease in the funding
support provided by the District of Columbia
Medical and Dental Manpower Act, a Federal
Government program. The combination of the
projected increase in expenses due to inflation
and decrease in income totals approximately
$900,000 and the increase of $1600 per student
will yield an amount approximately equal to
the projected gap. The operations of the School
of Medicine and Health Sciences are planned to
proceed on a no-growth basis; that is, there
will be no increase in staffing or in other
aspects of the School.
In addition, the Board of Trustees also approved a
maximum tuition rate for the academic year of 1976-77
of $12,500 for each candidate for the degree of Doctor
of Medicine. The exact amount, which will be set by
the President of the University under authority granted
him by the Trustees will be determined when the extent
of the impact of cost increases and the anticipated
loss of funding support from such federal programs
as the Medical and Dental Manpower Act and the Health
Professions Capitation Grant Program are determined.
Continuation of current rates of inflation combined
with the total loss of funding support from federal
programs would necessitate the maximum $12,500 tuition
rates for 1976-77. Both local and national efforts
to provide financial support to students continue; and
should efforts to secure funding support to the School
prove fruitful, tuition will be set at the lowest
feasible figure. On August 7, 1975, appellants initiated
this action, arguing below that the new tuition rates
were instituted in breach of their contracts with
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the University's bulletin,
contention on appeal.
They are renewing this
Were there new tuition rates instituted in
Issue
breach of the student '
Univ^ s^y
e
bunetin?
Pr° :eCted lncreases in
Decision
:
No
.
Reasoning ; (1) The mere fact that the bulletin con-tained language regarding a projected tuition increaseis not enough to support a finding that the language
amounted to a contractual obligation. In construingthe terms of a contract, the document itself mustbe viewed as a whole. it has been noted that:
In ascertaining intent, we consider not only
the language used in the contract but also
the circumstances surrounding the making of
the contract, the motives of the parties and
the purposes which they sought to accomplish.
(2) The terms of the document are to be given their
common meaning.
In arriving at that menaing. the court should
view the language of the document as would a
reasonable person in the position of the
parties. Viewing the pertinent language as a
whole, in the context of a University bulletin,
we cannot conclude that a reasonable person would
have assumed that the University intended to
bind itself by the construction appellants urge
on us
.
Harris, Associate Judge, concurring:
I concur in the affirmance. The statements in
appellee ' s bulletin concerning future tuition
increases were too hedged with qualifications
to be considered promises which the University
was obligated to perform. Appellants had no
reasonable expectations which deserve protection.
Giles v. Howard University held that since the
University's Medical School's student promotion policy
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was not an integrated agreement, standard in interpreting
it was that of reasonable expectation.^
F^cts. Plaintiff enrolled in the Howard UniversityCollege of Medicine in August 1973. He passed allhis first semester classes except biochemistry, whichhe failed. The college permitted him to participatefully in the second semester program, provided he
agreed to retake biochemistry in the Directed StudyProgram during the summer of 1974. He passed allhis second semester courses but failed biochemistry.
Plaintiff then received a letter from the Dean of
the Medical College, Marion Mann, M.D., informing him
that he would be allowed to continue as a medical
student if he repeated biochemistry and retook and
obtained satisfactory grades in the other courses
in his curriculum that he had already passed.
Dean Mann's letter also stated:
Section IV of the Student Promotions Policy
is applicable only to students who begin the
academic year in good academic standing. The
Committee hereby informs you that you are not
in good academic standing but are on probation;
and that if you fail any course during the
first semester, you will be dropped from the
College of Medicine.
Plaintiff repeated the courses and passed biochemistry,
but failed anatomy. On March 7, 1975, he was dropped
from the College of Medicine. He thereupon requested
readmission. By letter of July 7, 1975, Dean Mann
informed the plaintiff that his request for re-
admission had been considered and that the committee
considering the request would be reconvened if the
plaintiff passed special National Board Examinations
in anatomy, biochemistry, microbiology, and physiology.
The plaintiff took these examinations and failed all
four. No further action was taken on his request for
readmission. Plaintiff sues alleging denial of fifth
amendment procedural due process rights and a common
law claim for a breach of contract or tort.
Issue: 1. Was plaintiff denied his fifth amendment
procedural due process rights?
2 . Does he have a common law claim for breach
of contract?
62Giles v. Howard University, 428 F. Supp. 603 (1977).
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Decision : 1. No.
2. No.
Reasoning
: (1) Howard University is not sufficient-
^ inv°lved with the federal government to make itsactions equivalent to federal government actions andthus subject to the restraints of Fifth Amendment
.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. Only the federal governmentis subject to constitutional restraints of FifthAmendment procedural due process. U. S.C.A. Const
Amend. 5.
(2) To state an actionable claim for breach of contract
or tort because of refusal of university to readmit
plaintiff to medical school, plaintiff must adduce
evidence of a violated contractural right or improper
motivation or irrational action on part of university.
After reading the Student Promotions Policy, the rea-
sonable expectation of any student is that if he fails
a course and does not make up the deficiency in the
Directed Study Program, he can be dismissed or can be
retained upon compliance with any reasonable condition.
This is the interpretation the Court gives the Student
Promotions Policy. Under this interpretation, the
plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence of a violated
contract right. He has also failed to present any
facts to show improper motivation or irrational action
on the part of the university or any of its officials.
On the contrary, all the evidence indicates the
university went out of its way to help the plaintiff
remain in medical school without compromising its
academic standards. It gave him at least three second
chances. Under these circumstances, the facts necessary
to sustain an actionable claim have not been shown.
In conclusion, twenty-two of the 100 cases were in the
area of student related cases. In these twenty-two student
related cases, five of the areas of contract were in issue
(RE: Table 1, page 95). Issue in this category did not
arise in relation to the area of Consideration, Fraud,
Mistake and Duress or the Statute of Frauds. A graphic
representation of the distribution of the percentage of
TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF 22 STUDENT-RELATED CASES ACCORDING
THE AREAS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN ISSUE
Source: 100 Cases
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student issues, in the 100 cases as briefed in this
chapter to the area of the law of contract is found in
Figure 1, page 97.
Faculty Related
Case law in relation to faculty and the lav; of
contract may be divided into two categories: (1) personal
and (2) operational. By the personal classification,
the rights of the individual faculty person under his
contract of employment including the issue of tenure are
set forth, while the operational classification may be
defined as the academic rights and freedom of the faculty
person while functioning as an educator under his contract
of employment. This research proved that as far back as
1893, students questioned in the courts the latter classifi-
cation. The academic prerogative of faculty to make aca-
demic decisions, e.g., recommend candidates for a degree,
was clearly set forth by the court in People v. New York
Law School .
^
3
Facts : In 1892, the Dean of the school suggested
that a committee be appointed to arrange for the com-
mencement, secure a hall and engage a speaker. The
committee was so appointed. By a majority vote, after
much contention, they decided to invite a clergyman
of one faith to offer the invocation and a clergyman
of another faith the benediction. On June 2, the Dean
indicated to the committee that this was a poor
63People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663
(1893) .
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Figure 1. Distribution of the percentage of
student issues in the 100 cases to the areas of the
law of contract.
Legend
:
1. Expressed or Implied
2. Offer and Acceptance
3. Consideration
4. Capacity
5. Fraud, Mistake, Duress
6. Illegality
7. Statute of Frauds
8. Performance and Breach
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decision and suggested that they did not have
religious participants. The committee accepted theDean s suggestion.
_
On June 3, the Dean was informedby telegram that Bishop Doane, one of the trustees,
would confer the degrees. Because a church dignitary
was to confer the degrees, the faculty determinedthat he should be asked to conduct the appropriate
religious exercises. This determination was communi-
cated to the committtee. On the same day, the relator
and eight or ten others demonstrated against the action
of the faculty. Mr. O'Sullivan charged the dean with
underhanded conduct and the students
,
then present
,
threatened not to attend the commencement exercise
unless the faculty action was reversed. On June 6,
Mr. O'Sullivan had a meeting with the dean. The
meeting as described by Mr. O'Sullivan is sufficient
to say it justified the refusal of the faculty to
recommend him as a student upon whom a degree should
be conferred. The relator has admitted the truth of
the answering allegations.
Issue: Did the conduct described justify the Dean's
refusal to award the certificate to the relator?
Decision: Yes.
Reasoning : The court focused on the right of faculties
to recommend candidates for degrees. It held:
Assuming the relator's conduct is correctly
stated by the Dean, as we must, it was, to say
the least, contumacious and calculated to breed
disorder and trouble in the school. That there
should be some power vested in the faculties of
schools and colleges to repress and punish such
conduct will be conceded by all. It cannot be
that a student having passed all examinations
necessary for a degree can, before his graduation,
excite disturbance and threaten injury to the
school or college without being amenable to some
punishment. No course would seem open to forth-
with expel him or refuse his degree. In this
case, the latter course was taken. The faculties
of educational institutions having power to con-
fer degrees, and the teachers of schools having
the right to recommend to the Regents of the
University, students deemed worthy of degrees,
are necessarily vested with a broad discretion as
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to the persons who shall receive those honors orbe recommended for such distinction; and when
the conduct of a student has been such, intermediateis final examinations and the time of conferring
that there is a fair occasion for the
exercise of discretion on the part of the faculty,
and there clearly was in this case, it should be
reversed by this court, and the case must be an
extraordinary one to justify judicial inter-
ference. The court further indicated that it
saw no reason why the right to discipline is not
as great between the final examination and the
graduation.
Thus, in the nineteenth century, the court clearly
upheld the right of faculty to make academic decisions.
Case law presently, as later cases will validate, uphold
the; separation of the academic decision and the courts,
when the faculty are not arbitrary or capricious in their
judgment. The aforementioned case clearly indicated "the
case must be an extraordinary one to justify judicial inter-
ference." It should be noted that, irrespective of the
classification, faculty rights emanate from the contract.
Therefore, the legal issue to be determined by the court is
one relative to basic contract law.
In researching litigation in higher education relative
to the law of contract and faculty and administrative
personnel, the researcher found that faculty and administra-
tive personnel related cases were voluminous. For this
section of case reviews, the terms faculty and administrative
personnel are used interchangeably. Thus, in the following
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pages, selected cases (1966-1977) are briefed to
present the pertinent research data.
The issue of probationary teachers was discussed
in the Harvard Law Review ;
In deciding whether to rehire or grant tenure, the
consideration involved goes well beyond a judgment
about general teaching competencies. College
professors are ordinarily specialists teaching
particular courses. In seeking to mold a balanced
department
,
the institution must take into account
the particular contributions which each potential
teacher will make to the department as a whole; for
this purpose personal factors, such as the political
or economic biases of the professor, may well be
legitimate considerations. An attempt must also be
made to evaluate the potential academic contributions
of the new teacher, as well as his teaching ability.
In addition, in many institutions the practice is
to hire several probationary teachers in contem-
plation of filling our tenured positions. A
decision not to rehire thus does not involve issues
of 'proof' of the teacher's unsuitability; it in-
volves rather a complex comparative and evaluative
process. Although dismissal during the term of the
contract must entitle the probationary teachers who
are not rehired to a full hearing, to grant such a
hearing to all probationary teachers who are not
rehired would be both administratively too burdensome
and practically useless, for the issues involved may
not be suitable for a judicatory
.
Numerous statutes and regulations entitle certain
public employees to permanent job security, i.e., they can
only be discharged for enumerated causes. For employees
who have tenured status, these statutes create property
interests within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such employees cannot be deprived of this property interest
64 Harvard Law Review 1048, 1101 (1968).
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without first having a hearing that satisfied due process
hearing. This is the decision in Perry v. Sindermann
.
65
Fact_s: Sindermann had been employed on a series of
one year contracts in the Texas public higher
education system for ten years. During his tenthyear of teaching, he was given timely notice that his
contract would not be renewed. Sindermann petitioned
the federal court urging that he was entitled to a
statement of reasons for his non-retention and a pre-
termination hearing to contest those reasons. He
alleged that while the public junior college where
he had been employed had no provision 'in the col-
lege's official Faculty Guide' and on "guidelines
promulgated by the formal tenure system, it had a de
facto tenure program which was passed on a Coordina-
ting Board of the Texas College and University System
that provided that a person, like himself, who has
been employed as a teacher in the state college and
university system for seven years or more has some
form of job tenure."
Issue ; Does Sindermann have a right to a hearing?
Decision : Yes, if he could prove his allegations.
Reasoning : Though a subjective "expectancy" of
tenure is not protected by procedural due process,
respondent's allegation that the college had a de
facto tenure policy, arising from rules and under-
standings officially promulgated and fostered, en-
titled him to an opportunity of proving the legitimacy
of his claim to job tenure. Such proof would ob-
ligate the college to afford him a requested hearing
where he could be informed of the grounds for his
non-retention and challenge their sufficiency.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring:
I concur in the Court's judgments and opinions
in Sindermann and Roth , but there is one cen-
tral point in both decisions that I would like to
underscore since it may have been obscured in
the comprehensive discussion of the cases. That
point is that the relationship between a state
institution and one of its teachers is essen-
tially a matter of state concern and state law.
65Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 600 (1972).
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The Court holds today only that a state
employed teacher who has a right to re-
employment under state law, arising fromeither an express or implied contract, has,in urn / a right guaranteed by the FourteenthAmendment, to some form of prior administra-tive or academic hearing on the cause for non-renewal of his contract. Thus, whether a par-teac
^
er in a Particular context has anyright to such administrative hearing hinges ona question of state law. The Court's opinion
makes this point very sharply: Propertyinterests
. , . are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source
such as state law ...
Because the availability of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to a prior administrative
hearing turns in each case on a question of
state law, the issue of abstention will arise
in future cases contesting whether a particular
teacher is entitled to a hearing prior to non-
renewal of his contract. If relevant state
contract law is unclear, a federal court should,
in my view, abstain from deciding whether he is
constitutionally entitled to a prior hearing,
and the teacher should be left to resort to
state courts on the questions arising under state
law.
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in part:
I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion
holding that respondent has presented a bona
fide First Amendment claim that should be
considered fully by the District Court. I
would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals
to direct the District Court to enter summary
judgment for respondent entitling him to a
statement of reasons why his contract was not
renewed and a hearing on disputed issues of
fact
.
Board of Regents v. Roth argued issues relative to
whether or not a non-tenured teacher acquires due process
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rights under a one year contract of employment. 66
Facts : Roth was a non-
in his first year of hi
in the Wisconsin public
In accordance with the
and regulations, he was
that his contract would
year. He filed suit in
that he was entitled to
his non-retention and a
contest those reasons.
tenured assistant professor
s first teaching position
higher education system,
relevant Wisconsin statutes
given timely notification
not be renewed for the second
the federal court claiming
a statement of reasons for
pre-termination hearing to
Issue : Does Roth have a legal right to a statement
of reasons for his non-retention and a pre-termina-
tion hearing?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : (1) The requirements of procedural due
process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property. A public em-
ployer's decision not to retain a probationary
employee did not ordinarily constitute a deprivation
of liberty.
It stretches the concept too far to suggest
that a person is deprived of liberty when
he simply is not rehired on one job but re-
mains free as before to seek another.
(2) A public employer's decision not to retain a
probationary employee did not ordinarily constitute
a deprivation of property. The terms of the re-
spondent's appointment secured absolutely no interest
in reappointment for the next year. They supported
absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to re-
employment .
Issues relative to pre-termination hearings were
decided in Papadopoulos v. Board of Higher Education . The
court held:
66Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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Whether a public employee is entitled to a pre-
termination hearing depends upon his entitlement
to continued employment, i.e.
,
his job security;
the existence and extent of a public employee'sjob security depend upon state law governing public
employment.
The court indicated that employment contract of
public employees may create the right to continue their
employment over and above that provided by statute or
regulation but such contract, standing alone, does not
create interest requiring due process hearing before
breach and employee's remedies are measured by law of
Q
contract, not by constitutional law.
Facts : Plaintiff is a state university professor
(Oregon) of mathematics from September 1967 to June
1970. In 1969, defendant or its subordinate offi-
cils, decided to deny plaintiff his tenure and to
terminate his employment. Plaintiff received a
written notice of non-reappointment dated February
25, 1969. In December of 1968, the tenured faculty
of the Plaintiff's Department voted 20-1 in favor
of indefinite tenure for plaintiff. The chairman
of the department added his own favorable recommen-
dation. These recommendations were forwarded to
John Ward, Dean of the School of Science, who in
turn did not recommend plaintiff for tenure.
Plaintiff appealed to the Review and Appeal Committee
of the Faculty Senate who after a review of his case
recommended to the president that indefinite tenure
be granted to Dr. Michael Papadopoulos . The president
after a review of the facts upheld plaintiff's non-
renewal in a letter to plaintiff dated September
24, 1969. The Faculty Senate thus formed an Ad hoc
Committee to study the situation. Their final report
again recommended that tenure be granted to the
plaintiff. The president, on Feburary 19, 1970,
advised plaintiff that after reconsidering the
^
^ Papadopoulos v. Board of Higher Education, 511
P. 2d (1973).
68 Papadopoulos v. Board of Higher Education.
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Faculty Senate ' s recommendations
, his decision(of September 24, 1969) remained the same. "Thisdecision is based on the judgment that the Ad hocCommittee's report concerning the adequacy ofperformance constitutes additional reasonabledoubt that tenure should be granted." Plaintiff
then appealed to the Board of Higher Education.
In March of 1970, the Board's Academic Affairs
Committee held a hearing on plaintiff's appeal.
Th® Committee limited its inquiry as to questions
of procedure. It concluded that proper procedures
were followed. Plaintiff filed with the circuit
court which ruled that the Board had to accord plain-
tiff a hearing on the grounds for the termination
of his employment. At the end of a four-day hearing
the Board ruled "that the decision of the Oregon
State University to grant indefinite tenure to
Dr
. Papadopoulos and not to renew his academic
appointment are affirmed."
Issue : Was plaintiff entitled to a contested case
hearing before the Board terminated his employment
effective June 1970?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : One of the Board's regulations in effect
at the time material to this case provided:
If any appointment of an academic staff member
—
not on indefinite tenure, is to be terminated
otherwise than for cause he shall be given a
timely notice of termination as follows:
at least twelve months' notice.
1969 Adm. Code Sec L-3-F.
The effect of this regulation is to entitle the Board's
academic employees to continued employment unless
and until they receive timely notice of termination
in accordance with the requirements of the regulation.
When June 1969 passed without plaintiff having been
told his employment would be terminated effective
June 1970 by somebody with authority to make that
statement, he then had an entitlement to continued
employment until June 1971.
In Schlecting v. Bergstrom , the court followed the
reasoning of Curran v. Laird: "not all operations of
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government are subject to judicial review even though
they may have a profound effect upon our lives. it
pointed out that all levels of government occasionally
make decisions based on "determinations that lie outside
sound judicial domains in terms of aptitude, facilities
and responsibility." The court went on to say that
personal decisions involving probationary employees are
such matters.
Facts : Plaintiff was discharged as a county
employee. She claims her discharge was an
arbitrary decision. A demurer was sustained
and plaintiff appeals.
Issue ; Did the plaintiff state a legal cause of
action?
Decision : No
,
Reasoning : The discharge of a probationary employee
as the plaintiff is not subject for review for ar-
bitrariness. The court went on to say: 'If we were
to entertain the claim that a probationary employee
discharge was arbitrary, then there would have to
be an examination of the reasons for the discharge
and the sufficiency of these reasons. This is a
familiar exercise when a tenured public employee
is discharged. If it is also necessary when a
probationary employee is discharged, then the dis-
tinction between two groups of public employees has
been rendered largely meaningless.'
Alberti v. County of Erie was a case in which a non-
tenured teacher at the Erie Community College was held to
69Schlecting v. Bergstrom, 511 P. 2d 846 (1973).
70 Schlecting v. Bergstrom.
107
be entitled to timely notice of termination. 71 Com-
pensation due to him was restricted to the pay for the
year m which he would have worked if he had not been
improperly terminated, less the amount of any earnings
that he received that year.
Facts ; Petitioner was hired by the Erie CountyCommunity College in September 1967. His appoint-ment continued for two years until it was termina-ted by the Urban Center in August 1969, allegedlvbecause of philosophical differences between thePetitioner and the board of directors of theinstitution. Petitioner had taught for twoyears and his status was as a non-tenured but fullterm employee. Plaintiff instituted an Article 78proceeding seeking reinstatement and back pay.
Defendant contends that the procedural rights are
not available to a faculty member who is not to be
rehired at the conclusion of his yearly appointment.
Issue ; Must notice of termination be given to a
term appointee? Should plaintiff be reinstated?
Decision ; 1. Yes.
2. No.
Reasoning : (1) The requirement that notice of termina-
tion be accorded a term employee (appointee) is not
obviated. The Faculty Handbook requires that written
notice be given to the term appointees as to whether
their appointments will be renewed not later than
February 15. The regulation under the Education Law
requires a written notice to term appointee who has
served for two years, not later than December 15.
Petitioner was not given notice of his termination
until May 1969 and even this was informal. No written
notice was communicated until actual termination.
Therefore, the decision not to rehire petitioner for
the academic year 1969-1970 was defective for lack
of timely notice. (2) Since the respondent (defendant)
had the right to terminate petitioner without stating
reasons, reinstatement is inappropriate. The purpose
of the notice requirement is to provide appointees who
71Albert v. County of Erie, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 343 (1974).
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are not being hired with an opportunity to looktor other employment. We conclude that thepetitionesr is entitled to an award for the amountor nis salary for the academic year 1969-1970, theyear that he would have worked had he not been im-properly terminated less the amount of any earninqhe received that year.
A non-tenured faculty person through his contract
of employment, does not have a property right in or
legal expectancy of further employment
. was the holding
in Shephard v. West Virginia Board of Regents
.
72
Facts : Suit was brought against the West Virginia
Board of Regents and others by a non-tenured
assistant professor who sought to compel her re-
employment for the 1973-74 school year, and to re-
cover the wages and benefits to which she would
have been entitled as such an employee during the
said school term. On the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the District Court held that (1) the defendant
did not have any property rights in or legal expectancy
of further employment, (2) she was given written
notice of her non-reappointment by a communication
more than 12 months before the expiration of her
appointment for the 1972-73 academic year, consistent
with controlling regulations, (3) she was not en-
titled to a statement of reasons for her non-reappoint-
ment or to a hearing thereon, and (4) the Board of
Regents and its members, in their official capacity,
are not "persons" within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Act.
Issue : Does the complaint state a claim upon which
relief may be granted?
Decision: No.
Reasoning :
authorized
modify and
lations re
tenure and
members at
diction
.
(1) The West Virginia Board
and empowered by law to make,
amend as well as enforce rule
lating to and controlling the
the non-reappointment of the
the state institutions under its juris-
In this case, the regulations controlling
of Regents is
promulgate
,
s and regu-
employment
,
faculty
72 Shephard v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 378 F.
Supp. 4 (1974) .
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1:he granting of tenure requires positive and
affirmative action. Plaintiff was not grantedtenure and had no property right in or leqal
expectancy of further employment. (2) Plaintiff
was given written notice of her non-reappointmentby communication of May 9, 1972, more than twelve
months before the expiration of her appointmentfor the academic year 1972-1973, consistent with
controlling regulations. The record discloses
no issue as to any claimed protected rights underthe First or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion. The plaintiff is not entitled to a statement
of reasons for her non-reappointment or to a hearinq
on it . ^
Burdeau v. Trustees of the California State College
hold that a non—tenured assistant professor 1 s personal
hope or even expectation of re-employment or his sincere
belief in his own qualifications gave him no hope or claim
7 3to a job for the ensuing year.
Facts : Plaintiff appeals an opinion of the District
Court dismissing without leave to amend the action
he had filed resisting the failure of the university
to rehire him. He was a probationary assistant
professor with a one year appointment. On February
19, 1971, plaintiff was informed by President Pfau
that he would not be re-employed. The letter gave
no reason for the action. By California statute, the
trustees have the power to provide by rule for the
government of their appointees and employees, inclu-
ding reappointment of non-tenured academic employees.
California State College, San Bernardino, has formu-
lated procedures which include a consultative process
for rehiring of professors. In accord with this
process, President Pfau obtained the evaluations
and recommendations of the Division of Social
Sciences Committee on Retention, Promotion and
Tenure: from the college-wide Committee on Retention,
Promotion and Tenure; and from the Vice President for
Academic Affairs. Individuals participating were to
7 3 ,
Burdeau v. Trustees of California State
College, 507 F. 2d 770 (1974).
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evaluate and base their recommendations onaching, professional recognized research and crea-tive activity and college service. All three
recommendations were considered by the presidentnhis decision. Plaintiff availed himself ofexisting grievance procedures and a hearing was heldupon his grievance. At the hearing, plaintiff
refused to proceed until he was furnished the evi-dence that the several committees or PresidentPfau had relied upon in making their determinations,
or until he had been given access to his personal
Z
2:,' With the matter in a standoff the plaintifffiled this suit. He claims a denial of his FourteenthAmendment due process rights.
Issue
:
Did the plaintiff have a legal right to the. 4- ~ V ^ _L _L
materials from the file of the committee?
Decision : No. Judgment Affirmed.
Reasoning : The grievant had no information from
the committees or their files as to their recommen-
dations of findings and he was entitled to none.
The Faculty By-Laws provide for the confidentiality
of the committee's findings and recommendations.
Therefore, where the state rules and the faculty rules
do not provide a grievant with materials from the
files of the committe, he may not be filing his
grievance to turn the proceeding into a fishing
expedition for the information he was not otherwise
entitled to obtain.
Lyman v. Swartley was a case in which a tenured
faculty person at the Idaho State University was terminated
without being given the opportunity to respond. The
court ordered the university to reinstate him and to pro-
vide him with monetary benefits because the Board of
Education in the termination process violated the plain-
74tiff's due process rights.
74
Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661 (1974).
Ill
t5
C
^
5 : Plainti£f is a tenured faculty member of theIdaho State University. in 1948, he began hisduties at the school and has an impressive academicbackground being a medical doctor and also holding
a doctorate in zoology. Defendants Swartly,
Alford, Deaton, Hay, Munson and Thatcher are members
of the Idaho State Board of Education which controls
the Idaho State University. Defendant Benoit was
not officially sworn in as a member of the board
to the act complained of . Defendant Davis is
the president and executive officer of the university
and subject to the orders of the Board of Education.
From April 3, 1973, through April 5, 1973, the board
was in session in Moscow, Idaho, for the purpose of
discussing faculty salaries, the input of faculty
members, and proposed reappointments of faculty mem-
bers at the institutions of higher learning in the
state. The board directed the president to provide
them with an indepth evaluation of Dr. Lyman on
April 5, 1973. This was a unique procedure and set
up an unprecedented occasion. Plaintiff was the one
and only person selected for evaluation. Defendant
Davis (President) delegated this duty to the Univer-
sity Faculty Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr.
Kenneth Smith. Faculty members elected by faculty
vote comprised the membership of this committee.
Smith convened his committee and they voted less than
unanimously to undertake their charge. An ad hoc
subcommittee was appointed to prepare and submit
the proposed guidelines for the evaluation process.
Lyman was then invited to express his ideas for in-
corporation into the guidelines. On April 13, 1973,
guidelines were formally adopted by the faculty
committee. The plaintiff responded to the proposed
evaluation quickly, positively and aggressively. He
talked to Dr. Smith on the telephone on April 16,
1973, and wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Smith with
copies to the board, to Davis, to the president of
the local Chapter of the American Association of
University Professors and of the Idaho State University
Faculty and Professional Association. He also posted
the letter on a bulletin board of the Biology
Department and placed one on the table in the Student
Union Building. The letter was admitted into evidence.
As a result of the letter all agreed that Lyman '
s
actions in writing the letter and talking to Smith
had the effect of making a fair and impartial evalua-
tion by the evaluation committee impossible. The
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Faculty Committee felt that it could proceed
fhat
r
^h
all
T’ •
There was a general consensus
discharge!
nt 3Ct constituted for
t
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Xl 23
'
1973
'
the board notified the plaintiffthat he was discharged because of his letter andtelephone cails which had in effect thwarted a directorder of the board, i.e., the evaluation of Lyman.
ob 3 ected to this discharge and on May 12,1973
'
aPPeaf
ed with counsel before a regular meeting
of the board. Mr. Benoit speaking for the board
announced that the board believed that it had the
authority to discharge Lyman and stated that thephone calls and letter constituted cause for hisdischarge. Lyman's counsel indicated that no dis-
charge of a tenured teacher without due process was
authorized to determine the existence of good cause.
The chairman offered to entertain a motion from the
b<^a^d to reconsider the discharge order but no motion
was offered. The meeting then adjourned. Plaintiff
represented by the attorneys of the Civil Liberties
Union then entered the suit.
Issue : Were the plaintiff's rights to due process
violated?
Decision ; Yes.
Reasoning
: (1) Tenure as a legal right means a rea-
sonable expectation of continued employment, so
long as the employment is performed properly. This
right of public employment is a property right. A
law. In such a case the due process requires as a
minimum: (a) specification of charges of conduct
or performance alleged to warrant deprivation of
continued employment, (b) an opportunity to respond
to those charges, and (c) a fair and impartial fact-
finding process to determine the validity or non-
validity of the charges. Here, the board without
affording the plaintiff any opportunity to respond,
determined, unilaterally, that cause for discharge
existed and purported to terminate the employment.
This action deprived the plaintiff of a valuable
property right without due process of the law. (2)
The court held that the plaintiff must be reinstated
in his employment status. He was entitled to be
reimbursed for the salary and other monetary benefits
he should have received had he not been wrongfully
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dischairged. Defendants were ordered to reinstatethe plaintiff and were restrained from any further
acts designed to interfere with the plaintiff's
right to employment except those in which dueprocess is provided. Money damages from the indi-defendants were denied as they were not
motivated by bad faith.
Plaintiff s contract as an instructor was not
renewed. The reason for the non-renewal was to allow
the employment of people working on their doctorate.
Pl^ifttiff claims this non—renewal was an infringement
of her liberty interests. The court held that the non-
renewal of the contract was not an infringement of
liberty interests in Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of
7 SLouisiana State University
.
Facts : Plaintiff sues under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was wrong-
fully discharged from her position as instructor
at the University of New Orleans, formerly Louisiana
State University in New Orleans (UNO) . She was
first employed as an associate in the Department of
Sciences at UNO for one semester from September
1964 to January 1965. She left UNO to complete
work on her master's degree in mathematics which
she received in June 1965. Plaintiff was appointed
as instructor of mathematics from September 1965 to
May 1966. She was offered and accepted three suc-
cessive appointments covering the periods September
1966 through May 1969. She only completed the first
semester of the 1968-1969 contract when she resigned
for maternity reasons. Plaintiff returned to UNO
in September 1969 and served as instructor of mathe-
matics for two successive academic appointments.
These were September 1969-May 1971. In February 1971
she was notified that she would not be reappointed at
UNO. Her period of notification was well within the
75Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana
State University, 386 F. Supp. 202 (1974).
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time recommended in the University Regulations andthe American Association of University Professors.Plaintiff taught from September 1971 to May 1972,
and she was not appointed for the following year!
In May 1972, plaintiff used the UNO grievance
procedure by requesting that her case be reviewedby a grievance committee which consisted of fivefaculty members. This committee concluded that
the plaintiff had not been unfairly treated and that
there was no basis for her grievance. At all
times after September 1965, the plaintiff's position
at UNO was that of instructor. According to the
University's By-Laws, the University Regulations,
and the Faculty Handbook, persons with the rank of
instructor are on an annual appointment and are not
eligible for indefinite tenure.
Issue : Does the plaintiff have a legal cause of
action for breach of contract?
Decision ; No.
Reasoning : (1) The non-renewal of employment of a
non-tenured teacher in order to implement a reduction
in the size of the faculty does not require notice
and hearing because such non-renewal does not stigma-
tize or label the teacher in a degrading way. As a
matter of law, the court could not say that the non-
renewal in order to reserve instructor's positions
for persons working on their doctorate degree resulted
in such stigma that her liberty interests were in-
fringed. (2) The record sufficiently showed that if
the college instructor was under the impression that
she had tenure, such an impression was not reasonable
in view of the year to year renewal of the contract
of employment, as well as the explicit provisions
on tenure in the University By-Laws, Regulations and
Faculty Handbook.
Another case dealing with the issue of the termina-
tion of contract of a tenured professor was King v. Conser -
vatorio de Musica de Puerto Rico . The findings in this
case upheld the violation of the plaintiff's due process
rights. A major factor in this case was the fact that the
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defendant institution received public funds and was
sufficiently entwined with the government to bring its
action under the restriction of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76
Facts: A civil rights action alleging that the plain-tiff was suspended from his duties and pay as
at
4.u
hS Conservat°rio effective on January
14, 1975 without a prior hearing and because he is
a. Negro and/or Stateside American in violation of his
rights to due process of law and of the Equal Protec-tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively.
A prayer is made for injunctive relief to stop thedefendant from unconstitutionally terminating plain-
s employment and for compensatory and punitivedamages together with costs and reasonable attorneys 1
fees. Defendant answered the complaint and argues that
the termination of the plaintiff's employment without
prior hearing was carried out in accordance with the
pertinent school regulations and, therefore, was
legal. All allegations founded on discrimination have
been denied. The regultions governing disciplinary
proceedings at the Conservatorio de Musica provide
full due process protection for all employees prior
to involuntary termination of employment— including
a prior hearing upon request. The regulations also
provide that a professor may be suspended without
prior procedural guarantees if both the Dean of
Administration and the Dean of Studies consider it
advisable. The defendants argue that the application
of this regulation was proper because "no student
wanted to enroll in the classes conducted by Professor
King and the fact that the hearings on the charges
would take more time, which would mean that there
would be no teacher for percussion during the semester
beginning in January was sufficient cause to take the
action of suspension."
Issues : 1. Does a tenured professor have a legal
right to a pre-termination hearing?
2. Is the plaintiff required to exhaust
his state remedies before going to the
Federal Court?
3. May a private beneficiary come within the
structure of the Fourteenth Amendment?
378
7 6 .King
F. Supp.
v. Conservatorio de Musica de Puerto Rico,
746 (1974).
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Decisions ; 1. Yes.
2 . No.
3. Yes.
Reasoning
: (1) The Supreme Court has ruled that "apublic college professor dismissed from an officeheld under tenure provisions has an interest in
continued employment that is safeguarded by due
process, and which includes the right to a priorhearing." (2) A Section 1983 plaintiff is not
required to exhaust the state remedies before cominginto the Federal Court: the federal remedy is separate,
and it supplements the state remedy. (3) The defendant
Conservatorio de Musica de Puerto Rico is a musical
teaching center at the University level subsidized
by annual appropriations by the legislature from
the Treasury of the Government of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico. Government financial support has
been held to bring a private beneficiary within
the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chung v. Park held that a tenured professor's con-
7 7tract may be terminated for incompetence.
Facts : This is a civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. section 1983 which was instituted by a college
professor at Mansfield College who alleged that his
constitutional rights had been violated when he
was terminated at the school. In a prior decision
the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
tenure under the college's tenure policy. The court
then heard evidence on the issue of whether Dr. Chung
received "due process" under the Fourteen Amendment
to the Federal Constitution in the proceedings which
led to his discharge. The Faculty Handbook sets
forth the procedures to be utilized by the college in
dismissing a tenured faculty member. The state claims
that is is immune from that part of the plaintiff's
claim which is based upon the embellishments to his
federal constitutional rights contained in the Faculty
Handbook. The Commonwealth made a motion for summary
judgment in the immunity ground at the time of the
trial which was denied. The Commonwealth also asserts
that when Chung accepted the type of hearing which had
been worked out by his attorney for the Commonwealth,
77Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524 (1974) .
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he waived his right to the type of hearing which
was prescribed by the Faculty Handbook. in any
event, the Commonwealth claims that the scope of
the hearings received by the plaintiff was in all
respects in conformity with the requirements of
the due process" clause of the Constitution. Dr.Chung received an eight day hearing. No interest
in liberty such as free speech was involved. The
hearing panel after an exhaustive hearing, clearly
found that Dr. Park's reasons for dismissal of Dr.
Chung were indeed motivated by the two factors
noted, intransigfence and incompetence.
1. May a college use sovereign immunity
as a defense?
2. Did Dr. Chung have a "due process
hearing"?
3 . Was there a breach of contract?
Decisions : 1. No.
2. Yes.
3 . Yes
.
Reasoning ; (1) The defense of sovereign immunity
can be waived by a general appearance and litiga-
tion in federal court. The court had no hint that
the Commonwealth would indeed raise this defense
until the receipt of a letter dated March 27, 1974,
by the Deputy Attorney General Robert F . Nagel sev-
eral days before the hearing. No evidence was in-
troduced on this issue at trial and legal argument
will not be entertained at this time. (2) Contrac-
tual provisions can be waived expressly or implied-
ly. Through the process of negotiation, Dr. Chung
made the conscious choice of obtaining a "due pro-
cess" hearing which had some procedural aspects
which were different from those employed in a nor-
mal tenure revocation proceeding. The burden of
proof rested upon Dr. Chung in his hearing. A
careful reading of the materials surrounding the
hearing afforded Dr. Chung has convinced the court
that the college came forward with all the evidence
necessary to establish that Dr. Chung's lack of com-
petency and that Dr. Chung had the opportunity to
refute all the evidence presented. The hearing was
held prior to the effective date of his termina-
118
tion of employment. (3) There was no breach of
to
n
fo^o„ Lfnsfield State Colle9e in failing^llow the precise procedure of the FacultyHandbook as Dr. Chung did not request that thoseprocedures be followed in his case.
A college librarian received a judgment for a one-
year renewal of her contract in Barrett v. Eastern Iowa
Community College
.
78
This was a case in which how does
one terminate a contract was an issue. The court, for
colleges and universities ruled that the college librarian
to whom statutorily required notice that the Board of
Directors was considering terminating her contract was
mailed with 65 cents postage due and who did not receive
a second notice, which was properly stamped, until three
days after the statutory deadline, did not receive timely
notice of her termination and thus her contract was
automatically renewed for an additional year. 79
Facts: On May 15, 1970, plaintiff and defendant
entered into a written employment contract, under
which the plaintiff agreed to serve as libraian and
receive from the defendant $916.00 on the last
day of the month for 12 consecutive months start-
ing on the last day of September 1970. The term of
the employment was to begin on August 24, 1970 and
end on July 30, 1971. Code section 279.13 in regard
to such contracts required the college by certified
letter
,
to mail the notice of termination not later
than the tenth of April.
On March 25, 1971, the defendant's board of
directors decided that contracts for Marguerite
Barrett, librarian, and
,
be terminated effective
7 8 Barrett v. Eastern Iowa Community College, Dist.,
221 N.W. 2d 781 (1974)
.
79Barrett v. Eastern Iowa Community College.
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at the end of the 1970-71 academic year and thatthe board Secretary be directed to mail lettertermiriate by March 26, 1971
,
andletters of termination by April 10, 1971 asprescribed by Chapter 279, Section 13 of' the Codeof Iowa. The board Secretary on March 26, 1971
] and by certified mail, with proper stampsattached, mailed to the plaintiff a "Notice ofConsideration of Termination of Teacher's
continuing contract." On April 6, 1971, the
secretary of defendant's Superintendent took atyped letter of termination addressed to theplaintiff, Davenport, Iowa. She testified thatWhen I came to the post office substation at theSchlegal Drug Store in Davenport, I had a 6-cent
stamp, which was required on it, and I told thelady at the substation what I wanted, and that I
wanted the letter mailed Certified Mailing and Ipaid for it and obtained a receipt. The receipt
of the substation was made out by the lady at the
post office substation." When the letter was
delivered to the plaintiff at her home in Clinton
it was stamped "Certified Mail" and "Postage Due
65 cents. Another certified letter, with proper
postage attached, was mailed on April 13, 1971.
Defendant concedes the second mailing was not timely.
Following April 13, plaintiff was afforded a hearing
before the board. It made no change of the termina-
tion action voted, without plaintiff's knowledge on
March 2
.
Issue : Was the contract legally terminated?
Decision : No.
Reasoning : (1) Statutory provisions specifically
require the college by certified letter to mail the
notice of termination not later than April 10. The
verb mail means: To place a letter or other mail
matter, properly enveloped or packaged, addressed
and stamped, in a mail slot, mail chute, or mail box,
provided by the post office department for reception
of mail, or to deliver a letter or other mail matter
so prepared to a postman or letter carrier employed
by the department. The trial court without the benefit
of Flanders v. Waterloo Community College erroneously
applied the substantial compliance rule. Plaintiff
on the record made was entitled to a judgment declaring
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defendant had failed to give termination noticenot later than April 10, 1971, and therefore hercontract was automatically renewed for anotheryear.
Another case arising out of retrenchment was the
American Association of University Professors, Bloomfield
College Chapter v. Bloomfield College
.
80
This case
involved a collective bargaining contract as well as
a personal contract. The law of contract was applied
consistently in this case.
f^c^ts^
. Action for declaratory relief and specific
performance in relation to the academic tenure of
faculty members at Bloomfield College. Bloomfield
College is a private institution of higher education
licensed under the laws of the State of New Jersey.
Plaintiff is a labor organization within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
section 152, and for the purposes of Article I,
paragraph 19 of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution,
which has been certified and recognized by the
National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive
representative for collective bargaining on behalf
of the college faculty. The individual plaintiffs
include faculty members who seek clarification of
their claimed tenured status and those services have
been terminated and seek reinstatement to their
former positions. Their periods of accumulated
service range from 8 to 22 years. In addition to
Bloomfield College, also named as defendants are
Merle F. Allhouse, president of the college, and
the individual members of the college board of trustees.
The legal basis for the claim of tenure is to be
found in the Faculty Handbook of the college under
the heading of "Bloomfield College Policies on
Employment and Tenure." This document forms an
essential part of the contractual terms governing
the relationship between the college and faculty.
Under paragraph C thereof tenure is a means to certain
ends, namely: (1) freedom of teaching and research
o n
American Association of University Professors v.
Bloomfield College, 322 A. 2d 846 (1974).
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and of extramural activities anri (o\ = _ cc-degree of economic security to make the professionattractive to men and women of ability Tenure(freedom and security) are indispensable to thesuccess of an institution in fulfilling its obliqa-tions to its students and to society. Followinq aPe
^?da° f S6Ven YearS ' which a11 theplaintiffs completed, subparagraph C (3) provides:
•
*
:
a teacher will have tenure and his
services may be terminated only for adequate
cause, except in case of retirement for age,
°r under extraordinary circumstances because
of financial exigency of the institution.
Fertinent also in subparagraph C ( 6
)
of the "Policies"
which provides:
Termination of continuous appointment because
of financial exigency of the institution
inust be demonstrably bona fide. A situation
which makes drastic retrenchment of this sort
necessary precludes expansion of the staff
at other points at the same time, except in
extraordinary circumstances.
On June 21, 1973, the Board of Trustees adopted
Resolution R-58 which in material part resolved:
Upon the recommendation of the Executive Committee,
the President, the Dean of the College, and
with the advice of faculty size due to financial
exigency, and in accordance with the action of
the Board on March 1 and of the special
Evaluation Committeee for the reduction the
recommendation of the Academic Affairs
Committee that thirteen faculty members be
terminated in the reduction of faculty size due
to financial exigency, the following persons
be informed that they will be terminated as of
June 30, 1974, and their duties for the
1973-74 academic year be defined to include no
teaching, participation in College governance,
or voting privileges.
Defendant Allhouse on June 29, 1973, notified 13 mem-
bers of the faculty that it was his "unpleasant duty
to inform you that the Board of Directors, at its
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eeting on June 21, 1973, took action to terminateY.ur services as part of the reduction of the facultysize due to financial exigency." On the same day,all the remaining members of the faculty, tenured
J^n°r^nU Ted ' ™?re notified by letter memorandumthat at the June 21 meeting, the Board of Trustees
in°i/?10n/° effect that every faculty membershould be informed that all the 1973-74 contracts
are one year terminal contracts." Between June 21,1973, and the commencement of the school year, the
college engaged the services of 12 new and untenuredfaculty members, defendants assert that they werehired to replace others who were lost to the school
over a period of time as the result of "normal
attrition," not those who were terminated under
Resolution R-58.
Issues ; 1. Did the action taken follow from a bona
fide belief on the part of the Board of
Directors in the existence of a financial
exigency?
2. Was there sufficient evidence of "exi-
gency"?
Decisions : 1. No.
2 . No
.
Reasoning : (1) The court held that the actions of
Bloomfield College with respect to the tenured status
of its faculty members in terminating the services of
some and placing others on one year employment con-
tracts under the circumstances presented overflowed
the limits of its authority as defined by its own
policies, and therefore failed to constitute a legally
valid interruption in the individual plaintiffs'
continuity of service. Whatever other motivations
defendants might have had, they have failed to demon-
strate by a preponderance of the evidence that their
purposed action in good faith related to a condition
of financial exigency within the institution. (2)
Further confirming the impression that the defendant's
primary objective was the abolition of tenure at
Bloomfield College, not the alleviation of financial
stringency, is their careful eschewal of other
obvious remedial measures such as across the board
salary reductions for all faculty members and the
reduction of faculty size by the non-renewal of con-
tracts with teachers on probationary status, rather
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than the termination of those who had earned tenuredstatus by years of competent service. The reasonsof economy were used in a subterfuge. Therefore
be in^d? ^ tSnUred teachars i> held to
Meetings of the minds" concept in the law of
contract was the essence of Tobin v, Louisiana State
8
1
"
~
Educatlon
- Here, the court held that there cannot
be a contract unless the wills of the parties coincide,
and even when there has been unequivocal communication
of consent in writing, obligations arising from it still
may not be enforceable if the consent has been produced
by some vice 82
Facts: Suit for damages arising out of breach
of contract. Judgment was for dismissal and the
plaintiff appeals. In March 1969, the plaintiff
was employed teaching history at the Southern
University in Baton Rouge. Plaintiff was in his
sixth year of teaching and held the rank of Assistant
Professor. In a conference with his department
chairman (Dr. Cobb), plaintiff told him’ that he in-
tended to pursue a Ph.D. degree in history during
the academic year of 1969-1970. On March 19, 1969,
Mr. Tobin wrote Dr. Cobb saying that he did not
plan to work at Southern during the 1969-1970
academic year. Plaintiff applied for admission
to two graduate schools. On or before May 1, 1969,
the plaintiff had either been rejected by both
schools or knew that he was going to be rejected.
After a short time the plaintiff received a letter
dated May 1, 1969. At the bottom of the letter was
a place for the plaintiff to indicate whether his
services would or would not be available to Southern
for the coming year. Plaintiff did not sign or
return the letter.
Plaintiff testified that he had received a similar
8
1
Tobin v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 319
So. 2d 823 (1975)
.
8 2
Tobin v. Louisiana State Board of Education.
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th
?
year before
'
which he had not returnedand that he had eventually received his contract*'of employment. in early August 1969, the plaintiffreceived a contract for the 1969-1970 school yearsigned by the president of the university. The plain-
within
1
^^ ^
^ returned it to the university
a few days. in the middle of August thepiaintiff testified that he had a brief^eeiing
with Dr. Cobb at the post office at Southern.He testified that he told Dr. Cobb that he had
S
S
uS'i'
Ved a contract
- He could not remember Dr.Cobb s response. Dr. Cobb had relinquished hispost as Chairman of the History Department to Dr.Moran at that time. He had no recollection of the
meeting. On September 5, 1969, the plaintiff calledDr. Moran to inquire why he had not been called to
return to work. The plaintiff testified that he
was told that he would be placed on the registration
committee, but he heard nothing further. Dr. Moran
testified that he told the plaintiff that he had
not been called because he was not expected to
teach during the coming year. On September 19,
1969, the plaintiff sent a telegram to the president
of the university asking if the university intended
to honor the contract of employment. The Dean of
the College of Arts responded the same day, saying:
Appears contract missent through clerical
error. Department Chairman indicated your
intention to return to school. Consequently,
no courses assigned you this fall. Kindly
inform me of your plans for further study.
Plaintiff consulted counsel and entered this suit.
Plaintiff testified that had he not received the letter
of May 1, 1969, and the contract, he would have sought
employment elsewhere. He relied on the contract with
Southern University. It is clear from the testimony
in the record that both the letter of May 1 and the
contract were sent in error. The plaintiff was not
expected to teach in the 1969-1970 academic year
and a replacement was obtained for him that year.
Issues : Did the plaintiff have a valid contract?
Decision
:
No. Judgment Affirmed.
Reasoning : The court held:
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It was clear from the evidence offered that
Dlaintiff
U
h
1VerS
t
t
v
SSnt thS contract to the
to of fp^t-hp
mistake
,
and that it never intendeder t e position to him. since the plain-tiff never advised the university of any changein his plans to further his education, he musthave known that he was not expected to teachm the 1969-1970 year. His own consent to the
contract was flawed. This was because when he
signed the contract, he knew or should haveknown that it did not represent the true in-tention of Southern University. If the wills
of the party concurred in anything, it was thatthe plaintiff would not teach at Southernduring the 1969-1970 academic year. The court
went on to indicate that it is fundamental in
our law of contract that there can be no con-
tract unless the wills of the parties coincide,
^"ticle 1766 of the Civil Code provides that no
contract is complete without the consent of both
of the parties.
Under evidence that the teaching professor was
appointed temporarily to the university, and that uni-
versity regulation allowed termination of temporary ap-
pointments at will, the university’s termination of a
professorship without citing cause was within the terms
O O
of the contract was a rule of law in Pryles v. State .
Facts : Claim is for damages arising from the alleged
wrongful discharge of plaintiff from his position of
Professor in the Pediatric Department of the state
Medical Center of the State University of New York
(School). In 1965, plaintiff was hired to serve
jointly as the Director of Pediatrics at the Brooklyn
Jewish Hospital and Professor of Pediatrics at the
Medical School. In addition to being in charge of
the hospital's pediatric department and the teaching
of pediatrics at the hospital to medical students
of the school, his professional duties would also
include supervising the other doctors teaching
83Pryles v. State, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 628 (1975).
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pediatrics at the hospital. Plaintiff' <= ann„'
ment was temporary, apparently because hi s
P
salary
wo,n5
aid
+
eX?1US1Vely by the hospital and the schooluld not give permanent appointment to professorswhose salaries it did not pay.
r
vears
t
unfi?
e
J;r
d dual caPacity for seveny t l he was discharged by the hospital inovember 1972 because of dissatisfaction with theperformance of his administrative duties. The schoolwas aware of plaintiff's problem with the hospitalbut did n°t object to his discharge. On January 23,1973, plaintiff wrote to the then president of theschool requesting clarification of his status withthe school indicating that he declined to stay atthe schooi. The president replied on February 26,1973, that when the plaintiff's activities at thehospital terminated, "it is my obligation to alsoterminate your professorship." Plaintiff then enteredthis claim for damages for loss of wages, loss of
reputation, and reinstatement.
Issue : Does plaintiff have a cause of action in
contract for breach?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The plaintiff's letter of appointment
clearly specified the appointment unequivocally stated
a temporary appointment was terminable at will. The
representations which allegedly were made by the
employer are not only inadmissible to bind the
state because of their hearing nature, but they are
also immaterial. There are no ambiguities (the
regulations are definite on the termability of
temporary appointments) and that rule proscribes the
use of prior oral representations to vary the terms of
the contract. The court, therefore, finds plaintiff
only received a temporary appointment in 1965. By its
terms, said appointment was terminable at will by the
president of the school. The court further held
that prerequisites for a tenured continuing appoint-
ment were not present here and, therefore, such an
appointment could not rise by estoppel or otherwise.
Michigan College Federation of Teachers v. Lake
Michigan Community College involved rights of faculty who
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participated in a strike. This case brought forth the
following rule of law: Due process liberty interests
are not implicated when a teacher is charged with failure
to meet minimum standards in his professional relationship
with students.
^
fHflf
:
unTnn
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erS communitY junior college andtheir io brought action against college boardtrustees, college and the president of thecollege for reinstatement with damages after theteachers had been discharged for allegedly partici-pating m an illegal strike. The District Courtentered a temporary restraining order which was
vacated by the Court of Appeals. The United States
M
1S
?
r
i
Court for the Western District of Michigan,Noel P. Fox, Chief Judge, granted remedial relief
against the college and the college appealed. TheCourt of Appeals, Harry Phillips, Chief Judge, heldthat m the circumstances of the case the strikingteachers did not enjoy the protection of the dueprocess clause in that teachers were not deprived
of a property interest or a liberty interest by
discharge; and that even if the teachers were
within the protection of the due process clause thehearings to be conducted before the college board of
trustrees would not be procedurally deficient.
Issue: Were plaintiff's due process rights violated?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : Where the only fact that community college
board of trustees would be called upon to decide was
whether a particular employee in fact participated in
illegal strike and board's sole objective in conducting
hearings is to assure that the innocent teachers were
not mistakenly identified as strikers, hearings on
discharges would satisfy the procedural due process
requirement of an impartial decision maker even though
college was the party against whom the strike was
directed
.
84 .Michigan College Federation of Teachers v. Lake
Michigan Community College, 518 F. 2d 1091 (1975).
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Holstrop v. Board of Junior Colleges pointed out
that even if the president of the Public Junior College
deceived the board by the manner in which he submitted
the renewal of his contract, this fact did not establish
that he did not have property interest subject to due
process protection. Apart from the fact that had not it
been superseded, the earlier contract would have been in
effect at the time of termination. The new contract
was at most voidable for fraud. As there was a genuine
dispute on the issue of fraud, the president, asserting
denial of due process in connection with his discharge,
had a claim of entitlement that gave him a right to a
hearing. This was true with respect to the issue raised
by contention that there was no meeting of the minds on
8 5the new contract.
Facts : Plaintiff was appointed President and Chief
Administrative officer of Prairie State Junior
College in Chicago Heights by the defendants through
a series of contracts which extended his tenure un-
til June 30, 1972. On May 25, 1970, as part of his
official duties, plaintiff prepared a confidential
memorandum for circulation among his administra-
tive staff which requested that the staff consider
certain proposed changes in the college's ethnic
studies program for discussion at the next staff
meeting. An unknown party made the memo public.
Plaintiff, on July 13, 1970, was summoned to the
office of the Counsel of the board and told he had
the choice of resigning or being fired. The publi-
cation of the memorandum was mentioned as the basis
for firing but he was told that he would be fired
without notification. A list of charges that
^Holstrop v. Board of Junior Colleges, 523 F. 2d
569 (1975).
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supposedly justified his termination was givenhim after his termination. Plaintiff claimedthat the facts showed a deprivation of his riqhtt0
j
f
^
ee speec^ and a denial of due process of lawand his contract rights. District court held forthe defendants.
Issue: 1. Were the First Amendment rights
violated?
2. Did plaintiff have a property right
in his job?
3. Was the Board empowered to make more
than a one year contract?
4. Did the plaintiff get a fair hearing?
Decision : 1. No.
2. Yes.
3. Yes.
4 . No.
Reasoning : (1) The evidence indicates, and the Dis-
trict Court could properly have found, that the
board members were disturbed because a memorandum
proposing the repudiation of their commitment to
continue the ethnic studies program for another
year was withheld from them until the fortuitous
leak to the newspaper compelled its disclosure to
them, which occurred less than three weeks before
the date proposed in the memorandum for effectuations
of this highly controversial action; and this "timing
and concealment" rather than expression of views "in
the memorandum" constituted one of the reasons for the
board's action. The facts do not show a violation
of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. (2) Plain-
tiff had a claim of entitlement to his job even as-
suming he deceived the defendant by the manner in
which he submitted the form for the new contract.
Apart from the fact that the earlier contract covering
the period July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1971, would still
have been in effect if the new contract had not super-
seded it. The new contract was at most voidable for
fraud, not void. So long as there was a genuine
dispute on the issue of fraud, plaintiff had a
claim of entitlement that gave him a right to a hear-
ing. The same is true as to the issue raised by the
contention that there was no meeting of the minds
assuming that issue to be analytically different from
the fraud issue. (3) In 1927, the Illinois General
Assembly conferred on school boards the power to con-
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prlnclpals and superintendentst p iod o three years after an expiration ofa two year period. Thus, we think that the boardempowered to enter into contracts for a duration oflonger than one year. in the case at bar, the boardprior to the April 1970 election, purported toextend plaintiff's contract until June 30, 1972 ortwo years beyond its term. After the mid-April
' elec-tion, the new board did not object to the plaintiff's
new contract and permitted him on July 1, 1970, to
commence serving under it. This adoption of the
contract by the new board meant that plaintiff had
a valid contract at least through June 30, 1971.
This is so whether plaintiff was working under his
original (1969-1971) or his superseding (1970-1972)
contract. We also conclude under the enabling
statutes and the board ' s own rules adopted pursuant
to the statute, the board had authority to contract
with the president of the college for a period of
more than one year. (4) The court stated "our review
of the evidence leaves us with the definite and firm
conviction that plaintiff was never offered a fair
hearing on termination, and that, in fact, the board
prejudged his case before making any hearing available
to him.
"
The court decided two rules of law relevant to
colleges and universities in Decker v. Worcester Junior
College . They are: (1) If a college drops a formal proce-
dure requiring that a faculty member be given notice as
of a certain date if he is not to be reappointed to the
faculty, the college can be bound to the terms of the
8 6procedure; and (2) The Executive Committee of the College
Board of Directors, in adopting "a policy of seeking to
establish probable enrollment for the coming year in
sufficient time to permit decisions to be made on faculty
needs, and to allow faculty contracts to be extended on or
8 6 _ .Decker
909 (1975).
v. Worcester Junior College, 336 N.E. 2d
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about March 1 annually f " had not adopted a policy to
effect that the reappointment of a faculty member was
automatic unless he received notification on or about
March 1 that he was not to be reappointed.^^
Facts; College faculty members who were not re-
appointed brought a bill seeking determination thatthey had been reappointed for another academic yearbecause they had not received a lawfully effective
notice of the termination of their appointments.
The plaintiffs were reappointed in March 1972 to
the faculty of the defendant college for the academic
1971—1973. Each had received and countersigned
annual letters of reappointment in prior years.
Allegedly, because of the college's financial
problems, neither one was reappointed for the 1973-
1974 academic year. They sue seeking a determina-
tion that they, in effect, had been reappointed for
another academic year because they had not received
a lawfully effective notice of the termination of
their appointment pursuant to an alleged policy and
practice of the college.
Issue: Were the plaintiffs rehired for the 1973-1974
academic year?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The Executive Committee of the college's
Board of Directors adopted the policy of seeking to
establish probable enrollment for each coming year in
sufficient time to permit decisions to be made on faculty
needs. This allowed faculty contracts to be extended
on or about March 1st annually. This policy does not
contain a commitment to the plaintiffs or an assurance
of reappointment in the absence of notice to the
contrary
.
Under college and university's teacher's tenure law,
pursuant to which State Board of Education adopted regula-
tions imposing a three year probationary period, and by
87 Decker v. Worcester Junior College.
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virtue of a special contract resulting from the teacher's
accepting appointment as a university teacher, upon
affirmative representation that tenure was acquired after
three years of satisfactory probationary service, teacher
acquired tenure upon completion of such and was entitled
to all rights and privileges inherent in that status,
even though it was the practice to grant tenure only
upon the recommendation of the university president and
upon approval of the state board was the rule in State ex
8 8
rel Chapdelaine v. Torrence .
Facts : Appellee (Chapdelaine) applied to Tennessee
State University for a position of Assistant Pro-
fessor. The Dean of Faculty, on May 27, 1966, noti-
fied in writing that he was being recommended to the
State Board of Education for employment effective
September 15, 1966. The Dean advised: "The
University offers the faculty certain fringe bene-
fits such as: Teacher retirement, tenure after three
years of satisfactory service, group life and hospital
service, free admission to all University-sponsored
cultural and athletic programs and social security
benefits." Appellee relied upon this offer of ap-
pointment and their representations and accepted the
tenured position and received a letter from the Dean
finalizing his appointment. He was re-employed for
the next two years and completed his three-year pro-
bationary period in June 1969, and was employed for
the school year 1969-1970. His salary was also in-
creased. Statute provided for tenure for a teacher
who has been employed by the Board and has served
for at least three school years. The president of
the State University thought the probationary period
was five years and gave tenure only after a satisfac-
tory probation period of five years.
Issue: Did Appellee acquire tenure under his con-
tract of employment?
88 State ex rel Chapdelaine v. Torrence, 532 S.W.
2d 542 (1975)
.
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Decision ; Yes.
Reasoning : Appellee accepted appointment inreliance upon the affirmative representation thatamong the fringe benefits offered by the universitywas tenure after three years of satisfactory serviceThis created a viable understanding that satisfactoryservice for three years would result in tenure
status. A college can create a contractural re-lationship, independent of tenure laws, which would
r
f
SU
i
t
i
n tenure. Courts may apply the conventional
standard of transactions in the marketplace to any
agreements reached by the unqualified acceptance
of an unqualified offer.
ihe terms of employment by contract is property
interest which cannot be extinguished without conforming
to dictates of due process and this property interest con-
sists not only of right of receipt of money under employ-
ment contract but also to hold the position in a maxim
law set forth by McClanahan v. Cochise College
.
89
Facts : McClanahan was a continuing education teacher
who was first employed as a full time classroom teacher
and subsequently as a Dean of Occupational Instruction.
His contract had been renewed for more than four
consecutive years of employment with Cochise College.
His contract for 1972-1973 was as Dean of Occupational
Instruction. His total tenure at the college was in
excess of eight years. On June 9, 1972, he was given
until February 1, 1973 to resign as Dean of Occupational
Instruction. On January 19, 1973, the governing board
of Cochise College gave him notice that his services
with the institution would be terminated. In ac-
cordance with Policy 2019 of the College Manual and
Policy 2006 he requested a hearing. Prior to the
hearing set for April 1973, plaintiff's attorneys were
notified that the college would not allow faculty
witnesses to be called to testify in plaintiff's behalf
nor would a transcript of the hearing be made available.
Plaintiff brought an action in the U.S. District Court
which ordered a hearing before the Governing Body of
O Q
McClanahan v. Cochise College, 540 P. 2d 744
(1975) .
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Cochise College. The hearing was held and plain-tiff was terminated for cause.
Issue : 1. Whether the due process hearing must be
held prior to the termination of the
contract or can it be held post-termina-
tion?
2. Is a community college district a political
subdivision of the state?
Decision ; 1. Either.
2. Yes.
Reasoning : A term of employment by contract has been
recognized as a property interest which cannot be
extinguished without conforming to the dictates of
due process. This contractual property interest
consists not only of the receipt of money under the
employment contract, but also of the right to hold
the position. The court also said:
once it is determined that due process
applies, the question becomes—what due
process is due? Due process if flexible
and calls for such procedural protection
as particular situation demands.
McLachlan et al., v. Tacoma Community College Dis-
trict No. 22 laid the precedent that Community College
teachers who knew they were hired on a full time basis
for one year to replace teachers on sabbatical leave and
who were employed under contracts in which they waived
"all rights normally provided by the tenure laws of the
state," validly waived their rights to statutory notice
of non-renewal of their one year contract, despite argu-
ments that public policy prohibited such waiver. They also
validly waived their statutory right to converging of
evaluation committee to review their progress in their
135
progress in their teaching courses. 90
Facts ; Four instructors, who were employed atdefendant community college, under part time teachinq
contracts for the 1971-1972 school year, sued seek-ing reclassification of their status to full timefaculty appointees and enforcement of statutory
tenure rights. Superior Court entered summaryjudgment for defendant and dismissal of complaint.
Plaintiffs appeal.
Part A
Facts : Two plaintiffs, McLachlan and Wiseman were
employed by the college for the 1970-1971 school
year under full time teaching contracts. Their
contract provided in part:
This contract is written for one year only.
During that time, the employed waives all
rights normally provided by the tenure laws
of the State of Washington.
They taught during the 1970-1971 school year and
were not notified of any decision that their full
time contracts would not be renewed. However, at
the time of contracting, they were told their em-
ployment was to replace full time instructors on
sabbatical leave. In September 1971, McLachlan and
Wiseman were offered part time teaching contracts
for the fall of 1971 and later for the spring of
1972.
Issues : 1. Did McLachlan and Wiseman validly
waive their right to statutory notice
of non-renewal of their one-year
contract?
2. Did they validly waive their statutory
right to continuing evaluation?
Decisions : 1. Yes.
2. Yes.
Reasoning: (1) Neither McLachlan nor Wiseman filled
a vacant, full time teaching position. Both knew
they were being hired to replace faculty who continued
90McLachlan et al., v. Tacoma Community College
Dist. No. 22, 541 P. 2d 1010 (1975).
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lp2°W A h?lr tenured Positions while on sabbaticaleave. A teacher may waive the statutory renewal
notice provisions in advance of the notice date,provided he knows the purpose of his employment isto replace the regular occupant of that position
who is on a one year sabbatical leave. McLachlan
and Wiseman validly waived their rights to statutory
notice of non-renewal of their one year contract.
(2) We also see no serious reason why a probationaryfaculty member should be prohibited from waiving
the benefit of a possible recommendation to tenured
status after an abbreviated period of teaching.
Part B
Facts : Adams and Shelley were employed by the
defendant to teach under a part time quarterly
contract, in the 1970-1971 school year. In the
1971-1972 year, they accepted contracts to teach
in excess of 10 hours per week in the 1971-1972
school year. Interim, a collective bargaining agree-
ment was signed by defendant which provided:
No faculty member who teaches more than
ten credit hours unless he replaces a
person for one year on a sabbatical leave.
A person who has taught more than ten hours
per quarter during the 1970-1971 year on a
part time basis is excluded from this limita-
tion for 1971-1972 year only.
Plaintiffs claim this agreement is arbitary, irra-
tional and unenforceable.
Issue : Is the collective bargaining agreement arbi-
trary, irrational and unenforceable?
Decision: No.
Reasoning : The court found that the collective bar-
gaining contract enlarged the number of persons to
whom part time contracts could be offered and,
specif icially as to Adams and Shelley, preserved for
them the right to teach (and be paid for) a greater
number of hours than otherwise would have been
available to them. The court further held that: we
do not find that an instructor's contractual obliga-
tions under a full time contract are distinctly dif-
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ferent fr°m and greater than an instructor's
obligations under a part time contract.
At the end of each yearly appointment, assuming
proper notice, the school administration could choose
not to renew college teacher's employment for any reason
or for no reason other than for a constitutionally im-
permissible reason such as race. Even assuming a col-
lege teacher received a favorable tenure recommendation
from his immediate peers in the faculty, Nace v, Oregon
State System of Higher Education held this did not create
any right to tenure under the statutory scheme, as
personnel decisions as to faculty members are made by
the Board of Higher Education and its subordinate offi-
91
cials
.
Facts : Petitioner appeals from a decision of the
State Board of Higher Education made by its sub-
ordinates, affirming the non-renewal of his
annual appointment to the faculty at the Oregon
College of Education. Petitioner received a
series of three one year appointments to the OCE
faculty. They were "yearly tenure" appointments.
They provided that the petitioner could not be dis-
charged during the year except for cause, but did
not guarantee that petitioner's employment would
necessarily be renewed for following years. After
three years' employment, petitioner was entitled
to one year's notification that his employment
would not be renewed. At the end of the petitioner's
third year, college officials notified him that his
fourth year would be his last. Petitioner objected
to that decision. A series of informal efforts to
mediate the dispute were unsuccessful. The Board,
through counsel, then afforded petitioner a formal
91
543 P.
Nace v. Oregon
2d 687 (1975)
.
State System of Higher Education,
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contested case hearing pursuant to the Administra-tive Procedures Act, ORS Ch. 183. The formal
was conducted before a subcommittee ofthe Faculty Welfare Committee of the OCE FacultySenate. The committee recommendations were
generally favorable to petitioner. On review,
the college president's findings and conclusions
were all adverse to petitioner, the ultimate
conclusion was "the termination" of Dr. John B.
Nace as a faculty member of Oregon College of
Education is hereby affirmed."
Issue : 1. Does the Due Process Clause prohibit
the government from depriving citizens
of liberty or property?
2. If a faculty person receives a favorable
peer evaluation for tenure, does this
recommendation create any "right" to
tenure?
Decisions : 1. No.
2 . No
.
Reasoning : (1) All the Due Process Clause requires
is that, in circumstances such as these, government
action be preceded by allowing the affected citizen
an opportunity to be heard. The court indicated
that petitioner was heard thus, the possible existence
and extent of his alleged property interests are
now irrelevant, and (2) The court clearly indicated,
but assuming for the sake of discussion that
petitioner received a favorable tenure recommenda-
tion from his immediate peers on the faculty, this
does not create any right to tenure. Under the
statutory scheme, ORS 351. 070(1) a, personnel de-
cisions are made by the State Board and its subordinate
officials— in other words, the administration.
Statutory provisions that Regents of a university had
power to remove any officer connected with the university
when, in their judgment, interests required that it was
insufficient to justify discharge of the head football
coach from the university in absence of evidence that the
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coach was an officer of the university was a holding
ln Feldman v. Regents of New Mexirn . 92
Facts: Plaintiff is a head football coach wasischarged during his contract term. He suedfive theories for recovery of damages.When defendants moved to dismiss, parties
sstipuiated that the motion to dismiss be con-
sidered a motion for summary judgment.
Issue: Is defendant entitled to a summary judgment?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : Absent a showing that the plaintiffdid or did not exhaust his administrative remediesprior to this suit, the court held that the
defendants failed to make a prima facie showing
entitling them to summary judgment.
Contracts between board of regents of state
university systems and faculty members included relevant
state laws and consitutional provisions as they existed
when contracts were signed in a rule of law from Georgia
Association of Education v. Harris . 93
Facts : This is a class action, under the 1871
civil rights statute, seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief with respect to certain contracts
of employment between the Board of Regents of a
university of Georgia system and faculty members.
This action was filed by the Georgia Conference of
American Association of University Professors, the
Georgia Association of Educators, and certain
aggrieved faculty members of those associations
against the Board of Regents of the university
system of Georgia. The plaintiffs attack the announced
intention of the Board of Regents not to honor the
9 2Feldman v. Regents of New Mexico, 540 P. 2d 872
(1975)
.
9 3 Georgia Association of Education v. Harris, 403
F. Supp. 961 (1975)
.
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stated salary terms of the plaintiff's faculty
employment contract for the 1975-1976 academic
year as violative of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Georgia Constitution. Defendants
moved to stay proceedings pending adjudication of
pending state court proceedings.
Issue : Should defendant's motion be granted?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : All of the substantial claims raised
by the plaintiffs arise from the alleged breach of
the employment contracts by the defendant Board of
Regents and the dimensions, interpretation and
construction of the subject employment contract is
a matter of state law. Basic contract law dictates
that all contracts include relevant state laws and
constitutional provisions. The instant action is
in the state court, therefore motion granted.
Collins v. Wolfson was a case in which in a period
of retrenchment, several Miami-Dade Community College
teachers were not rehired. This action was to implement
a reduction in the size in college personnel. Question
arose in litigation as to whether or not the trustees of
the college made their decision of non-renewal in light
of their established criteria. The court held that a
tenured teacher has the legal right to a due process hear-
ing. The purpose of the hearing would be to assure that
his position was in fact 'discontinued' within the mean-
ing of the contract and, if he was instead the victim of
a 'reduction in force' that the trustees made their
decisions pursuant to their previously announced cri-
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teria. 94
Facrbs: Suit by seven instructors who allegethat their non-renewals were effected pursuantto an arbitrary and subjective set of criteria
employed by the Board of Trustees in determining
which teachers would not be rehired on the
school's implementing a reduction in the size
of personnel. One of the four instructors chargedthat his non-renewal was retaliatory in nature topunish him for participation in a well published
demonstration at the Democratic NationalConvention in July 1972. Two instructors chargedthe arbitrary nature of the board's evaluative
criteria. One claimed that he enjoyed the Miami—
Dade s genre of tenure, a "continuing contact" and
that this vested property interest was not
summarily defeasible by the board's couching the
termination as a "reduction in force" rather than
as a discharge. In an amended complaint, three
additional instructors joined as plaintiffs
alleging that, although their employment was not
terminated, their constitutional rights were vio-
lated by a college official's depositing in their
files an uncomplimentary memorandum charging
neglect of duty for their unexcused absence from
campus on the morning of February 7, 1973, and in-
viting their response to these charges. The Dis-
trict Court dismissed the entire suit for failure
by all plaintiffs to state a claim for relief under
U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.
Issues : 1. Did the non-tenured faculty have a
legal cause of action?
2. Did the faculty person alleging genre
of tenure have a legal cause of action?
Decisions : 1 .
2 .
No
Yes
Reasoning : (1) There is no mere conjecture that the
possibility that subjective standards could mask an
improperly grounded failure to renew. To bring
themselves within section 1983, they must allege
that the trustees' employing these criteria actually
operated in some manner to deprive him of presently
enjoyable First Amendment rights. The trustees'
^Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F. 2d 1100 (1975).
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failure to renew the contracts was not any alleqed
wrongdoing, but simply that someone on the facultyhad to go because of a necessary reduction in staff
size. In fact, by definition, a reduction in force
means that someone who otherwise would likely beinvited to stay must be relieved. Employing ad-
mittedly general criteria or guidelines is thus
confined to determining who among qualified in-
structors is more or less expendable, rather thandeciding who on the faculty has so misbehaved as to
warrant dismissal for cause. There is simply no
"stigma" or "badge of infamy" associated with this
sort of non-renewal. (2) The tenured faculty person
should have been permitted by the court to establish
entitlement to such a hearing
,
the purpose of which
would be to assure that his position was in fact
'discontinued' within the meaning of the contract
and, if he was instead the victim of a 'reduction
in force,' that the trustees made their decision
pursuant to their previously announced criteria.
In Busbee v. Georgia Conference A.A.U.P
.
,
the court
held: Contracts which were entered into by Board of
Regents and faculty members at institutions of university
system after effective date of Act appropriating sum
for salary increases for university system personnel but
prior to the effective date of the appropriate Act amend-
ment eliminating such funds for salary increases, after
it became apparent that revenue estimate for fiscal year
was excessive, and which contained no provisions that
payments provided for were subject to reduction depending
on availability of funds, were valid contracts and were
binding on Board and any failure to make payment under such
95
contracts would constitute a breach of contract. The
Q C
Busbee v. Georgia Conference A.A.U.P.,
2d 437 (1975) .
221 S.E.
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court further held that the Board of Regents of the
University system of Georgia is a person in law, able
to sue and be sued and that it does not have sovereign
immunity in a suit for breach of the express terms of
a contract which it is authorized to and has entered
into. It also declares that the governor does not have
statutory authority to enter into faculty employment
contracts not to sue and be sued therein.
Facts : A suit for declaratory judgment instituted
by and on behalf of certain faculty members at
institutions of the University System of Georgia
seeking an adjudication that certain employment
contracts entered into by the Board of Regents
of the University System of Georgia are valid and
binding. The defendants are George Busbee, Governor,
Johnnie L. Caldwell, Comptroller General, Gayden
W. Hogan, Director of the Fiscal Division of the
Department of Administrative Services and the Board
of Regents of the University System of Georgia and
its members. The trial court ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs and the defendants appeal. The
General Assembly met in regular session beginning
in January 1975 and enacted an appropriations Act
for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1975,
appropriating almost two billion dollars based on
a revenue estimate of $1,823,000,000 plus. The
Georgia Constitution prudently provides that the
General Assembly shall not appropriate in any fiscal
year more money than it expects to collect in revenue
during the fiscal year plus that which it has on
hand in revenue sharing funds. The appropriations
Act for the fiscal year beginning in July 1, 1975
was approved by the Governor and became effective
on April 25, 1975. It appropriated to the Regents,
among other purposes, $223 million for personal
services (salaries and wages) at its instructional
institutions. In addition, that Act appropriated
$11,500,000 for salary increases for University
System personnel and approximately $44,500,000 for
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salary increases for certain other state employees
such increases to commence September 1, 1975 .Once the Governor approved the appropriations Actthe Board of Regents executed contracts with many'faculty members increasing their 1975-1976 salaries
over their 1974-1975 salaries by varying amounts.When the Governor realized that the revenue esti-
mate for FY 1975-1976 was excessive, he called a
special session of the General Assembly which metfrom June 23-July 3, 1975. The General Assembly
amended the FY 1975-1976 appropriations Act by re-ducing it almost $125 million. Included in this
reduction was the $56,000,000 state employee salary
increase provisions, including the $11,510,000 to
fund salaries. Plaintiffs are faculty members who
received salary contracts between April 25, 1975,
the effective date of the original FY 1975-1976
appropriations Act, and July 3, 1975, the effective
date of the repeal of those increases. The Regents
announced that the plaintiffs and other faculty
members who received contracts containing salary
increases will not be paid those increases but
will be paid their 1974-1975 salaries.
Issues ; 1. Did the Board of Regents breach the
plaintiffs' contract for the 1975-1976
academic year?
2. Did the Amendments to the appropria-
tions Acts which the General Assembly
enacted, impair the obligation of
plaintiffs' employment contracts?
3. Did the Regents' failure to honor the
plaintiffs' contracts violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
of Georgia?
Decisions
:
1. Yes.
2 . No.
3. No need to decide.
Reasoning : (1) The court considering the merits noted
that the faculty contract forms do not contain a
provision to the effect that the payments provided
for therein are subject to reduction depending upon
the availability of funds as provided by the appropria-
tions Act and Amendments thereto. The faculty em-
ployment contracts entered into between April 25 and
July 3, 1975 are valid and binding upon Regents and
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that nonpayment thereof according to their writtenemS constitute a breach of such contract(2) No economic necessity vital to the interestsof the people m the state has been sufficientlyshown to invoke such power as the state may have toimpair the obligation of its contract.
Dissenting Opinions : (Issue of Sovereign Immunity)
' A
.
mai°rity of this court has heldtnat this litigation is controlled by the 1785
statute and its predecessor Acts relating to theold corporation
_ known as the Regents of the UniversitySystem of Georgia and that because of those Acts
*T
e Presant department of State Government known asthe Board of Regents of the University System ofGeorgia has no sovereign immunity, I conclude thatthe Board of Regents of the University System is adepartment of State Government with the same degree
of sovereign immunity as any other department of
State Government.'
A Central Virginia Community College teacher, who
was non-tenured, applied for a multi-year contract and
was denied the contract. He criticized the report which
was the basis for the decision not to grant him tenure.
His criticism was misinterpreted as threats to various
college officials and he was dismissed. In Phillips v.
Puryear
,
he won his suit when the federal district court
held that he had been denied procedural due process prior
to dismissal and was due his back pay. The court also
held that no punitive damages would be assessed against
96the defendants.
Facts : Plaintiff complains that his dismissal from
his teaching position as an Associate Professor of
Health, Physical Education and Recreation at CVCC
violated his constitutional right to procedural due
96Phillips v. Puryear, 403 F. Supp. 80 (1975).
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process of law and freedom of speech.
Issues: 1. Was the college president impartial
plaintiff's adversary hearing?
2. Did plaintiff's dismissal violate his
constitutional right to freedom of
speech?
Decisions : 1. No.
2. Yes.
Reasoning;: This is not a case in which plaintiff's
contract was not renewed because of his failure to
maintain good relations with fellow faculty members.
In this case, plaintiff was dismissed in the middle
of a school year, and branded a 'substantial threat
to the welfare of the institution' solely on thebasis of two brief conversations with fellow faculty
members
. The speech which resulted in these severe
sanctions against plaintiff was a criticism of a
report which had stigmatized him. There is no doubt
that the plaintiff's rights under the Constitution
allowed him to criticize the report of the Ad Hoc
Committee and those persons who prepared it and
it is further clear that this criticism as such could
not be a basis for his dismissal and stigmatization.
The court found that the plaintiff's statements to
the two faculty persons were remarks and the later
personal reactions could not make them threats. It
should be noted that in relief in this case plaintiff
was ordered reinstated in a teaching contract for
the current school year because he was dismissed
and stigmatized in violation of his constitutional
rights
.
On the basis of fraud, the court held, "damages re-
coverable in action against community college district
board for negligent misrepresentation as to the source
of funding for teacher position were damages for any in-
jury which was the direct and natural consequence of fact
that the teacher who was not told that position which he
moved to Arizona from Alaska to accept, was specially
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funded, they acted on the faith of the district
board s representations and special funds ceased to be
97
available" in Van Buren v. Pima Community College .
Facts : Husband and wife who resigned teaching
positions in Alaska and moved to Arizona so that
the husband could accept position there for the
1972-1973 school year brought action against
community college district board, alleging
that husband had not been told that his position,
which was not renewed when special funds were no
longer available, was dependent upon the ex-
istence of special funds. Superior Court awarded
damages in amount of $3,000 and the plaintiff's
appeal asserting that the damages were in-
adequate and that punitive damages should have
been awarded.
Issue : Should the court award punitive damages?
Decision ; No
.
Reasoning : The trial court could have legitimately
concluded that the losses allegedly incurred after
the 1972-1973 school year were the result of the
appellant's decision to remain in Arizona.
In Billmeyre v. Sacred Heart Hospital of the Sisters
of Charity, Inc. y an Instructor of Practical Nursing's
contract was held to be automatically renewed in the
absence of proper notice of non-renewal, even though the
school was funded by a federal grant subject to the
9 8
annual renewal.
Facts: Action for breach of an employment contract.
The Circuit Court rendered judgment for the defendant
hospital and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of
^ 7Van Buren v. Pima Community College District,
540 P. 2d 763 (1975)
.
^^Billmeyre v. Sacred Heart Hospital of the Sisters
of Charity, Inc., 331 A. 2d 313 (1975).
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Appeals held that there was testimony that thehospital's School of Practical Nursing had beenfurnished by federal grants routed through theState Department of Education, and that funding
was for a one-year period and renewed annually,
the letter agreement whereby either party could
terminate the employment contract at the end of
the school year by giving notice in writing to
the other not later than May 1 of such year was
not tailored to meet realities of supportive pro-
gram and, absent an ambiguity, could only be read
as meaning that the contract was automatically
renewed for a second year in the absence of notice.
The plaintiff's conduct, in whatever its form
could not be said to have justified her dismissal,
as permitted by contract, in accordance with the
hospital's personnel policy, in the absence of
evidence that an effort was made to terminate the
plaintiff's employment in a manner contemplated by
policy. Plaintiff seeks to recover $10,037.48 in
damages for breach of contract. By letter agree-
ment dated 15 October, 1972, Mrs. Billmeyre was em-
ployed as a Coordinator-Instructor in the hospital's
School of Practical Nursing.
Mrs. Billmeyre was on a 30-day leave of absence for
surgery in April-May, 1973, and on her return
received a letter written on 13 May from Sr. Mary
Agnes, the hospital's Director of Nursing Services
which indicated that Sister did not think it wise
for Mrs. Billmeyre to continue in the Practical
Nursing Program. The principal thrust of Mrs.
Billmeyre ' s argument is that the contract must be
construed as renewing itself for another year in
the absence of notice from either party prior to
1 May
.
Issue : Is the contract ambiguous?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The court indicated that the hospital '
s
School of Practical Nursing had been funded by federal
grants, routed through the State Department of
Education, and that funding was for one-year periods
and renewed annually. The difficulty with the
letter agreement was that it was not tailored to
meet the realities of the supportive program. To
make it fit would require us to write a new contract
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for the parties, which we cannot do.
Where the probationary period for Associate
Professor was three years, at the beginning of the
plaintiff's full third year as Associate Professor of
History he was notified that he would be employed for
the fourth year but he was specifically informed that
the letter of rehiring was not a notification of
tenure and prior to completion of his third full year
he was notified that he would not be granted tenure and
that his employment would be terminated at the close
of his fourth year. Re-employment for the fourth year
did not work an automatic grant of tenure, and hence,
the Professor complaining of the wrongful termination,
had no property right to continued employment, was the
99holding in Kilcoyne v. Morgan .
Facts : Associate Professor of History brought
suit against the University Board of Trustees and
others to recover for alleged wrongful termination
of employment. Both sides moved for summary judgment.
The District Court held that where the probationary
period for Associate Professors was three years,
at the beginning of the plaintiff's full third
year he was notified of continued employment for
the fourth year but was specifically informed that
the letter rehiring was not a notification of
tenure and prior to the completion of his third
full year, he was notified that he would not be
granted tenure and that his employment would be
terminated at the close of the fourth year, re-
employment for the fourth year did not work an
automatic grant of tenure and, hence, the plaintiff
had no property right to continued employment.
^Kilcoyne v. Morgan, 405 F. Supp. 828 (1975).
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Issue : Did the plaintiff acquire tenure?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : Plaintiff had clearly not completed
the probationary period requisite to receiving
tenure when he was notified of his dismissal.
There is no provision in the Faculty Manual that
no faculty member can be employed without tenurebeyond the expiration of his probationary period.
Paragraph G of Section I of the Appendix B states
:
'Appointments without tenure are probationary.
'
The plaintiff, therefore, has never had tenure and
has no property right. The court further found no
requirement in the Faculty Manual to continued
employment
.
In Green v. Richmond
,
the following concept of the
law of contract was held: where there is no conflicting
evidence as to the terms of the oral contracts, construc-
tion of those terms is a matter of law for the judge
rather than the jury.^^
Facts : An action in the nature of quantum meritum
against the personal representative of the estate
of decedent to recover for services rendered by
the plaintiff in reliance on the decedent's oral
promise to leave a will bequeathing his entire
estate to her. The Superior Court entered judgment
for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
Issues : 1. Was the oral agreement illegal on the
theory that it included sexual inter-
course or cohabitation as part of the
consideration?
2. Should a preliminary showing of re-
liability have been required before
the amount of inventory?
Decisions : 1. No.
2 . Yes
.
100Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 691 (1975).
151
Reasoning
: ( 1 ) The oral agreement involved apromise to make a will, and as such was not
^nd
d
no?’
H°wever
' if the oral agreement was legala t contrary to public policy, the olaintiff
^
h\ fair of her services. Fromthe totality of the evidence, the jury was warrantedm inferring that the illicit relations were not
P2
r
^u°
f the Plaintiff 's performance. (2) The value
° the estate is relevant. The court indicatedtnat at the same time it recognized the great
P
?
t
??
tiality for unfair prejudices even if the value
of the estate were accurately shown. The likelihood
of irremediable unfair prejudice would be greatlyincreased if the value of the estate was substantially
overstated. A preliminary showing of reliability was
required before the amount of the inventory, which
may or may not have been reflective of the value of
the estate, was disclosed to the jury. While in
most cases the requirement of fairness would be
met by the fact that the defendant had the opportunity
to prevent rebuttal evidence. This is not the case
here
.
Plaintiff Blouin, in Blouin v. Loyola University
claimed that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were infringed upon when defendant did not renew his
teaching contract. The issue in this case was were various
alleged state involvements by the university sufficient
to support a finding of "state action." The court held
that the alleged state involvements by the university were
insufficient to support a finding of "state action" and
therefore the court did not have jurisdiction under
Civil Rights laws.^ 01
Facts : Appellant brought suit for damages against
Loyola University (Loyola) and certain of its
officials, claiming that his First Amendment right
of free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right of
101Blouin v. Loyola University, 506 F. 2d 20 (1975).
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due process had been infringed when the defendant
university refused to renew his teaching contract.
The district court granted Loyola ' s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the suit on the basis
that Loyola was not clothed with state action and
that the court had no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
1331. Appellant alleges certain facts which he
contends result in the requisite "state action."
He asserts that Loyola is the sole owner and
operator of a radio station and a television
station which are licensed under the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 and are subject to its
regulatory provisions. Additionally, appellant
points out that Loyola, as a private, non-profit
corporation, enjoys certain federal and state tax
exemptions. He claims that it receives substantial
federal and state monies in the form of grants,
subsidies, student scholarships, and loans. Appellant
suggests that a finding of state action would be
justified by the fact that Loyola is a corporation
organized and incorporated under the laws of the
State of Louisiana.
Issue : Were appellant's rights to due process and
free speech infringed upon when his contract was
not renewed?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning: Although university, against which
teacher brought suit, claiming university refused
to renew his contract, owned and operated a radio
station and television station which were licensed
under Federal Communications Act, although the uni-
versity as a private, non-profit corporation, enjoyed
federal and state tax exemptions, although it re-
ceived federal and state money, and although it was
organized and incorporated under Louisiana law,
those factors were not of the nature, kind or degree
necessary to support a finding of "state action," and
federal jurisdiction did not exist. The licensing
of an otherwise private entity by the government
does not, of itself, require a finding of state
action. Furthermore, the record does not disclose
any "nexus" between the alleged unconstitutional
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activity and the purported federal and state
government involvement. Accordingly, the orderof the district court dismissing the complaintis affirmed. ^
Where a letter which was sent by the chairperson
of the Department of Otolaryngology at the Medical School
to a physician, concerning the possibility of the
physician joining the staff of the medical school made
reference to the "Promotion and Appointment Committee"
which would have to approve any hiring suggested by the
chairperson, the "best offer" made in the letter from
the chairperson was not the type of an offer which the
physician could accept in such a manner as to form a
binding contract, but rather it was merely a recommenda-
tion which the chairperson would pass along to the
appropriate committee, was the rule of law in Jacobsen
r . 102v. Leonard.
Facts : In the fall of 1971, the plaintiff received
a telephone call from Dr. Leonard, chairperson of
the Department of Otolaryngology at Jefferson, re-
garding the plaintiff's availability to join the
staff of Jefferson, in that department. Plaintiff
who was a citizen of the State of Colorado, expressed
interest in the position. By a subsequent letter,
he made arrangements to visit the Jefferson facilities
in Philadelphia on December 18-21, 1971. He was to
meet personally with Dr. Leonard. The visit sub-
sequently took place during which time the plaintiff
and Dr. Leonard discussed the particulars of the
position, the salary range, academic title and
general hiring and promotional policies at Jefferson.
On December 29, 1971, Dr. Leonard wrote the plaintiff
and offered him the position of Chief of Audiology
102Jacobsen v. Leonard, 406 F. Supp. 515 (1976).
154
Center
S
ir?h«
Dir*Ct°r of the Hearing and Speechat the rank of Assistant Professor Thestarting salarywas to be $18,000 per year. Plain-
fu i
n hlS reP 1y letter expressed disappointmentwith Dr. Leonard's offer and stated that he
hn^?Ln0t 2?ly^ t0 bSgin aS the Chief of Audiology,but also as the director of the Hearing and SpeechCenter and at the Associate Professor level.Dr. Leonard then offered the plaintiff, by a letterdated January 13, 1972, the same position and
starting salary as stated in the December 29th offerbut at the higher rank of Associate Professor, andthe opportunity to become the director of theHearing and Speech Center at a later time if plain-tiff's interim performance was satisfactory. OnJanuary 18, 1972, plaintiff accepted Dr. Leonard'slatest offer and proceeded to make arrangements to
move to Philadelphia, which included the sale of
his house and termination of his employment in
Colorado. By letter dated January 31, 1972, Dr.
Leonard rescinded his offer for the reasons that
the majority of the staff of the Hearing and Speech
Center opposed plaintiff's joining the staff under
the terms contained in the January 13, 1972, letter,
and that the rank and promotion steps contained in
that letter would find little support at the level
of the office of the Dean of the medical school.
Issue ; Did the court err in not granting a motion
for directed verdict?
Decision ; Yes.
Reasoning ; There is no question that Dr. Leonard did
not have expressed or implied authority to enter
into binding employment contracts on behalf of
Jefferson. The plaintiff did not attempt to prove
his case on the merits of such authority. Plaintiff
did, however, contend and attempt to prove thoughout
the trial that Dr. Leonard had apparent authority
to enter a binding employment contract. While it
may be true that the plaintiff subjectively believed
that it was not possible for the appointment committee
to turn him down, he is nevertheless charged with
the knowledge that Dr. Leonard did net possess final
hiring authority. Thus, it held that the plaintiff
had knowledge that further steps of approval were
required before hiring. In light of this knowledge,
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plaintiff could not have relied in qood faithupon the apparent authority of Dr. Leonard.
Re-appointment in a non-tenured status, or back
pay in lieu of re-appointment, was the appropriate remedy
for failure to give timely notice of re-appointment to
a non-tenured instructor who had been employed by the
university for more than two years was held in Simon v.
Boyer
.
103
Fact_s: Petitioner was employed as an instructorm the Department of Physical Education for Men atthe State University of New York at Buffalo from1965 to 1969. On July 1, 1969, he was appointed
to the position of assistant professor of physical
education and served in that capacity until June
1972. In the summer of 1971, just prior to the
commencement of petitioner's seventh year of
university service, his employment record was
reviewed by the President's Board on Faculty Promotion
and Tenure which recommended to the Chancellor of
the State University that petitioner be denied tenured
status and that his employment be terminated at the
end of the next academic year. Because petitioner
had been employed by the university for more than
two years, he was entitled to twelve months' notice
that he was not to be reappointed, but such notice
was not given petitioner until December 21, 1971.
Petitioner thereupon commenced a grievance proceeding
under the collective bargaining agreement in effect
between the university and its professional employees,
contending that because he was not timely notified
of his termination he was entitled to be reappointed
for another full academic year commencing in September
1972 and that such reappointment must carry with it
an automatic conferral of tenure under 8 NYCRR 355.4(b).
The grievance proceeding culminated in arbitration,
under a broad stipulation of power in the arbitrator,
and an award was made directing that petitioner be
reappointed for an additional academic year but without
tenured status. Throughout these grievance proceed-
ings petitioner urged that under the terms of the
collective bargining agreement and the stipulation
103 Simon v. Boyer, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (1976).
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the arbitrator was empowered to award him tenure
^n"l^Pr°Priate remedy * Petitioner commenced thisproceeding as an action for declaratory judgmentseeking a determination that the arbitrator waswithout power to grant him tenure under the col-lective bargaining agreement and ordering thattenure be conferred upon him notwithstanding the
arbitrator's award.
Issue: Should tenure be conferred under his
contract?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : Reappointment in non-tenured status, orback pay in lieu of reappointment, is the appropriate
remedy for failure to give timely notice of reappoint-
ment in this situation. Petitioner's appointment
additional year did not grant him tenure
rights. Tenure may not be conferred by a back-door
maneuver. Furthermore, by attempting to enforce
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
so as to confer power upon the arbitrator to award
tenure, petitioner elected his remedy and cannot
later be heard to repudiate the same terms and
contend that such power was not conferred. For pur-
poses of the doctrine of election of remedies, in-
consistent remedies are those which proceed on opposite
and irreconcilable claims of rights. The test is
whether the facts necessary to support one remedy
are consistent with the facts necessary to support
the other.
A community college teacher whose employment was
terminated because of her exercise of First Amendment
rights of free speech and free press was entitled to
specific performance even though her contract was one for
personal services was the holding in Endress v. Brookdale
„
104Community College .
Facts : Plaintiff is a discharged community college
teacher who had served as a faculty advisor to the
*- 04Endress v. Brookdale Community College 364 A.
2d 1080 (1976)
.
157
college s student newspaper. she brought a civilrights action against the college and its presidentand members of the Board of Trustees. Plaintiff
Vq 7 i
e an edlt°rial which aPPeared in the April 26,
l °
f thS Sta11
'
the student newspaper ofwhich she was the faculty advisor. it accused thechairman of the Board of Trustees of a conflict ofinterest in allegedly "making a deal" whereby his
nephew s company received a contract from the colleqe
or the furnishing of audio-visual equipment. Thepresident in recommending plaintiff's dismissal
asserted as the alleged causes for such action, her
violation of "both the tradition established underboard policy and the philosophical platform andgoals of the college as the same pertain to freedom
of the press and student responsibility for the college
newspaper," and of the "editorial prerogative of the
student editor and the student staff," in ordering
and directing the editor of the newspaper "to publish
certain material without his approval" and "in causing
the publication of libelous material contrary to
accepted journalistic standards." The Superior Court,
Chancery Division, entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and awarded compensatory and punitive
damages and attorneys' fees and defendant appealed.
Issues
:
1. Did the evidence sustain finding that
the teacher had been terminated for
exercise of First Amendment rights?
2. Should college officials have known
that termination for that reason violated
the teacher's First Amendment rights
so that qualified immunity could not be
asserted?
3. Could college officials assert qualified
immunity with respect to the contention
that they should have known that
termination without a hearing violated
due process rights of the teacher?
4. Could punitive damages be awarded against
the president?
5. Were the compensatory damages excessive?
1. Yes.
2 . No.
3 . No.
4. Yes.
5. Yes.
Decisions
:
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Reasoning
: (1) The court found that there is noproof m this case that the plaintiff's activitiesled to a material or substantial disruption of classW
$
r
l!u
0r
^°i.
a substantial disorder or to the invasionof the rights of others. The court said it "perceived
no countervailing public interest which would
-justify
a restriction of plaintiff's First Amendment
activity." (2) Lack of intent on the individualdefendant's part (except President Smith) to violateplaintiff s constitutional rights would not necessarilybe a defense, if they should have known that their
conduct would have that effect. The court said thatit cannot be said that the individual defendant
reasonably should have known then that their action
would violate a clearly established constitutional
right of plaintiff to a procedural due process, i.e.,
the right to a hearing. (3) The court pointed out
that careless disregard or negligent ignorance of
clear, well established constitutional rights will
not insulate the defendants from liability. The sum
of $2,500.00 as punitive damages in the case of Presi-
dent Smith is a sufficient penalty to impose upon him
for his wrongful conduct and as a deterrant against
such action in the future. Punitive damages are
"allowed to punish the wrongdoer for a willful act
and to vindicate the rights of a party in substitu-
tion for personal revenge thus safeguarding the public
peace." Taking into accord the absence of proof of
any significant emotional effect upon the plaintiff
as the result of the action taken and considering
factors referred to above, the sum of $2,500.00 will
fairly and adequately compensate her for the depriva-
tion of her civil rights.
Under the circumstances in Anapol v. The University
of Delaware
,
the court held that a college professor's
confession of forgery did not eliminate the necessity
105
for pre-termination procedural protections.
Facts : Plaintiff was employed by defendant from
1960 through December of 1975. In the fall of 1974,
he attained the rank of Associate Professor. At this
time, he submitted a dossier to the Promotion and
''^Anapol v. University of Delaware, 412 F. Supp.
675 (1976).
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enure Committee of his department in support of hisapplication for promotion to rank of Full ProfessorAmong the publications in Dr. Anapol
' s dossier was
a photocopy of an article written by him for a publica-tion cal led the Barrister
. The masthead at thetop
f
irst Pa9e of this article contained the headingTrial Lawyers Association" beneath its title logo.The application for promotion was not granted. Durinqthe fall of 1975, plaintiff Anapol again submitted hisdossier for promotion and this time periodic faculty
evaluation. The dossier again contained the articlein barrister
,
but this time the volume number and date
were missing. Investigation proved that plaintiff hadforged a letter, purportedly from a Philadelphia
attorney, praising the Barrister
. It was also found
that Dr. Anapol had not been candid when questioned in
the
. course of this investigation by his department
chairman. Dr. Berten (Department Chairman) set forth
these conclusions in a memo. The ultimate result was
that, effective December 31, 1975, Dr. Anapol was
terminated for cause pursuant to a December 17, 1975
letter of Dean Gouldner (falsification of documents)
.
Dr . Anapol sued and his motion for a temporary restrain-
ing order was denied on December 29, 1975. The motion
for preliminary injunction was merged with the merit
of Dr. Anapol 's procedural due process claim and this
case was tried in the court on January 23, 1976.
Issue ; Whether the Due Process Clause guaranteed to
Dr. Anapol procedural safeguards which he was not
awarded?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning ; Dr. Anapol was not accorded the pre-
termination procedural due process to which he was en-
titled. He must be reinstated with back pay. This does
not mean the university cannot hereafter terminate
Dr. Anapol 's employment based on the events which gave
rise to this litigation, provided adequate procedural
safeguards are afforded him. If such charges are re-
instated against him and processed with reasonable
alacrity, the university if it determines suspension to
be in its best interest, need not return Dr. Anapol to
the classroom or campus pending final disposition of
those charges.
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What is of interest to this research is the fact
that the court in its decision went on to point out the
reason that it could not honor a plea of the defendant in
relation to the collective bargaining agreement was due
to the ambiguous terms of the contract.
Implicit in Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Blooms
-
berg State College
,
was the rationale that termination of
a contract is an event which solidifies positions in the
inference that a professor, after notification of the
opportunity to prepare and fully present his side of the
case prior to that event. Skehan ' s minimum requirements
at the pre-termination stage:
(1) clear notice of the charges being considered;
(2) a reasonable time interval to marshall facts and
evidence
;
(3) an explanation of the substance of the evidence
supporting the charges, and
(4) an opportunity to present his side of the case
in a manner which will permit the decision maker
to weigh both sides.
Facts : Plaintiff was terminated during his contract
term on the grounds that he had failed to fulfill his
"classroom obligations" and "had flagrantly, wilfully
and maliciously disrupted the instructional program."
He was notified in writing of those charges by the
president of the college on October 9, 1970, and given
106Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsberg State
College, 538, F. 2d 53 (1976)
.
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an opportunity to respond in writing within fivedays. On October 23, 1970, the Trustees terminatedhis employment effective October 17. On December 1,1970, the Committee on Academic Affairs was convenedto hold a hearing concerning dismissal. The courtheld that the professor was entitled to a pre-termina-tion hearing and that the December 1 post-terminationhearing did not meet the requirements of due process.
Judgment for plaintiff with minimal damages, plaintiff
appeals. Remanded from the Supreme Court to the
United States Court of Appeals for an opinion.
Issue: Is the plaintiff entitled to an award of
attorney's fees under the theory that he had acted as
a "private attorney general"?
Decision : Dependent on Facts—Case Remanded.
Reasoning : The theory upon which it was suggested that
the district court could award attorneys' fees—the
private attorney general theory—has been foreclosed by
Alaska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society
and the obduracy ground was not previously considered.
We reward this aspect of the case to the district court
for additional findings on the obduracy issue. The
court went on to vacate its prior judgment and that of
the district court and remanded the case for finding
of fact. The court clearly indicated that if Skehan's
only contract right expired by its term at the end of
the 1970-1971 academic year, and there was no First
Amendment violation, a back pay award against the in-
dividual defendants, covering the 1970-1971 period, must
be considered.
Reassignment of the college president's assistant
for community affairs to the position of "Acting Associate,
Office of the Vice President for Planning and Development"
was within the District of Columbia's Board of Higher
Education's discretion to assign duties to such person under
employment contract which required him to perform all duties
assigned to him by the president or the board was a legal
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determination in Robertson v. District of Columbia Board
Board of Higher Eduration 107
Facts: Appellant was employed at Federal City Colleqe
l q 7
9
J
r°m July 1970 t0 June 30
' 1973. On June 9
9
•
e ®^tered into a one year employment contractwith Appeliee Board of Higher Education, signed bythe president of FCC. The contract was to serve asthe Assistant to the President for Community Affairs
1 o
n JU
!
Y 1972 and to terminate on
*
June 30, 973. On July 28, 1972, the president ofFCC was relieved of his duties and Dr. Elgy Johnson
was later named acting president. The employment con-tract incorporated a memorandum of understanding whichpermitted the president of FCC to terminate or modifythe contract for acts detrimental to FCC, but only "in
accordance with established policies and procedures
of the Board of Higher Education." Appellant agreed inthe contract to "undertake and perform those duties
assigned to him by the President or the Board of Higher
Education." Suit was brought by the Appellant against
the District of Columbia Board of Higher Education for
equitable relief and actual, compensatory and punitivedamages on theory that the board had breached plain-
tiff |s one year employment contract to serve as college
president's assistant for community affairs by withhold-
ing paychecks, by reassigning him to the position of
"Acting Associate, Office of the Vice President for
Planning and Development," by willfully and maliciously
denying him a step increase in salary, and by willfully
and maliciously failing to renew his contract. The
Superior Court awarded plaintiff the amount of one with-
held check, but otherwise found in favor of the
defendant. Plaintiff appealed.
Issue : Did appellant prove a breach of his employment
contract?
Decision: No.
Reasoning : The appellant did not establish either a
breach of his employment contract or an intentional
tort or constitutional deprivation on the part of the
appellees. Each event appellant argues to be an adverse
action is authorized or allowed under the terms of the
107 Robertson v. District of Columbia Board of Higher
Education, 359 A. 2d 28 (1976).
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contract itself either expressly or impliedly.Appellant agreed in the contract to perform all
hoard
S as
D
Slgned to him by the president or the
arasiistan^^Tvf^ of .5PPellant from his positiona sistant to the president thus falls withinappellees discretion to assign duties to appellantThe contract did not provide for step increases orautomatic renewal. Appellees agreed to pay appellanta fixed salary for his one year contract, which wasdone, and appellees agreed to give appellant 90 days'
notice of nonrenewal of his contract, which also wasdone. Appellees' actions in these respects did notbreach their contract with appellant, but rather werem accord with that contract.
In the case of Bruce v. the Board of Regents for the
Northwest Missouri State University
, the court ruled that
a non-tenured state university faculty member, who had a
written contract which provided for sabbatical leave and
required him to serve at least two more years on faculty,
had a legitimate claim of entitlement to benefit of his
sabbatical leave contract. This benefit constituted a
"property interest" within the meaning of procedural due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore,
Bruce had a constitutional right to a hearing to provide
him with the opportunity to vindicate his claim to that
^
108interest
.
Facts : Plaintiff, from September 1966 through
the 1970-1971 academic year, held a one year employ-
ment contract as an instructor in the Speech Depart-
ment at Northwest Missouri State University. In
September of 1969, plaintiff applied for a sabbatical
leave to work on his Ph.D. during the 1971-1972 aca-
demic year. On September 8, 1970, the defendant
108Bruce v. Board of Regents for Northwest Missouri
State University, 414 F. Supp. 559 (1976).
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"rote plaintiff advising him that the defend-ant Board approved plaintiff's request for a sabbatical
ofs4 500 for i2
71"1972 "anemic year with leave paj$4, the purpose of permitting plaintiff tocontinue his education toward the degree of Ph D
° f Nebraska
-
The university ‘regardedthe documents and resolution concerning plaintiff's
sabbatical leave as a 'sabbatical contract.' in Octo-ber 1969
,
plaintiff was made Acting Chairman of theSpeech Department and in November 1969, he was pro-
moted to Assistant Professor effective February 1,1970. Robert Bohlken, the new chairman of plaintiff'sdepartment, polled the tenured members of the depart-
and received a unanimous vote in favor of
recommending plaintiff for tenure. Chairman Bohlken
endorsed this recommendation in a letter sent to the
Dean of Faculties on September 21, 1970. Interim,
Bohlken and plaintiff had strong differences of
opinions
. In October 1970, Bohlken obtained a return
of the tenure recommendation he forwarded to Dr. Small
on September 21, 1970. He also prevailed on Dr.
Folsom, another member of the department to change
his vote. He then placed himself in a position to
break a tie vote, did so, and advised Dr. Small on Octo-
ber 20, 1970 of the result of the "second" tenure vote.
A "second" tenure vote was not provided for in the
Handbook. He did not give plaintiff written notice
that he recommended that plaintiff should not receive
tenure. By November 12, 1970, the faculty in-fighting
was so bad that Bohlken formally requested Bruce's
termination effective June 1971. The defendants
approved the "second" tenure vote and voted not to re-
new Bruce's contract effective May 14, 1971. This vote
was amended to read effective December 22, 1971. The
Board also resolved in the same November 23, 1971
resolution that it rescinded the leave of absence
granted Bruce for the 1971-1972 academic year.
Issue : Did plaintiff have a legal right to procedural
due process in regard to his sabbatical leave contract?
Decision: Yes.
Reasoning : The court held the test for determining
whether a person's interest in a benefit must be
considered a "property" interest within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment by stating that:
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person s interest in a benefit is a propertyinterest for due process purposes if thereare such rules of mutually explicit under-
standings that support his claim of entitle-
ment to the benefit and that he may invoke
at a hearing. Controlling guidance in how toapply the test is stated as follows-
A written contract with an explicit
tenure provision clearly is evidence
of a formal understanding that supports
a teacher's claim of entitlement to
continued employment unless "sufficient"
cause is shown. Yet absence of such an
explicit contractual provision may not
always foreclose the possibility that
the teacher has a property intrest in
re-employment. Roth (408 U.S. 601)
.
In Goodyear v. Junior College District of St.
Louis, the court applied basic concepts of the law of
contract when it held: "when an individual seeks to
work for a school district without complying with re-
quirements of statute requiring all contacts to be in
writing, he does so at his own risk." In interpreting
statutory requirements the court further said- 'require-
ments of a statute requiring school districts to make
all contracts in writing are mandatory and not merely
. 109directory.
Facts : Plaintiff sued defendant to recover in
quantum meruit for services performed for the
school district. Plaintiff did not have a written
contract. The Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis dismissed the actions and plaintiff appealed.
109
540 S.W.
Goodyear v. Junior
2d 621 (1976)
.
College Dist. of St. Louis,
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Issue: Does plaintiff have aquantum meruit? course of action in
Decision : No
.
T
£
e
K°
Urt quoted Section 432-070
,
R.S.MO 1969 which states 'No school distr ict--shallmake any ^ contract
—unless the same— shall be inW
f
1
^
1
?g
* It held that the requirements of thisstatute are mandatory and not merely directoryTherefore, the court reasoned 'that the statute re-quiring all contracts with school districts to bem writing precluded recovery against school district
on quantum meruit or any theory of implied contract:
and that
.
plaintiff could not recover even though
school districts are authorized by statute to sue
and be sued. The court went on to indicate thatby statute, a County Board of Education in NorthCarolina may terminate the employment of a teacher
at the end of the school year without filing
charges or giving its reasons for such termination,
or granting this teacher an opportunity to be heard.
A contract of employemnt which contains no provisions
for the duration or termination of employment is
terminable at the will of either party, irrespective
of the quality of performances by the other party.
Due process rights of a tenured faculty person,
when the faculty person initially breaches his contract
of employment was defined in Kalme v. West Virginia Board
of Regents:
When a state college president's letter informed
tenured professor that the reason for his
termination was his violation of contractual agree-
ments to perform assigned teaching responsibilities,
professor knew of his right to a hearing and immediate
ly exercised it, proceedings of faculty hearing commit
tee cooperated in all respects with requirements of
due process, and professor's termination and loss
of tenure were ratified by hearing panel and re-
affirmed by Board of Regents, 'dismissal' of
professor satisfied due process requirements.
Ill
‘*' d
^Still v. Lanu, 182 S.E. 2d 403 (1971).
^*'"*'Kalme v. West Virginia Board of Regents 539 F.
2d 1346 (1976)
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lme SUed the West Virginia
° Regents and the president of West VirginiaState College, contending that he was deprivedofa tenured professorship without due process of lawSummary judgment was awarded defendant—plaintiff
’
appeals During the 1972-1973 academic year Kalme
wVS ° f absence from th® college
Y
in orderto complete research for his doctoral thesis.During this time he taught at Inter-AmericanUn^ersity m Puerto Rico. West Virginia Statebeard nothing from Kalme so that on Marchb, 19/3, the Dean of Instruction wrote to Kalmeinquiring what his intentions were. On March 16having no reply, the Dean wrote again, enclosing acopy of his March 6th letter. He emphasized thatthe college had to know Kalme' s plans in order to
make personnel decisions. This letter crossed inthe mail with Kalme' s letter of March 15th whichindicted that he intended to return to West
Virginia State for the fall semester of the 1973-1974
school year. Interim correspondence followed regard-ing Kalme 's progress toward his doctoral degree.
On March 1, 1973, Kalme was assured of reappointment
to Inter-American University and he accepted and
returned this contract on May 31st. On June 16th
Kalme also signed and returned a contract offered
by West Virginia State for the same 1973-1974 school
year . Both colleges were kept conveniently ignorant
of Kalme 's conflicting contractual obligations.
Kalme failed to appear at West Virginia State to
resume his teaching duties there. The day classes
began, August 30, 1973, the president of the college
received a letter from Kalme in which he requested
an extension of his leave of absence in order
to complete his doctorate at the University of
Ottawa; this letter made no reference to his teaching
contract. A check at Ottawa revealed Kalme was not
a full time resident nor had his thesis topic been
officially accepted. On September 4th, the president
responded to Kalme that the school "no longer
considers you in the employment of West Virginia
State College or in an official leave capacity."
At a faculty hearing held on December 14th, with
Kalme and his attorney present, the president's
decision was affirmed. After the Board of Regents
declined to reinstate him, Kalme filed suit.
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l£sue: Did plaintiff violate his contract ofemployment?
Decision ; Yes.
Reasoning ; The Constitution protects individuals
against deprivation by the State of their libertv
or property without due process of law. The employ-ment rights of a tenured professor constitute a suf-ficient. property interest' to warrant due processprotection. Kalme intentionally and flagrantly
violated his contract of employment with the college,
and it was upon this contractual relationship that
any property interest depended.
A community college president's power to accept an
assistant professor's resignation was incidental to his
delegated powers from the Board of Trustees to hire,
promote and dismiss employees was a maxim of law set
forth in Carroll v. Onondaga Community College.
The court further decided that where there was any doubt
in an assistant professor
' s mind as to whether her
resignation had been accepted was resolved by unequivocal
statements in community college president's letter
which was received by her before she attempted to with-
draw her resignation, the assistant professor's resigna-
tion was accepted by the president and his acceptance
was conveyed to her in a language sufficiently clear to
be understood by her before she asked that the resignation
be withdrawn
.
112Carroll v. Onondaga Community College, 384
323 (1976).
IllCarroll v. Onondaga Community College.
N. Y.S.
169
Facts: The petitioner resigned by a letter dated
April 16, 1975, as an assistant professor at
Onondaga Community College. Her resignation was ac-
cepted by the president. He conveyed his acceptance
to her in a language sufficiently clear to be
understood by her, before she asked that the resig-
nation be withdrawn. The president accepted her
resignation in a letter dated April 22, 1975, and
a second one dated May 14, 1975. Both letters were
received by petitioner before she attempted to with-
draw her resignation.
Issue: Did the president have the power to accept
petitioner's resignation?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : The court reasoned that the Board of
Trustees had the power to delegate the authority
to the president to hire, promote and dismiss
employees. The evidence establishes that it did so
by resolution September 24, 1965 and that the power
to accept petitioner's resignation was incidental
to this power.
In Vallejo v. Jamestown College, the court ruled
that the measure of damages for breach of contract is
the amount which will compensate party aggrieved for
all detriment proximately caused thereby or which in the
ordinary course of things would be likely to resolve
therefrom; person injured is, as far as it is possible
to do so by monetary award, to be placed in position he
_ , 114
would have been in, had contract been performed.
Facts: Vallejo was employed by defendant as an
instructor and acting chairman of the Department
of Modern Foreign Languages, On December 15, 1972,
he was offered a contract for the nine month period
beginning September 1, 1973. On December 15, 1973,
Vallejo was advised that "because of financial
H^Vallejo v. Jamestown College, 244 N.W. 2d
75 (1976).
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exigencies and/or low enrollments in the academicarea for whlch you have had a responsibility." hewould not be offered a contract for the 1974-1975academic year. The college claimed that this
a
?
t
i°
n Was taken at the discretion of the Board
of Trustees of the college because the college
was in a poor financial position, and that the over-
fr ii
St
,
f reduction and consolidation scheme, of whichVallejo s non-renewal was only a part, would resultin a saving of funds. Vallejo claimed his contract
was not renewed because of clashes with administra-tion over academic matters. He claimed he was deniedhis academic freedom as provided for in the faculty
manual and has been separated from his position
without due process of law, and that the failure of
the college to follow the provisions of the faculty
handbook is a breach of the contract between himself
and the college. Vallejo states that he was fired
and his academic freedom violated because of his
failure to change a student's grade, because of his
criticism of the Board programs, and because, as the
administration claimed, "he failed to support the
college." Vallejo holds that the 'Statement of Aca-
demic Freedom' is part of the contract of employment.
Issues ; 1. Whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict of the
jury?
2. Were damages excessive?
Decisions : 1. Yes.
2. Yes.
Reasoning : (1) After examining the evidence, the
court held there is sufficient evidence to sustain
the verdict of the jury. (2) The court quoted
the North Dakota Legislature through Sec. 32-03-09,
North Dakota Century Code, which has set out the
measure of damages for breach of contract:
For the breach of an obligation arising from
contract, the measure of damages, except when
otherwise expressly provided by the law of this
state, is the amount which will compensate
the party aggrieved for all the detriment
proximately caused thereby or which in the
ordinary course of things would be likely to
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result therefrom. No damages can be recoveredfrom a breach of contract if they are no?clearly ascertainable in both their „a?£e and
of
i
?he
t?«nyiaw?ViSi°n ±S in effect the
Dissent
: (Justice Vogel)
:
Here we are dealing with damages affecting thecareer of a professional man for years to come.In such an area, the range of permissible verdictsis much wider, and we should be most reluctantto second-guess juries, prove damages to hisprofessional
_ future because of the nonrenewal
of his teaching contract, but the trial courtdid not allow him to do so. He made an offer
of proof that he was unable to obtain employmentm any of the fifty or eighty colleges he applied
to, that his unemployability in any college wasdue, in his opinion, to the wrongful non-
renewal, and that he was thereby damaged in the
sum of $10,000. to $12,000, I believe this offer
of proof was proper.
In the University of Colorado v. Silverman
,
the
court held that a letter from an Associate Dean to an
assistant professor which advised her that her current
employment was for a one year period and that her reap-
pointment was subject to certain prerequisites and did
not constitute an offer of employment by the agent of
the Board of Regents which thereafter ripened into a
contract binding on the Board of Regents upon satisfaction
of the stated conditions, since no contract could come
into being without affirmative action by the Board of
11
S
Regents itself.
115University of Colorado v. Silverman, 555 P. 2d
115 (1976).
172
19? 2
U
?q 7 t
rSit
!
ei
"Ployed respondent to teachlor the 7 -19 3 academic year. in December 1972she received a letter from an Associate Dean, ad-vising her that her current employment was for aone-year period and the reappointment was subjectto two conditions: (1) The renewal of a grant underwhich she was hired; and (2) Evidence of competence
and recommendation from the program area anddivision faculty peers that she be continued in herpresent position. Respondent was notified, howeverby letter dated February 14, 1973, that she would
not be reappointed. She was told that the schooldesired to open the position to other applicants.
The same letter stated, "your work has been quite
satisfactory and we are sure the committee would
welcome the resubmission of your papers." This
notification of nonreappointment complied with the
standard set forth in the University of Colorado
Faculty Handbook 1970 in effect at the time of this
controversy. Respondent then filed a grievance with
the faculty committee on privilege and tenure. The
committee recommended to the university president
that respondent be reappointed. The president did
not respond, nor did he submit the recommendation
to the Board of Regents. Respondent was not rehired.
As a result, in December 1973, she commenced an action
in Boulder County district court. She alleged five
causes of action: breach of contract, estoppel, and
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Upon petitioner's motion, the trial court dismissed
the action. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded the case for trial. Respondent's contract
claim was essentially that a binding contract or
re-employment arose when the two conditions pre-
requisite to reappointment, as set forth in the
December 1972 letter from the Associate Dean, were
satisfied; and that the university breached this
contract when it advised respondent of her nonre-
appointment by the February 1973 letter.
Issues
:
1. Is the hiring authority of the Board of
Regents delegable?
2. May estoppel be invoked against the
university?
3. Did the university president's failure
to transmit the recommendation of the
faculty committee to the Board of
Regents deprive respondent of property
without due process of law?
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Decisions ; 1
. No.
2 . No
.
3
. No
Reasoning
: (1) The power to hire teachers involvesconsiderable judgment and discretion, whether at theuniversity or high school level. Absent legL?ativeauthorization, the Board of Regents' hiring9authoritv
^
^legated. (2) The court pointed out that*the
^
doctrine of estoppel is not favored. There isno manifest and injustice' requiring the invoca-tion of the estoppel doctrine. Respondent
received adequate notice of the Regents' decision
not to retain her. She was, in fact, notified wellbefore the March 1 deadline set by the university'sFaculty Handbook 1970. The Regents' decision notto rehire her made within their statutory authority,
cannot be considered manifestly unjust. (3) The
respondent s right to have the procedural regula-
tions strictly followed is a right without substance,
and to remand for the purpose of ordering a trans-
mittal of the committee's recommendation by the
President to the Board of Regents would be an exercise
in futility. This is so because the recommendations
of the committee on privilege and tenure are advisory
only
,
as they must be in light of the Board of
Regents' exclusive hiring authority under the statute.
Groves, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent because I agree with the court of
appeals in its conclusion that the statute
did not preclude delegation of authority
by the Board of Regents. I further agree
with the court of appeals in its conclusion
as to estoppel based upon reliance. I concur
with the majority opinion here as to the question
of estoppel predicated upon manifest injustice
and the question of due process.
Shaw v. Board of Trustees held that the fact that
two college teachers, who were division chairmen, were
subjected to a June 30th deadline for submitting a letter
of contrition in connection with violation of policy
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manual while other faculty members had until August
did not work a denial of equal protection since the
chairmen were classified as "twelve month administrators
"
whose new contract year commenced on July 1st, while
the others were not. 116
Facts: Roger Shaw and Richard Winn had beenteaching at Frederick Community College since1968 and 1969, respectively. Professor
Shaw was tenured and Professor Winn was under a
continuing appointment. Both were designated
Division Chairmen, positions that entailed con-
siderable administrative responsibilities in
addition to teaching duties. The Policy Manual
which sets forth regulations adopted by the Board
of Trustees for the governance of the college, and
which all teachers were expected to be familiar
with, specifically imposed upon Shaw and Winn the
obligation to attend and participate in, among
other things, commencement and scheduled workshops.
On about May 22, 1973, Professors Shaw and Winn
received letters from Dr. Stephens, the college
president, stating that termination of their em-
ployment as of June 30, 1973 was being considered.
The assigned reasons were that they willfully and
in concert with others refused to attend the work-
shop on May 17, 1973, and refused to participate in
commencement exercises on May 20th. These letters,
which were received in slightly different form by
the other protesting faculty members who were not
Division Chairmen, far from represented an irrevocable
decision of dismissal. Indeed, Dr. Stephens made
known his desire to meet with each protestor, and
solicited letters from each explaining his actions.
Everyone understood the deadline for action by Shaw
and Winn was June 30th. Following discussions in
mid-June with an attorney representing all (including
Shaw and Winn) but one of those who received termina-
tion letters, Dr. Stephens indicated that termina-
tion proceedings would be dismissed against all those
who met the following conditions: Acknowledged that
116
Shaw v. Board of Trustees of Frederick Community
College, 549 F. 2d 929 (1976).
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the activities engaged in were a neglect ofprofessional duties; promised not to participate
ln thS future '* and agreed thatthe Policy Manual was the basis upon which thecollege would be run. Dr, Stephens even agreed toaccept a prepared form letter incorporating theseconditions, subject to the requirement that eachfaculty member desiring to avail himself of thisprocedure also have a personal conference withhim. Professors Shaw and Winn, despite the
availability of this form letter procedure, failedto take action to head off dismissal proceedingsprior to their deadline of June 30th. The record
reflects Dr. Stephens' continuous desire prior tothat date to sit down and discuss the matter with
them, and his encouragement that they accept the
conditions that had been set forth. They declined
to do so, however, until July 2, 1973, Professor
Winn having previously indicated his unwillingness to
admit that he had neglected his professional duties.
When letters similar to those that had previously
been found acceptable were finally received from
Shaw and Winn on July 2nd, Dr. Stephens advised the
two that their action had come too late and that
the matter had been referred to the Board of
Trustees. Following hearings by the Board in July
and August, at which Shaw and Winn were represented
by their attorney, an alternative dismisal was offered
to the four remaining faculty members, including
Shaw and Winn, who had failed to meet the June 30th
deadlines. They were offered one year employment
contracts, provided they perform work off campus,
Shaw and Winn declined this offer and were subsequent-
ly discharged.
Issue : Whether the dismissals were for violations
of legitimate conditions of employment, or as
plaintiff claims, for engaging in constitutionally
protected activity?
Decision ; Dismissal was for violation of legitimate
conditions of employment.
Reasoning : The court in this case quoted Wood and
Bishop saying: "It is not the role of the federal
courts to set aside decisions of school administra-
tors which the court may view as lacking a basis in
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wisdom or compassion," Wood, 420 U.S. at 326 95
?;
C|- f because of mistake, Bishop, ll s.Ctat 2080. The question is whether the dismissals
constituted a denial of plaintiff's rights of
association and expression guaranteed by the FirstAmendment, as they claim. They, of course, did notsurrender those rights by virtue of accepting
employment in a public educational institution
They had every right to disagree with the changing
of the tenure system and the trustees 1 failure togrant formal bargaining rights with the college
administration, and to say so. But because theirposition is that they could not, consistently with
the First Amendment, be discharged for violating the
terms of their employment simply because those
violations were a part of such a protest, must be
rejected. The conduct of Shaw and Winn went beyond
P^e speech into the realm of breach of the express
obligations of their employment. They admit that
they willfully absented themselves from the scheduled
workshop and failed to participate in commencement
in the manner expected of them. It was within
the discretion of the Board of Trustees to discharge
them for those reasons. After the deadline of
June 30th had expired without Shaw or Winn having
met Dr. Stephens' conditions, the Board of Trustees
offered them one year contracts as an alternative
to dismissal. They declined to avail themselves of
this second opportunity to avoid discharge, and now
ask the court to provide a third opportunity. This
we cannot do.
Butzner, Circuit Judge (dissenting)
:
Except for the judge's assessment of the
competency of the legal advice Dr. Shaw and
Dr. Winn received, I agree with his comment
on the evidence. I do not agree with his
conclusion that the facts 'provided legal
justifications' for the college to discharge
these professors. Therefore, I would reverse
the judgment of the district court, and
direct their reinstatement.
The rule of law that the By-Laws of the governing
body with respect to termination and conditions of em-
ployment become part of the employment contract between
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the college and the Associate Professor, who at the •
time of the offer and acceptance of his initial appoint-
ment was advised in writing that the offer and acceptance
of the appointment constituted a contract honoring poli-
cies and practices set forth in the faculty handbook
which was furnished to him at that time, was set forth
ln gradY v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Col-
Facts : The plaintiff was a tenured AssociateProfessor at Wayne State University. He was dis-
missed without a hearing in June 1973. This
was after the college budget for 1973-74 schoolyear had been reduced by the Legislature. This
action is for damages and for declaratory relief as
a result of the termination of his employment.
The District Court found that the plaintiff was
entitled to procedural due process before the
termination of his tenured employment. The
trial court dismissed the plaintiff's petition
upon the ground that procedural due process had
been available to the plaintiff under a grievance
procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, but
the plaintiff had missed a time limit in that
procedure and was therefore bound by the resulting
dismissal on procedural grounds. From the fall of
1968 through the summer of 1970, the plaintiff was
employed as an Assistant Professor at Wayne State
University. During the 1970-71 school year, the
plaintiff took a leave of absence for additional
work on his Ph.D. He was offered and accepted re-
appointment for the 1971-72 school year, and was
promoted to Associate Professor. Due to funding
problems, he was not offered appointment for the
summer of 1972. He was again reappointed for the
1972-73 school year with tenure at a salary of
$10,400. Plaintiff's contract of employment
specifically included the college bylaws, policies
and practices relating to academic tenure and
117 n ^Brady v.
College, 242 N.W.
Board of Trustees of Nebraska State
2d 616 (1976)
.
178
facult:y dismi S sal procedures. The tenure provisionsof the bylaws provided that dismissal of a facultymember with tenure must be initiated by the Presidentor other administrative officer, who must hold apersonal conference with the faculty member todiscuss the anticipated action. if the problemis not resolved in the first step, the Presidentis to present a formal statement of reasons fortermination and provide the faculty member with adate for a hearing by a faculty committee. Thefull formal faculty committee hearing includes the
right to counsel, presentation of evidence, witnesses
and . affidavits and requires recording and a trans-
script of the hearing. The faculty committee makesits recommendation to the President but regardless
of that recommendation, a hearing may be requested
before the governing body of the college by either
the President of the faculty member facing termina-
tion. This hearing is also a formal hearing and the
decision of the governing board is final. At no
time did Brady ever have a hearing nor was he ever
n°tified of his termination or prospective termina-
tion until after the college board took official
action to terminate his employment on June 16, 1973.
On February 21, 1973, the President of the college
wrote Brady: "You are hereby offered reappointment
in your present assignment for 1973-1974. Salary
statements may be made only after the legislature
has acted on our budget request." On March 10, 1973,
the interim President of the college wrote Brady:
"Due to the condition of funds, it is not possible
to offer extension of appointment for the third term
of summer session of 1973." By letter dated June 18,
1973, the interim President informed Brady that be-
cause of the level of legislative appropriations he
would not be offered reappointment for the 1973-1974
academic year. The letter advised him that this
termination was based on "financial exigency." In
that letter, the interim President advised Brady that,
by appointment, he would discuss the conditions
under which Brady's termination was made and under
which Brady was selected as one of the people to be
terminated; and that he would be pleased to give Brady
any assistance possible in helping him find employment.
Brady was in Oregon when he received the notice of
termination. On June 30, 1973, the plaintiff Brady
wrote to the Chairman of the Department of Social
179
Sciences attempting to initiate a grievance pro-cedure provided for in a collective bargaining
agreement between the board and the Higher EducationAssociation of Nebraska. He was not a member of theAssociation but was entitled to the benefit of thebargaining agreement. He set out as the basis forhis grievance that his tenure status had been
violated and that the college had not dismissedhim in accordance with the provisions of the bylaws,
which were a part of his contract. On July 6, 1973
^
the Chairman of the Department of Social Servicesdenied Brady's grievance. On July 10, 1973, Brady
wrote to the Dean of Arts and Sciences for the col-
lege. He again indicated the two grounds for his
complaint. On July 16, 1973, the Dean wrote a
letter to Brady in Oregon advising him that his
termination was based on financial exigency and
denied his grievance. On August 3, 1973, Brady
wrote to Dr. Wills, the earlier denials of grievance
had relied upon "financial exigency" but had ignored
his specific requests. On August 13, 1973, Dr.
Wills advised Brady that his August 3rd appeal had
been carefully reviewed and that Dr. Wills had
determined that the grievance was denied "for a num-
ber of reasons," Dr. Wills first asserted that
Brady's appeal was out of time because it was after
July 26, 1973. Second, that Brady had not enumerated
any specific provisions of the bylaws or the collec-
tive bargaining agreement which had been violated.
Third, that under the bylaws, tenure ceases when the
position in question no longer exists, and because
the plaintiff's position was eliminated due to lack
of funds, his tenure status ceased at the time his
position was eliminated. Fourth, Dr. Wills asserted
that the notice provisions of the bylaws applied
only to probationary employees and they were not
applicable to the plaintiff. On August 20, 1973,
Brady appealed to the Chaiman of the Faculty Senate,
and on August 24, 1973 the appeal was rejected on
"procedural grounds" that he had not appealed the
grievance to Dr. Wills within 10 days after the July
16th letter denying his grievance. The legislative
appropriations for the college in the spring of 1973
provided for approximately 80 full-time equivalent
faculty members where there had been 99 in the 1972-
1973 school year. Because of authorized terminations
for other reasons, only seven faculty members were
180
recommended for involuntary termination. Three ofthose were in the history department, when Bradv
was terminated, one untenured member was retainedin the history deparment and another untenured
person, the tormer President of the college was added
£
aCulty at a salarY higher than other members
of the history department. The plaintiff's position
was not eliminated but he was. Others including an
untenured person taught his former courses in the1973-1974 school year. it is uncontested that Brady
was a good teacher and that no termination for
cause could be justified.
Issues
:
1. Were the bylaws of the governing
body with respect to termination and
conditions of employment a part of
the employment contract between the
college and Brady?
2 . Did the action of the legislature in
reducing appropriations make it impos-
sible for the university to perform
its contractual commitments to Brady?
3. Because Brady began a grievance
procedure under the HEAN collective
bargaining agreement, did he waive
his constitutional right to due process
and also his contractual rights?
Decisions ; 1. Yes.
2. No
.
3 . No.
Reasoning : (1) The court said that there can be no
serious question but that the bylaws of the governing
body with respect to termination and the conditions
of employment became a part of the employment contract
between the college and Brady. At the time of the
offer and acceptance of the initial appointment in
1967, Brady was advised in writing that the offer
and acceptance of appointment at Wayne constituted
a contract honoring the policies and practices set
forth in the faculty handbook which was furnished to
him at that time. The court pointed out that courts
have generally held that where a college faculty
member is employed using annual reappointment forms
which do not set forth in full the terms and
conditions of employment, the employment policies,
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and re9ulations of the college become a nar-<-tbe eifPloyTnent contract between the college^nd
t^JaCUl? member ‘ -(2) The reduction in funds
salarLr
de
H
lt: financially impossible to pay thealaries under seven faculty contracts. it did not
i? impossTb?e
S
io
le t0 PaY Brady any m°re thanlt madet pay any one of the more than 100f
2
CU
i
ty contracts. In any event, the reductionin the funds could not and did not in any way makeit impossible for the defendant to perform itscontractual obligations to give Brady notice and hear-ing prior to termination. A tenured professor has
LS^f^^en^- pr°perty interest in continued employmentto entitle him to the protection of procedural dueprocess. (3) The HEAN grievance procedure required
a hearing at each step of the appeal. It also
required that any grievance initiated by a tenuredfaculty member which involved a dismissal or non-
reappointment required a hearing procedure in step 4
.
The defendant simply ignored these provisions. Thereis no evidence in the record to support the dismissal
of the appeal as out of time except an assumption
as to the time of receipt of a letter, and then the
computation of time is based on an erroneous in-
terpretation of the bargaining agreement by reference
to other provisions which are inapplicable.
The plaintiff was deprived of his right to notice and
hearing required to be granted to him before he could
be deprived of rights. The termination was ineffec-
tive to terminate his teaching contract. That con-
tract, therefore, continued on the same terms for the
1973-74 contract year. There is no practical justifi-
cation for an indefinite extension. His salary for
the previous year was $10,400. There had been no
agreement as to salary for the following year. Under
such circumstances, the measure of damages is the
amount of his salary for the last effective year of
his contract, $10,400 less the amount which he earned,
or with reasonable diligence could have earned from
other employment during the 1973-74 contract renewal
period.
Failure to negotiate a contract was the basis for
the civil rights action in Franklin v. Atkins. 118 Im-
118Franklin v. Adkins, 409 F. Supp. 439 (1976).
182
portant rules of law for colleges and universities
derived from this case are: (1, There is no requirement
“ ^ Constituti
- that a college teacher's classroom
conduct be the sole basis for determining his fitness
for teaching, in that fitness for teaching depends on
a broad range of factors. This is particularly true in
a case of potential applicant rather than a case of
present employee seeking to continue in his position, 119
and (2) university Regents may decline to hire a professor
for good reason or perhaps, for no reason, but they may
not do so for bad reason if that reason is one's lawful
exercise of a constitutionally protected right. 120
Facts: On December 3, 1973, the plaintiff appliedfor one of two available faculty positions in the
a T
1
?u
Sh
u
D
??artmen^ at the University of Colorado.Although his application was one of several hundred
submitted, the English faculty approved his applica-
1
?
January' 1974 by the "overwhelming" vote of2b to 5 with one abstaining. Prior to subsequentindependent investigations and interviews, theplaintiff s appointment also received the approval
of the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences.
The Vice President and the President at that time
also approved his appointment. At the regular meeting
of the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado
on April 25, 1974, Dr. Thieme presented the plaintiff's
application for consideration with his recommendations.
However, the Regents voted 8 to 1 against approval.
On June 25, 1974, at another regularly scheduled
meeting of the Board, the same Regents voted to re-
fuse to reconsider the earlier vote. The eight in-
119Franklin v. Adkins.
120Franklin v. Adkins.
183
dividual Regents voting against the plaintiffon each oocasion are the named defendants.Plaintiff brings this action under 42 u S csection 1983, seeking injunctive relief and*
?n
m
Rn?
aSlnr, each defendant ' a^d, pursuantale
_
57
'
Fed * R * civ
- a declaratory judg-ment. Injunctive and declaratory relief arealso sought for the alleged violation of the
university’s own regulations by the defendants.Plaintiff s claim that each defendant's decision
was based primarily if not solely on ProfessorFranklin^s belief in Marxism, his advocacy ofthat political belief and philosophy in his
speeches and writings and his participation in
various political movements, groups, and demon-
strations, thus abridging his First Amendment
right to free speech and association as well as
violating university regulations. Defendants
respond that the decision not to hire Mr. Franklin
was a valid exercise of the discretion vested
in them, and involved a determination that the
hiring of the plaintiff was not in the best
interests of the University of Colorado.
Issues ; 1. May the Board of Regents consider
factors other than a teacher's class-
room conduct when reviewing his ap-
plication for employment?
2. Did the defendants base their de-
cision on grounds which impermissibly
abridge the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights on a consideration
prohibited by their own regulations?
Decisions ; 1. Yes.
2 . No
,
Reasoning : (1) The Board of Regents were not
limited to their consideration of the plaintiff's
application to his academic qualifications and
teaching abilities alone. There is no require-
ment in the Federal Constitution that a teacher's
classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining
his fitness for hiring. Fitness for teaching de-
pends upon a broad range of factors. This is
particularly true in the case of a potential
applicant, rather than that of a present employee
seeking to continue in his position. The state's
interest in obtaining even marginly relevant in-
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^ defendants perceived that conductallmg outside the realm of protected freespeech, and because the pattern of conduct indicatedthem a substantial risk of similar occurrenceson the University of Colorado campus should theplaintiff receive a faculty appointment. As theplaintiff concedes, a separate but related basis
or the refusal to hire which could have been and
was relied upon was the fear of disruptions on theUniversity of Colorado campus
. Certainly, in a situ-
ation of potential disruption, there is no require-
ment in the law that the proper authorities must
wait f°r the blow to fall before taking remedial
measures
.
In Smith v, Greene
, the court for Colleges and
Universities held: (1) A college faculty member may have
a property interest’ protected by the due process clause
if there are policies and practices promulated and fostered
by the college officials that constitute legitimate claim
of entitlement to the continued employment," 121 and (2)
where the probationary period for the community college
teachers was limited by statute to three consecutive regular
college years, notice that the teacher's contract would not
be renewed for the fourth year was equivalent to notice
both that the tenure was not awarded and that the teacher's
121Smith v. Greene, 545 P. 2d 550 (1976).
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probationary faculty appointment would not be renewed. 122
Facts: The appellant held a "probationary faculty
appointment" with Washington State Community ColleqeDistrict No. 17, He brought this suit against the
officers and trustees of the district. The respondents
allege error in their denial of tenure to him.
Respondent s motion for summary judgment was grantedby the superior court. Beginning in September 1971,the appellant was employed by the Community College
District No. 17 under the terms of three one-year con-tracts which designated appellant's status as a
probationary faculty appointment," under the Community
College Act of 1967. A review committee established
pursuant to the act periodically observed and evaluated
the appellant's teaching during each of these years.
The evaluations covered appellant's performance in a
number of areas. Some of the reports, in a number of
areas, indicated that the appellant needed improvement,
although the committee twice recommended the appellant
be granted tenure. Affidavits filed in the case indi-
cated that the district's board of trustees had uni-
formly decided not to consider tenure until the third
probationary year. On Febrary 5, 1974, copies of the
review committee's reports and recommendations, along
with letters of District President Johnson and Spokane
Falls Community College President Snyder recommending
denial of tenure, were mailed to the appellant and
each trustee. The letters of Johnson and Snyder did
not state the reasons for their recommendation that
tenure be denied. On February 21, 1974, the trustees
considered all of the recommendations submitted and
allowed the appellant and his supporters to speak in
his behalf. The trustees then unanimously voted not
to grant the appellant tenure without stating any
reason for this decision. The following day, President
Johnson, as Secretary of the board of trustees, notified
the appellant by letter that his employment contract
would not be renewed for the 1974-75 school year or for
any other year.
Issues: 1. Did the appellant have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued em-
ployment sufficient to invoke due process
protections?
122 Smith v. Greene.
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2
.
3.
4.
5.
Did a statutory requirement of
reasonable consideration” by theboard of trustees create a protectableproperty interest or require that
reasons be given for their decision?Did the members of the board of trusteesact beyond their authority in consider-ing the recommendations of the presi-dents of the college and district?
Is the trustees' practice of requiring
three years of probationary teachingbefore consideration of an award of tenureinvalid?
the letter from the Secretary of
the board of trustees constitute the
required notice of non-award of tenure?
Decisions : 1. No,
2 . No
,
3 . No
.
4 . No.
5 . No
Reasoning
: (1) a faculty member may not have a "proper-
ty interest protected by the due process clause if
there are policies and practices promulgated and foster-
ed by the college officials that constitute a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement to continued employment.
The Supreme Court has stated that to have a property
interest in a benefit, a person must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Property in-
terests are not created by the Constitution itself.
They are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law, rules of under-
standings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits. (2) Appellant's
faculty appointment for a designated period of time
was subject to termination "without cause upon the
expiration of the probationer's term of employment."
Under the terms of his third one year contract with
Community College District No. 17, appellant's appoint-
ment ended in June 1974. The fact that the review
committee's recommendations are usually followed is
not the kind of conduct which should confer a legiti-
mate expectancy of tenure. (3) The action of the board
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' since the probationaryperiod is limited to three consecutive regular collegeyears under the statute, notice that the appellant'scontract would not be renewed for a fourth year is
3 £°tlce both that tenure was not awardednd that his probationary faculty appointment would
not be renewed. The pertinent statutory provision
requires notice of a decision "not to renew a proba-tionary faculty appointment and does not refer totenure .
"
Grimm v. Cates brought forth two rules of law
specifically for Colleges and Universities. They are:
(1) Exercise of First Amendment rights are not the basis
for discharging non—tenured teacher unless the exercise of
such a right clearly overbalances the teacher's usefulness
as an instructor and (2) In view of the witnesses' testi-
mony that the terminated university professor's activities
for the teachers' organization had not been considered in
their recommendation to terminate the professor's employ-
ment at the university, the trial court in civil rights
action brought by the professor was correct in its determina-
tion that testimony offered at trial did not prove by a
138
preponderance of the evidence that the professor was
dismissed for reasons relating to the exercise of
First Amendment rights,
Facts: University professor brings a civil rights
action, claiming that his constitutional rights underthe First and Fourteenth Amendments were abridged
when he was issued a terminal contract. The U.S.Court for the Western District of Texas held that theprofessor was not entitled to a hearing, or a state-
ment of reasons for his dismissal. The professor
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence
supported the trial court's finding that the professordid not have a de facto tenure under the practice andpolicy prevailing at the university and that he was
not entitled to a hearing to determine whether theissuance of a terminal contract constituted a viola-
tion of his academic freedom.
After receiving his Ph.D. from the University of
^Hin°i s in 1963, the appellant taught for one year
at the University of Illinois, three years at Texas
Tech. University and one year at Sam Houston State
University. Dr. Grimm was hired as an Associate
Professor by Southwest Texas State University for the
academic year of 1968-1969. He completed three nine-
month teaching contracts at SWTSU for the academic
years 1968-1969 prior to receiving terminal notice
in May of 1971 and being issued a terminal contract
in June 1971.
Issues : 1. Did the district court incorrectly hold
that the plaintiff did not have tenure?
2. Was the plaintiff denied due process of
law?
3. Was the plaintiff entitled to a hearing
before a faculty committee to determine
whether the issuance of a terminal
contract violated his academic freedom?
Decisions : 1. No.
2 . No
.
3. No.
Reasoning: (1) Under the policy and practice at SWTSU
from the fall of 1968 to the spring of 1972, Dr. Grimm
had no legitimate claim of entitlement of tenure. Dr.
123Grimm v. Cates, 532 F, 2d 1034 (1976).
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Grimm possessed no property right by which hewas entitled to the procedural protection of theFourteenth Amendment. (2) and (3) Dr. Grimm was
2
6d f°r reasons related to the exercise
°f. the First Amendment rights and he was not
stigmatized by his termination. Therefore, it is
axam
jne the adequacy of the hearingsgranted to him by the administration at SWTSU,
In Bishop v. Wood
, the courts declared that the
federal court system was not a forum for review of all
liberty" rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It held that the United States Constitution cannot
feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review
for every error in connection with discharge of a public
employee. "In the absence of any claim that the public
employer was motivated by a device to curtail or penalize
the exercise of employee's constitutionally protected
rights, federal courts must presume that official action
was regular and, if erroneous, can be corrected in other
ways than by review of personnel decisions in the federal
124
court." However, the dissenting opinion agrees yet
disagrees by elaborating on the need not to review all
but to ensure this constitutional mandate of due process
are followed
.
Bishop v. Wood Dissenting Opinion (Justices Brennan
and Marshall)
:
These observations do not, of course, suggest
"^^Bishop v. Wood, 96 S.Ct, 2074 (1976) .
125Bishop v. Wood.
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that a Federal court is—the appropriateforum in which to review the multitude ofpersonnel decisions that are made daily bypublic agencies.
' However, the federal
the
.
aPProPriate forum for ensuringCo
^
stitutional mandates of due processare followed by those agencies of government
making personnel decisions that pervasivelyinfluence the lives of those affected there-by; the fundamental premise of the Due ProcessC 1
?t
1S
S
1S that those procedural safeguards
will help the government avoid the ’harshfact' of 'incorrect or ill advised personneldecisions.
'
,
12 D
Facts: On respondent Chief of Police's recommenda-tion
, respondent City Manager terminated petitioner's
employment as a policeman without a hearing, tellinqhim privately that the dismissal was based on afailure to follow orders, poor attendance at policetraining classes, causing low morale, and conduct
unsuited to an officer. A city ordinance provides
that a permanent city employee (as petitioner was
classified) may be discharged if he fails to perform
work up the standard of his classification, or if he
is negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his
duties. Petitioner brought suit against Respondents,
claiming that as a "permanent employee" he had a
constitutional right to a pre-termination hearing
; that
the ordinance, even though not expressly so providing,
should be read to prohibit discharge for any reason
other than those specified and therefore to confer
tenure on all permanent employees that his period
of service, together with his "permanent" classifica-
tion, gave him a sufficient expectation of continued
employment to constitute a protected property interest
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; and that the false explanation for his discharge
deprived him of interest in liberty protected by that
clause. During pretrial discovery petitioner was
again advised of the reasons for his dismissal. The
District Court granted respondents' motion for a
summary judgment, holding, on the basis of its under-
standing of state law, that petitioner "held his
position at the will and pleasure of the city." The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
courts
.
126Bishop v. Wood.
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I5sue= Was the petitioner denied his due process?
Decsision : No.
of~course * be crSted^or^1 in emPlo^t can,
contract, in either caL
r inance
f or by an implied
of the c 1a i» o; SSt^thSr^ decided £byiency
Court has helfthat^n' enforceable expectation^?"
6
contract
11 £ 1“actually granted some form of guarantee (still v
we recognized tKTt the nonretention of an untenured
'
!!?
e teacber might make him somewhat less attractive
w u strS
0
^"
5
'
bUt ™theless concluded tSat Jro ld tretch the concept too far "to suacrest- =person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is nottamed m one position but remains as free as before
the
S
d?Q ^
nother *" This same conclusion applies to
term?i^arge ° f 3 publlc employee whose position isrminable at the will of the employer when there
s no public disclosure of the reasons for the dis-charge.
In LaTemple v. Warns ley
,
through an action to recover
damages for an alleged breach of a written contract, the
court decided that under employment contract between teach-
er and community junior college which provided that
contract of employment would be deemed to continue for
next succeeding school year unless written notice of in-
tention to terminate contract was properly served by Board
of Trustees before certain date or teacher gave written
notice to president on or before certain date that he did
not desire continuation of contract, where prescribed
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notice of termination was not given or notice was im-
properly given and teacher was discharged, teacher was
entitled to damages in the amount of the salary teacher
would have received for the next school year had his
employment not been terminated . ^7
Facts: Action for breach of written contract in
which the defendants as Trustees of the Garden CityCommunity Junior College employed the plaintiff
to teach speech and theater courses and directdramatic activities for a term of nine months
commencing on August 24, 1970, for a consideration
of $9,568, payable in twelve equal installments.
Previously, the college had adopted a policy manual.Section 17, which states:
Section 17
. The Continuing Contract
The contract of employment of an instructor
shall continue in full force and effect during
the good behavior and efficient and competent
service rendered by the instructor. The
contract of employment shall be deemed to
continue for the next succeeding school year
unless written notice of intention to terminate
the contract is served by the Board of Trustees
on or before the fifteenth day of March, or the
instructor has given written notice to the
President on or before the fifteenth day of
April that he does not desire continuation of
said contract. The Board of Trustees
,
upon the
recommendation of the President, may consider
an instructor for discharge or termination of
contract for any of the following causes:
Immoral character, conduct unbecoming an in-
structor, insubordination, inefficiency, in-
competency, physical unfitness, or failure to
comply with reasonable requirements of the Board
of Trustees as may be prescribed to show normal
improvement and evidence of professional train-
ing
.
127LaTemple v. Wamsley, 549 F. 2d 185 (1977).
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In the event that an instructor is beinqconsidered for discharge or termination^his employment contract, he shall be givena warning and a specific statement in writingdefects or reasons for the proposed dis-charge or termination of contract. Thus, hewill have an opportunity to show improvement.
Following this procedure, if it becomes apparent
he
a
sha?l
1
h»
trUCt
°S’
S contract wil l ^ terminatedl be served a written notice by the BoardTrustees on or before the fifteenth day ofarch that his contract will terminate at theclose of the academic year and will not be in
effect for the succeeding school year
.
Instructors desiring a hearing before the Board
of Turstees must file a request for same with
the President within a fifteen day period after
receipt of notice.
The trial court held as a matter of law that the
plaintiff's contractual rights included the rightsprovided by Section 17 as well as those rights setforth in the written contract of employment. The
discloses dissatisfaction on the part of
the college admininistration with plaintiff's
conduct by letter dated January 29, 1971.
On March 10, 1971, defendants notified plaintiff as
follows:
Dear Mr. LaTemple:
This letter shall serve as written notice that
your contract of employment with the Board of
Trustees of the Garden City Community Junior
College will terminate at the close of this
academic year. You will not be offered a con-
tract for the succeeding school year 1971-1972.
Should you desire a hearing before the Board of
Trustees, please advise and file a written request
with President Raymond Wamsley within fifteen
days after receipt of this notice
.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ John G. Collins
Vice Chairman
Board of Trustees
(Exhibit 6)
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Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Board
on'AprSIs “d ^ he^ ™“2idprii 28, 1971, with no changes in the
contract?
01”10" t0 terminate P^intiffs employment
Issues: 1
. was plaintiffs employment contract
terminated for one or more of the causesm Paragraph 2 of Section 17?
2. Was plaintiff given the warning describedm Paragraph 3 of Section 17?
Decisions : 1. No.
2 . No
.
Reasoning : Section 17 clearly contemplates a contract
of employment continuing from year to year but ter-
minable by either party upon notice. If the pre-
scribed notice is not given, or the notice is improper-
y given, the employee is entitled to a contract forthe succeeding year and his discharge prior theretois a breach of the contract. The measure of damages
is the salary the plaintiff would have received the
school year had his employment not been terminated.
Two rules of Constitutional Law emanated from Tyler
v. College of William and Mary
. They were: (1) A property
interest in employment, for purposes of due process, is
indicated by a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued
employment; and (2) One has the right to due process for
loss of employment if he can prove he has a property in-
terest in the job, and a property interest is indicated by
12 8actual or implied guarantees of continued employment.
Facts : Plaintiff was hired by the College of
William and Mary as Assistant Professor of Modern
Languages and Literature for the academic year of
1969-70. That contract was renewed each year for
six years and the final contract signed for plaintiff's
seventh year of teaching was designated as a
128
Supp.
Tyler v. College of William and Mary,
29 (1977).
429 F.
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TS followed in accordance wi?h the wellt
teachet
S
for
gSneral C°Uege poli^ ° £ ^ploying a:e r six years to determine his or her
^
qualifications for tenure and then, if tenure wasno granted, terminating employment at the end ofthe seventh year. The criteria set out in the
ront
tY Handbook and generally recognized by theC llege as requisites to tenure include:
( ) Possession of education, experience anddegrees necessary to perform the individual'sduties; (2) Ability to effectively teach, based
on command of material and good student rapport;
(3) Evidence of research, publications and
other contributions to his field of study; and
(4) Participation in department, faculty and
college governance.
Additional requisites which appeared in the testimony
D3
f*
George R. Healy
,
Vice President for Academic
Affairs, include:
(1) Tenure requirements set up by the individual
departments; (z) Needs of the College as a whole,
i.e., available funds; and (3) Needs of the
department, i,e., future directions and goals,
over-tenured faculty.
The Department of Modern Languages
,
the department
in which plaintiff was employed, incorporated the four
criteria set out in the Faculty Handbook in its
requisites for tenure and included an additional
emphasis on teaching effectiveness, scholarly acti-
vities not limited to publications, and participation
in special services to students. During his seven
years within the Department of Modern Languages,
plaintiff was appointed to the Board of Student
Affairs, the Computer Center, and as coordinator of
the French and Italian section for three years. He
was awarded his Ph.D. in French Literature from the
University of Virginia in 1971 and in 1974 published
A Concordance to the Fables and Tales of Jean de la
Fontaine
,
a work running over a thousand pages and
reviewed as one of the three most important basic
reference works to appear on that author. Plaintiff
generally served as French instructor for the lower
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fird T freshman and sophomorela ) and contributed to the language laboratorvby utilizing his electronic skills to install new 7equipment and to modify existing facilities Forthese contributions
,
plaintiff was highlyRaised bvthe former head of the deparment, Mr. J. Worth
Did£k
r
' He wa
e
,f
Urrent department head, Ms. Elsa S.
5 u
ls° recommended by these departmentheads and his department for promotion to AssociateProfessor on three occasions and for tenure twiceHe was denied the promotions and tenure on all
occasions for the stated reasons that plaintiff isan average but not excellent academician and that hisinclusion within the Department of Modern Languages
would not greatly strengthen it.
Issue : Did the plaintiff develop some propertyinterest in his job as would entitle him to special
consideration outside the well-established policv
on tenure?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The College of William and Mary had a formal
tenure system. The system operated on a clearly
enunciated policy that a teacher could remain within
the system beyond a probationary period of seven years
only if granted tenure which required the approval
of his department and department head, the Advisory
Committee on Retention
,
Promotion and Tenure, the
Dean of Arts and Sciences, the Vice President for
Academic Affairs, the President of the college, and
the Board of Visitors. Plaintiff did not receive
the required approval and therefore did not receive
tenure. The court did not find from the evidence that
plaintiff enjoyed actual or implied guarantees of
continued employment, or a legitimate claim of
entitlement to continued employment in a formal tenure
system or a claim of entitlement supported by rules
or mutually explicit understanding in a de facto
tenure system so as to give rise to a property interest
protected by due process.
For college and university precedent, the court in
Gupta v. Boyer ruled that the trial court in Article 78
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proceeding brought by a professor who claimed that non-
renewal of his term of employment was subterfuge by the
college to avoid according him substantive and procedural
due process required on discharge for professional mis-
conduct, erred in ordering that, if professor's allega-
tions were found to be true, trial court should be held
to adjudicate professional misconduct charges; if professor
should have been charged with such conduct, trial court
was required to remit matter to college for proceedings
consistent with governing labor agreement. 129
Facts: Petitioner in this article 78 proceeding
alleges that he is a professor of history at State
University College at Brockport, having initially
received a three year term appointment in 1970 which
was renewed for a two year term in July of 1973.
Petitioner further asserts that subsequently, by a
letter from respondent-appellant College President
Brown dated August 26, 1975, he was notified that
his term appointment would not be renewed and that
as of August 31, 1976, his status as a faculty
member at the college would automatically cease.
This non-renewal of his term appointment, petitioner
contends, 'was a mere subterfuge and ploy' created
. . . to secure (his) dismissal without having to
. . . accord him with substantive and procedural due
process of law, as provided for under the policies
of the Board of Trustees of the State University of
New York . . . and the Agreement between the State of
New York and United University Professors, Inc.
. . . in cases where an employee is charged with
professional misconduct.
Respondents-appellants appeal only from that part of
Special Term's order which sets forth the so-called
'third step' of the trial. The argue that 'because
the controlling labor relations agreement establishes
exclusive jurisdiction and procedures for the conduct
129Gupta v. Boyer, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 255 (1977).
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iPlinarY hearings, it was an error for thecourt below to have ordered that such hearing isto be conducted, if at all, by the court.'
Issue
:
,
S^ld.th? =har3es of misconduct be remittedto resolution by the college in proceedings con-sistent with the governing labor agreement?
Decision ; Yes.
Reasoning : As a result of the exclusive nature ofthe disciplinary procedures set forth in the "Agree-ment which supplants otherwise extant rights and
remedies of petitioner, the court may properly policethe fair administration of said Agreement to prevent
one side, or the other, from circumventing, by anypretext, its controlling provisions and/or procedures.The trial court should proceed with the first step
of its proposed trial in order to 'preliminary deter-
mine whether, on the facts adduced, respondents were
required to present charges of professional misconduct
against petitioner so that he may be afforded a hearing
on such charges as provided in the Agreement. As re-
spondents-appellants state in their brief, it it is
found that petitioner should have been presented with
charges of professional misconduct, and that he should
have been afforded a hearing as a condition precedent
to the non-renewal of his term appointment, the trial
court should, at that point, remit the matter for
resolution to respondent appellant college for proceed-
ings consistent with the governing labor Agreement.
In Gorman v. University of Miami
,
the court reasoned
that where faculty member's right to tenure and, therefore,
continued employment, was fixed by terms of his employment,
alleged oral promise of university president to take
specified action upon faculty member's appeal to him did
not constitute an individual contract
.
Rehearing Denied : January 12, 1977
130Gorman v. University of Miami, 340 So. 2d 1180
(1977) .
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^PPellant seeks damages for wrongful termina-tron of his employment. Dr. Gorman contends that he
whf^arneC? ^S2Ure under his contract of employmentich included provisions of the faculty manual ofthe university. On the other hand, the defendants
contend that the terms of the plaintiffs employment
are to be determined from the annual Faculty
Appointments, which gave a later date for the plain-
s obtaining tenure than that which would be
computed from the faculty manual. it is undisputed
that the later date was an error occasioned by the
action of the university. There is conflicting
evidence concerning plaintiff
' s actions upon learning
that he had been mistakenly assigned a later date
for the attainment of tenure.
Issue: Does the oral promise of the president of
the university to take specific actions on the plain-
tiff's appeal to him constitute an individual
contract?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The court correctly entered summary final
judgment on count two of the complaint, which claims
the breach of an oral contract by Henry King Stanford,
President of the University of Miami. There is un-
controverted proof that plaintiff's right to tenure
and, therefore, continued employment were fixed by
the terms of his employment and the alleged oral
promise of the president of the university to take
specified actions upon plaintiff's appeal to him does
not constitute an individual contract. In addition,
it appears that at all times defendant Stanford was
acting as an officer of the university and not in his
individual capacity. The court considered plaintiff's
point directed to the granting of defendant's objection
to certain interrogatories and find that no error
has been demonstrated on this point, especially in
light of the holding upon count two of the complaints.
Finally, because of the views expressed herein, the
trial judge's order striking the plaintiff's prayer
for the remedy of reinstatement should be reversed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Where tenured teacher submitted written resignation
at the end of the next academic year and it was accepted,
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the college had right to refuse to honor teacher’s at-
tempted withdrawal of resignation especially since college
had acted on resignation in planning reduction in
faculty, was the holding for colleges and universities
in Gras v. Clark. 131 The court also held that a tenured
professor's letter of intention to resign at end of
next academic year was a voluntary relinquishment of her
right to claim a continued contractual status as tenured
teacher
,
and could have been withdrawn at any time prior
to effective date if it either had not been accepted by
employer or not been acted upon by employer in a manner
to prevent employee from insisting on revocation. 132
Facts: The affidavit of Robert J, Clark, the
Dean of Faculty of Elmhurst College, stated that
either in the month of July or August of 1972, Donna
Gras advised him of her decision to retire as a member
of the teaching staff in the fall of 1974; that on or
about November 1, 1972, the verbal decision was
confirmed in writing by the following letter which
plaintiff handed to Clark:
This is to confirm my decision to retire in
the fall of 1974. I had already mentioned
it to you and also Dr, Frick this summer.
However, I understand that a written confirma-
tion is necessary at this time.
It was further stated that in reliance on the resigna-
tion Clark conferred with plaintiff and with another
member of the teaching staff, Paulette Hatmaker , and
that both of the parties agreed to accept an
appointment for the 1973-74 teaching program.
This was confirmed and accepted by the following
131Gras v
.
Clark 361 N.E. 2d 316 (1977)
.
132
vGras Clark
.
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letter sent by Dr.
December 4, 1972:
Frick to Mrs. Gras dated
? S 5
1
f
easons
' the Executive Committee
of the Board of Trustees has authorized thatyour appointment for 1973-1974 will be half-time. During this year your full fringe bene-fits program will continue. You are an
outstanding teacher and we do appreciate your
services to Elmhurst College.
Pleadin9 s showed that plaintiff had notifiedthe defendants in August of 1973 that she was with-drawing her resignation but that defendants advisedher that she would not be allowed to do so. Defendants'
motion for summary judgment was granted, based upon
the pleadings, affidavits and a transcript of plain-hiff ^ s testimony at a hearing on a motion for a
preliminary injunction. Judgment was entered in favor
of the defendants from which plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the college in violation of
the employment contract to recover damages.
Issues : 1. Does the plaintiff have a contract
right to continued employment?
2. Is plaintiff estopped from claiming
that the college was not permitted to
prevent the withdrawal of her resigna-
tion?
Decisions : 1. No,
2 . Yes
.
Reasoning : (1) In effect, the plaintiff's letter of
intention to resign on the prospective date fixed by
the end of the 1973-1974 academic year was a voluntary
relinquishment of her right to claim continuing con-
tractual status as a tenured teacher. The resignation
could have been withdrawn at any time prior to the
effective date if it had either not been accepted by
the employer or not acted upon by the employer in a
manner to prevent the employee from insisting on
revocation. (2) The doctrine of waiver is based
upon the principle that one may dispense with something
of value by a voluntary act done with full knowledge
of the rights involved and with an intention to
relinquish those rights. When consideration for the
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waiver is lacking the resignation may be supportedby proof of conduct which gives rise to an estoppel.Mrs. Cras ietter of resignation was a statement ofher intention to waive her right to continuing
contractuai employment as a tenured teacher effective
at the close of the 1973-1974 academic year. MrsGras was acting with full knowledge of the rights’
which she would be giving up. A written resignationtendered to the proper officials and filed by them,is considered accepted. Upon acceptance of a tenuredteacher s resignation even though the effective dateis prospective the employing authority has the right
to refuse to honor a withdrawal of the resignation.
The delivery of Mrs. Gras' written resignation to
the president of Elmhurst College upon his reguest
after plaintiff's previous oral statements that she
intended to resign amounted to an acceptance of the
resignation. The college could refuse a subsequent
withdrawal. In any event, plaintiff's additional
circumstance that the college acted on plaintiff's
resignation in planning a reduction in the French
Department faculty is sufficient to estop plaintiff
from claiming that the college was not thereafter
permitted to prevent the withdrawal of her resignation
Trimier v. Atlanta University, Inc.
,
held that
Administrative Assistant to Dean of School of Business
Administration at the university was not entitled to re-
cover for breach of contract on alleged ground that notice
on June 26 of termination effective July 31 due to general
economic conditions came too later after offer in May of
renewal of her contract for following year, where both
her existing contract and renewal contract clearly provided
for termination with 30 days' notice because of budgetary
or economic situations on part of university; clause in
employment manual, on which Administrative Assistant based
her claim, requiring notification of non-reappointment for
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following academic year by March 15 of existing academic
year had reference to non-reappointment and renewal of
contract of employment which did not control termination
of service by reason of lack of funds and economic
13 3
consideration.
Facts : Ms. Trimier was employed as an Administrative
Assistant to the Dean of the School of Business
Administration at Atlanta University, Inc. and had
served in that position since June 8, 1971. she
was employed on a year-to-year basis from the be-
ginning of September of one year to the last of
August of the following year. In May 1975, she
was offered a new contract for the following year
for the period from September 1, 1975 to August 31,
1976, being under contract at that time which did
not terminate until August 31, 1975. The contracts
under which she was employed provided for effective
termination with 30 days' notice and referred to an
employment manual which provided for severance pay
of one month's pay for each full 12 months' service
up to a maximum of three months' salary of an
employee with tenure. On June 26, 1975 the university
notified Ms. Trimier that her employment was being
terminated effective July 31, 1975, due to present
general economic conditions
,
her release to be
effective on June 27, 1975, but that she would be
paid for July and August (vacation months) and for
three months thereafter in severance pay. Whereupon
Ms. Trimier brought suit for breach of contract,
contending that she had been re-employed for a full
12 months in May of 1975, and that the employment
manual providing for conditions of employment clearly
states that if an employee is not reappointed the em-
ployee must be notified no later than March 15 of any
academic year after the first year of service. De-
fendant answered, admitting generally all averments
of the complaint, but denying that the employment
terminated other than under the terms of the contract
and denied that plaintiff was entitled to any judgment
against it. After discovery, which involved admission
of facts and genuineness of documents with reference
13 3
Trimier v. Atlanta University, Inc.,
2d 342 (1977)
.
234 S.E.
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manual which are pertinent, and based on certain
favor of defend;nt “•
Issue: Did defendant breach plaintiff's contract?
Decision : No
.
Reasonin£: At the time of termination of employmentere were two contracts in existence, the first
of which ended on August 31, 1975; and a renewal
contract commencing the first of September 1975 forone year. There seems to be no dispute as to thefacts, even though her employment was terminated.
Where college agreed to pay employees specified
commission on tuition received by college from approved
enrollments credited to employees, and college, by its
voluntary act of ceasing to operate schools, placed
performance of its obligation under employment contract
beyond its control, employees were entitled to compensation
under contract even after employer ceased to operate its
schools was a rule of law laid down in Cannon v. Stevens
School of Business, Inc .^^ The court also pointed out
that a person cannot avoid liability for nonperformance
of its obligation under contract by placing such performance
beyond his control by his own voluntary act, and no one
can avail himself of nonperformance of a condition prece-
135dent, who has himself occasioned its nonperformance.
560 P.
134
^Cannon v.
2d 1383 (1977)
135Cannon v.
Stevens School of Business,
Stevens School of Business.
Inc
. ,
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ts ; Plaintiff sues in contract for recoveryunder a contract of employment. Plaintiffs were
student
^ defendant, to engage "aggressively in
recruitment." Defendant operated twobusiness colleges, one in Salt Lake City, and onein Ogden, Utah. The terms of employment were setforth m a written contract, drawn by defendant.Those provisions relevant to this dispute were
contained in sections VII and IX of the agreement.
VII. To accept as compensation under this
employment agreement: 13^ percent for all
enrollments taken where the current address
is in Weber, Salt Lake or Davis Counties, and
15 percent for all enrollments taken outside
these three counties. An additional 5 percentincentive commission will be credited to your
commission account at year end in addition
to the commissions shown above for all
tuition income over $100,000 paid by your
students during any calendar year (January
1st to December 31st)
.
IX. In the event this agreement is
terminated by either party and there exists a
deficit balance in your commission account,
the commission earned from the date of
termination forward will be applied toward
the deficit balance until that balance has
been satisfied. Credit balances on this
commission account after termination can be
drawn quarterly, the draw to be made during
the last month of each quarter, permitting
the college to complete the accounting state-
ments and reports for that quarter.
Since plaintiffs were soliciting enrollments over
a broad geographical area, they were required fre-
quently to obtain lodging and meals away from
home. Defendant would make advancements of $1,000
per month to plaintiffs, to assist in defraying
these soliciting expenses. Under its bookkeeping
system defendant entered these advances as
accounts receivable . Monthly, defendant issued a
computer printout to its salesmen. It showed
commissions earned, tuition refunds, other adjust-
ments; and the balance in the commission account at
206
the end of the month. On December 17 1973defendant entered into a contract with L D sBusiness College located in Salt Lake city Inexchange for $200,000, defendant agreed to' settlean asserted anti-trust action against the LDSBusiness College. Defendant alio agreed to dision-
Cit!
G
and
°P®r*tl0n of its school in Salt Lakec y, not to compete with (or sell its assetsto anyone wtio would compete with) L.D.S. Business
fniJho!!'
f°r 3 pe
f
lod of five years. Defendanturther covenanted to use its best efforts to in-fluence and encourage its present students to enrollat the L.D.S. Business College; to refer all inquiriesconcerning present or future educational needs ofprospective students to L.D.S.; to grant immediate
and exclusive access to all files and records ofprospective students, student directories, and mailinglists; and to deliver the permanent records of all ofdefendant's students of the Salt Lake City schoolfrom commencement of its operation to present time.
In conformity with this agreement defendant closedits school in Salt Lake City on December 31, 1973,
Defendant sold its Ogden school to the Robinsons on
December 31, 1973, for a basic purchase price of$267,000. In addition, Robinsons agreed to pay
certain accounts receivable, viz.
,
the accounts of
plaintiff Cannon for $5,544,06, and plaintiff Van
Luyk
,
for $3,069.07. Defendant conducted no further
operations at either school after December 31, 1973;
consequently, no further tuitions were collected.
Plaintiffs had fully performed the services which they
were required to render in order to be entitled to
compensation under the employment contract at the
time a prospective student was deemed by defendant
an "approved enrollment." Plaintiffs contend that
they were entitled to compensation for services render
ed and that defendant's voluntary actions which
prevented its performance in accordance with the terms
of the contract constituted a breach entitling plain-
tiffs to damages. The trial court granted judgment
to the plaintiffs and defendant does not challenge
the measure of damages. On appeal, defendant contends
the trial court erred in its determination that
plaintiffs were entitled to compensation under the
contract after defendant ceased to operate the schools
Defendant asserts it did not breach the contract, be-
cause its duty of performance was excused. This
assertion is predicated on the theory the terms of the
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contract create an implied condition precedent
if
Z
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mUSt bS °Peratin <J the business'
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to be rec3ui^ed to perform. Defendant cites
on "tuitto
1Gm plaint
J
ffs ’ compensation was basedi ns received by the college from all
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ments : " It urges it had no duty top y, because it received no tuitions. its contentionis there was no breach of contract, because therewas no duty to perform, because its duty to performwas subject to an implied condition precedent, viz.,the continued existence of the school, and receipt
of tuition. ^
Issues : 1
.
2 .
3.
Was there a breach of contract?
Was there an accord and satisfaction?
Was there a set-off?
Decisions : 1. Yes.
2 . No
.
3 . No
,
Reasoning : The court reasoned that the defendant
would not be entitled to prevail even if its asser-
tion of an implied condition precedent were accepted.
. . . Where, as here, the compensation agreed
to be paid for services rendered is to be paid
out of a fund to be collected by the party for
whom such services were rendered, there is
an implied obligation on the part of the
promissor to exercise reasonable diligence to
collect the fund from which the promisee may be
compensated for such services; and in default
of the exercise of such diligence, payment may
become due without the performance of the
condition. As stated by Professor Williston,
it is a principle of fundamental justice that
if a promisor is himself the cause of the
failure of performance of a condition upon
which his own liability depends, he cannot take
advantage of that failure.
By its voluntary act, defendant placed performance
of its obligation beyond its control, i.e., dis-
continuing the schools so it could not collect the
tuitions, and pay the percentages to which plaintiffs
were entitled. (2) An accord and satisfaction is
a method of discharging a contract, or settling a
claim arising from a contract, by substituting for
such contract or claim an agreement for the satisfac-
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^
a t e party, to whom the offer ismade, is bound to understand that if he accepts ithe does so subject to the conditions imposed
. . .
'
The accord is the agreement and the satisfaction1S the
m
®xecutlon performance of such agreement
. . This new substitute agreement must be foundedupon a legal consideration and must be consummatedby the assent or meeting of the minds of the partiesto the agreement. where we deal with an unliquidated
or disputed demand, consideration may rest on the
settlement of the dispute, e.g., the parties agreethe debtor will pay and the creditor will accept an
amount as a compromise of their differences andin satisfaction of the claim. At the time plaintiffs
cashed their checks
,
the court found
,
they were
unaware of their rights, or that their claims were indispute. They were unaware of the nature of the
contracts defendant had entered into with the third
parties, and as a consequence, defendant had breached
the employment contracts. Furthermore, neither by
the statement on the check or by other communication
did defendant express the intention the payment was
offered upon the condition it be accepted in full
satisfaction, or not at all. (3) In defendant's
agreement of sale of the Ogden school to the Robin-
sons, the Robinsons were required to pay for these
specific accounts. The court reasoned this indebted-
ness to defendant had already been discharged. Mr.
Robinson testifies he did not pay plaintiffs (whom
he employed) a commission on the old students who
continued in the school after he purchased it. He
further stated, under his contract with defendant,
he was not required to remit to defendant any of the
tuition he did not require Cannon and Van Luyk to
reimburse him, for paying, to defendant, the accounts
receivable. When this law suit was initiated,
Robinson refused to assign these accounts to defend-
ant, as requested. The evidence here sustained a
finding that the employer was not entitled to a
set-off for amounts advanced to employees to assist
in deferring soliciting expenses.
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The issue of the legal effect of the regulations
of the Board of Education implementing the Florida
school code was set forth in Phillips v , Santa Fe
Community College. 136
On complaint by the President of Santain l Prv 1 1 ^ _ i « • • _ _
Facts
:
——
— .
tica u uc r bFe Commu ity College, petitioner Phillips has beendismissed from his teaching position for in-
competence and misconduct. The complaint was
successively considered by a hearing officer
of the Division of Administrative Hearings, who
round the facts and recommended suspension for
six months, by the Board of Trustees of the
college, which accepted the recommended findings
and conclusions but imposed the penalty of dismissal
and which on Phillips 1 petition reviewed and
sustained the trustees’ decision. Phillips now
petitions for judicial review of the final agency
action discharging him.
Issues : 1. Does the order of the Board of
Education satisfy the statutory
requisites for agency's final order?
2. Was plaintiff's petition for review
untimely?
Decisions : 1. Yes.
2 . No
.
Reasoning : (1) To require such final agency action
by the Board of Education, as sought by petitioner
Phillips, would effectively displace the Santa Fe
Trustees as the body having authority to discharge
instructional personnel at that college. A hearing
would be required before the Board of Education
itself, or before one of its members, or before a
hearing officer whose proposed order would be sub-
mitted to the Board. Any prior proceedings before
the district trustees would thereby be eclipsed.
We decline to so emasculate the specific design of
the Florida school code to make it conform to the more
general scheme of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The district board of trustees of each community
college is the agency responsible for final action in
So
.
13 6
Phillips v. Santa Fe Community College, 342,
2d 108 (1977) .
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disputes concerning dismissal of instructionalpersonnel.. (2) The affected party may seekthat administrative remedy, in the time and mannerprescribed, without jeopardizing the judicial reviewsecured to him by Section 120.68. Thus, Phillips'timely application for review by the Board of Educa-tion tolled the time for seeking judicial review;
and, after the Board of Education sustained theSanta Fe trustees, Phillips had 30 more days in
which to seek judicial review of the trustees'final action. In this case, the petition for reviewis dismissed, it appearing that Phillips' petition
for review was filed more than 30 days after thedecision of the Board of Education reviewing and
sustaining the final agency action.
Issue of the legal effect of an oral contract of
employment in the Junior College District of East
Central Missouri arose in Neal v. Junior College District
1 07
of East Central Missouri
.
Facts : Plaintiff taught education psychology as a
part-time instructor at the Junior College during
the 1973 spring semester, the 1973 summer session,
the 1973 fall semester and the 1974 summer session.
For the first sesssion plaintiff was personally
contracted by Boyd H. Eversole, Dean of Academic
Affairs, inquiring whether she wanted to teach
educational psychology for the 1973 spring semester.
Thereafter, communication from the school concern-
ing plaintiff's teaching other sessions came through
plaintiff's husband, Thomas L. Neal, then an instructor
of psychology and sociology at the college. Thomas
received his information from Terry A. Zanin, chairman
of the division, who was relaying information from
either Dean Eversole or Dean Edward B. Conway.
During each session's registration, plaintiff and
her husband kept track of the number of students who
were signing up for the class because instructors
were only paid the full salary if twelve or more
students enrolled. If less than twelve students
registered the class would either be dropped or
taught by an instructor who was willing to be paid
at a lower rate. In each session the course scheduled
137Neal v. Junior College District of East Central
Missouri, 556 S.W. 2d 580 (1977).
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so tw ??h y pla intlff had en°ugh studentshat it was not dropped. No one ever officiallvtold plaintiff to start teaching; she jus? shewed Y
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had be<3un teaching the new class.t e start of the 1974 fall semester plaintiffagain received, but only through her husband,
communication from the college inquiring as toplaintiff s . interest in teaching the same course
again. Plaintiff expressed interest and preparedfor class and ordered books. During registration,however, plaintiff's husband was informed anotherinstructor would be teaching educational psychologym place of plaintiff. The course was given but it
was taught by this other person. Plaintiff made no
complaint about the action of the college. Her
husband, however, wrote a memorandum to Terry A.
Zanin, division chairman, requesting that he request
Dean Eversole to write plaintiff to the effect
^-h^t if 3. class in educational psychology was to
be taught the next semester (spring 1975) that
plaintiff would be the one to teach it. Dean Conway
responded by writing, in effect, that it was against
school policy to give a commitment like that. Later
plaintiff received the usual oral communication from
the college inquiring about her availability to teach
during the 1975 spring semester but again the class
was taught by someone else. Plaintiff was unable
to secure another teaching position either semester,
despite her efforts. Plaintiff's husband testified
that the communication he received from the college
concerning plaintiff were inquiries as to plaintiff's
availability, willingness and interest in teaching
the course, Zanin testified that he only asked
plaintiff's husband if plaintiff would be interested
in teaching if the opportunity arose and that he
had no authority to do more. The college President,
Dr. Donald E. Shook, stated that deans had no authority
to offer teachers a contract but could only locate
faculty. He further stated that the college does
not commit itself to part-time faculty (such as
plaintiff) until after registration. Plaintiff
agreed that the inquiries from the college were no
more than requests as to her availability and interest.
However, plaintiff believed from her past experience
that if the college asked about her availability,
then she would be the one to teach the class if it was
given
.
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plaint iff^nd ff ?*** Were n° -tracts between
1975 semesters?
f°r fal1 1974 and sPrin<3
Decision : Yes.
~
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There was sufficient evidence fromwhich the trial court could find that there was nocontract and such a determination is not against theweight of the evidence. Furthermore, although notadvanced by defendant on appeal, 432.070, RSM 1969
teacher's contract must be in writinginis statute is mandatory and is a part of the
substantive law. It was therefore necessary thatplaintiff allege and prove a written contract tobe entitled to judgment. All of the evidence provedthere was no written contract between the partiesfor the fall semester of 1974 and the spring semester
of 1975. The judgment is affirmed.
The following legal concepts are derived from Board
of Trustees of the State College of Maryland v. Sherman:
(1) Clear language of agreement will not give way to what
parties thought agreement meant or intended it to mean
and (2) When language of contract is clear, true test
of what is meant is not what parties to contract intended
it to mean, but what a reasonable person in position of
1 7 Qparties would have thought it meant.
Facts : On July 8
,
1970
,
Dr. Sherman executed a form
headed "Application for a Non Teaching Position,"
the "Non" having been inserted by someone above
the title on the form. On July 14, 1970, she was
hired for the school year beginning September 1,
1970. On March 3, 1971, Dr. Sherman addressed a
letter to the President of Bowie in which she said
13 8Board of Trustees of State Colleges of Mary-
land v. Sherman, 373 A. 2d 626 (1977),
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what was styled "Addendum toFaculty Contract between Dr. Sherman and the colleaeby which she was hired as a professor for the
mu
811 ™°nth Period ' effective September 1. 1971 11The addendum indicated that her "tenure status" would
,
e Probationary
. it was on a prepared form which
*** dune 30
'
1974," inserted after the statement,
?Q?o»
tl0nary period bY ••• The similar date of "July 1,1972 was inserted on the "Current regulations re-quire that you be notified concerning the termination
of your addendum dated April 11, 1972, in which her
salary was agreed upon for the school year beginningSeptember 1, 1972, The latter form had on it, "A
condition of offering this addendum is that you submit
a statement waiving rights to tenure before July 1,1975." This was done under date of April 24, 1972.
The April 11, 1972 addendum was accompanied by aletter from the college president saying in pertinent
part
:
Technically, you were employed at Bowie State
College under the old system that required
five years of service before attaining tenure;
however
,
a new contract was issued to you which
specifies a period of three years of service
as a requirement for attaining tenure.
I am prepared to extend your contract for an-
other year only if it does not lead to tenure.
If you accept these conditions, please submit
to me by May 1 a written statement waiving rights
to tenure before June 30, 1975.
On April 16, 1973, the last addendum was executed.
It pertained to employment for the college year
beginning September 1, 1973. It, too, referred to
her having probationary tenure status and said that
regulations required that she be notified concerning
the termination of her probationary period before
June 30, 1974. On June 6, 1973, the president
of Bowie advised Dr. Sherman that it was his "un-
pleasant duty to inform (her) that (her) contract
as a faculty member at Bowie State College" would
be terminated "at the end of the (then) coming
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academic year, after which it would not be re-newed. He added, "This means that you will no
Junfao I 97^°
yed at Bowie State College after
Issue; 1. Is Sherman a tenured faculty member?
Z' university breach her contract?
J ’ Dld the facts involve fraud and mis-
representation?
Decision ; 1. No.
2
. No
.
3 . No
Re_ason_in2. : (D This is a case of contract construc-tion. The principles of which are well known andhave been enunciated by this Court numerous times:
the clear and unambiguous language of an
agreement will not give way to what the
parties thought the agreement meant or
intended it to mean; where a contract is
plain and unambiguous, there is no room for
construction, and it must be presumed that the
parties meant what they expressed; and when the
language of a contract is clear, the true test
of what is meant is not what the parties to
the contract intended it to mean, but what a
reasonable person in the position of the parties
would have thought it meant.
(2) For the first year of her full-time employment
and therefore, the first year subject to the regu-
lations, 1971-72, Dr. Sherman would be considered
hired for the next "full academic year" (1972-1973)
unless she received notice before March 1, 1972.
Her contract was actually dated April 11, 1972. In
her second year (1972-1973) she should be regarded
as hired for the next "full academic year" (1973-
1974) unless she was given written notice before
December 15, 1972. Her contract was actually dated
April 16, 1973. By these regulations, having
been hired for the year 1973-74 (her third year)
she would be considered hired for the next succeeding
year, appointment for that 1973-74 school year.
That appointment would expire June 30, 1974-75, un-
less written notice was given 12 months prior to the
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xpiration of her 1974 contract. Notice had to
artniTf
1 r f°re June 30
'
197 3. This noticec ually was given June 6, 1973. Accordingly,there was full compliance by the college and
Y
Dr. Sherman did not acquire tenure.
In conclusion, sixty of the 100 random sampled
cases were in the area of faculty related case.
Table 2, p. 216, indicated that in the sixty faculty
related cases, only four of the areas of contract were
in issue. The areas of Consideration, Capacity, Illegali-
ty and the Statute of Frauds were not litigated as
major issues. Therefore, though there were approximate-
ly three times as many faculty related suits than
students in the sample, student related suits covered
a broader spectrum, in terms of area of contract in-
volved in issues. A graphic representation of the
distribution of the percentage of faculty issues, in
the 100 cases in higher education as briefed in this
chapter to the areas of the law of contract is found in
Figure 2, page 217.
Institution Related
In Sterling v. University of Michigan in 1896, the
court dealt with an issue relevant today, namely, did
the legislature have the Constitutional right to inter-
13
fere with or dictate the management of the university?
1 O Q
.
Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan,
68 N.W. 253 (1896)
.
TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF 60 FACULTY- RELATED CASES ACCORDING
THE AREAS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN ISSUE
Source: 100 Cases
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Figure 2. Distribution of the percentage of
faculty issues in the 100 cases to the areas of the
law of contract.
Legend
:
1. Expressed or Implied
2. Offer and Acceptance
3. Consideration
4. Capacity
5. Fraud, Mistake, Duress
6. Illegality
7. Statute of Frauds
8. Performance and Breach
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The fiscal autonomy of the University of
Massachusetts has been a controversial issue in the
legislature in the past few years and relates directly
to the issue in this 19th century case, what is more
relevant to this study is that the court in its dictum
of this case relates directly to the State College in
Massachusetts which had been a failure under management
by the state, thereby citing the need for a Board of
Regents to control the University of Michigan.
Facts : Mandamus by Charles Sterling to compel
the Regents of the University of Michigan to
comply with Act. No. 257, Pub. Act 1895, pro-
viding for the removal of the Homeopathic Medical
College from Ann Arbor to Detroit. The Act No. 257,
Pub. Act 1895 was passed by legislature in 1895.
In summary, it authorized and directed the Board
of Regents of the university to establish a
Homeopathic Medical College as a branch or as a
department of the university in Detroit and to
discontinue the existing school in Ann Arbor.
The Board of Regents claims: (1) that this act
was not for the best interest of the university
and (2) that the legislature did not have the
Constitutional right to interfere with or dictate
the management of the university.
Issue : Did the legislature have the Constitutional
right to interfere with or dictate the management
of the university?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The Constitution of 1850 placed the
university under the control of regents elected by
the people. The legislature has no control over the
university of the Board of Regents. It was not the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to take
away from the people the government of this in-
stitution. The designed and did provide for its
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management and control by a body of eight
elected men by the people at large. They
recognized the necessity that it should be in
sole
g
offf ^ ® 1®cted for lon9 terms, and whoseicial duty it should be to look after1 s interest
,
and who should have the opportunityinstigate its needs, and carefully deliberate
Tuwth:U2? S would best Promote its usefulness forthe benefit of the people. Some of the members
of the Convention of 1850 referred in the debatesto two colleges (one in Virginia and the otherm Massachusetts ) which had been failures under
management by the State.
Diverse legal suits in contract have been liti-
gated in the courts against the corporate institutions.
As the following pages
, through the medium of briefs
and selected cases, show the diversity of the focus of
the action, yet all actions are suits in contracts.
In the State ex rel. Sigall et al., v. Aetna
Cleaning Contractors of Cleveland, Inc.
,
the court set
the following precedent for colleges and universities:
Board of Trustees of a state university has the
authority to enter into contracts with independent
non-civil service employers to perform custodial
services .
,
„
„
140
Facts : This is an appeal from a decision of the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court permanently
enjoining the further performance of a contract
entered into between the Aetna Cleaning Con-
tractors of Cleveland, Inc, (hereinafter "Aetna")
and Kent State University (hereinafter "Kent
State"). The contract in question provides that
Aetna shall perform custodial services at thirteen
Kent State buildings. Civil service employees,
hired directly by Kent State, perform 75 to 80
140State ex rel. Sigall et al. v. Aetna Cleaning
Contractors of Cleveland, Inc. et al., 353 N.E. 2d 913
(1974) .
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percent of all the custodial work at Kent StateIn some buildings civil service employees perform-
custodial
131
?
uties durin9 the day while Aetna
employees work at night. The civilservice employees were paid $1.94 per hour
t
t
ine
°? the bearing before the trial court.Custodial employees in the classified civil ser-
vice are assigned by statute a "pay range number."Testimony elicited at the hearing below indicatedthat the civil service custodial employees werepaid a minimum of $2.55 per hour, plus fringebenefits. The trial court found that the contractm question was illegal in that it violated
constitutional and statutory law of Ohio relating
to civil
. service employment. Kent State, Aetna,
the President of Kent State, and the various
officers and members of the Board of Trustees of
Kent State have perfected this appeal.
Issue ; Was the contract illegal?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : It is possible that the Board of
Education might provide for this janitorial service
by an independent contract or by direct employment.
There is nothing complex or difficult to understand
about civil service laws and rules. The funda-
mental purpose is to establish a merit system,
whereby selections for appointments in certain branches
of the public service may be made upon the basis of
demonstrated relative fitness, without regard to
political considerations,. To carry out this purpose
elaborate rules have been formulated, designed to
thwart the purposes of the civil services system,
the Board of Trustees of a state university may law-
fully contract to have an independent contractor
perform services which might also be performed by
civil service employees. Plaintiffs introduced no
evidence tending to establish that the Board of
Trustees of Kent State entered into the contract in
a bad faith attempt to circumvent the purposes of
the civil service system.
In Appel Media v. Clarion State College , the
plaintiff terminated the installation of a television
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distribution system after its work failed to meet
contract specification. The issue related to plain-
tiff's compensation under the contract. The court
held that plaintiff was not entitled to receive the
full contract price but the contract price minus the
cost of contract completion as provided in the contract
plus interest. 141
Facts : On September 3, 1969, the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania acting through the Department of
Property and Supplies (Department)
, accepted thebid of Appel Visual Services, Inc. (Appel
Visual) for furnishing television distribution
facilities at Clarion State College.
Appel Visual's bid was $61,239. On October 15,
1969 the Director of Purchases for the department
was notified that Appel Media, Inc. (Appel Media)
would be assumed the contractural responsibility of
Appel Visual for the installation of the system,
Appel Media having recently contracted with Appel
Visual to assume and perform contracts which had
already been negotiated by Appel Visual and for
which work had not yet been begun. Appel Media
is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of installing and servicing audio-visual equip-
ment and video systems for school and university
use. Installation was begun by Appel Media in
December of 1969, at which time the anticipated
completion date was February 15, 1970. Problems
in installation developed almost immediately, how-
ever, and there was a series of meetings and inspec-
tions during the ensuing months of 1970 which in-
volved representatives of Appel Media, college
personnel, engineers and a representative of the
Attorney General. Finally, after an inspection on
October 21 and 22 of 1970, the engineer commissioned
by the department issued his inspection report,
which detailed numerous defects. Appel Media
141Appel Media v. Clarion State College, 327A
2d 420 (1974)
.
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learned of this report and of the Department'sintention to advertise for bids to complete the
work, and then ceased any further efforts to
complete the contract, leaving some of its
materials on the premises. in November, the
Department invited bids from other contracts to com-
plete the installation of the system, and Tele-
sonic Assoc. Inc. (Telesonic) was awarded a $40,000
contract for that purpose on March 21, 1971.
Appel Media filed a complaint in assumpsion with
the Board of Arbitration of Claims (Board) to
recover payment in full of the orginal contract
price. After preliminary objections were filed
and dismissed, a hearing was held on May 8-9, 1973.
On October 25, 1973, the Board entered an order in
favor of Appel Media in the amount of $24,139, a
figure arrived at by subtracting the cost of com-
pleting the work from the original contract price
and adding interest. Appel Media filed a timely
appeal with this court, asserting that it is entitled
to the entire contract price plus interest. Al-
though Appel Media admits that the results of
its work were not up the requirements of its con-
tract, it asserts that it expended the time, labor,
material and money called for in the contract and
in accompanying plans and specifications. Appel
Media blames its failure to produce the proper
results on electrical grounding conditions which
were peculiar to the site at Clarion State College,
and which were known only by the defendant when
Appel Visual's bid was accepted. Because Appel
Media did not adequately cope with the grounding
problems, there was a hum interference with the
signals received over the system, so that a darken-
ed line would appear across the television monitor.
The hum interference exceeded that called for in the
contract's performance specifications.
Issue: Is plaintiff entitled to receive the full
contract price?
Decision: No. Judgment Affirmed.
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Rea soning
; (i) If one party knows Qr has dreason to know of the unilateral mistake of the otherP y o a contract, relief will be granted to thesame extent as m the case of a mutual mistake.Here, however, the appellant has not shown that anyagents of the Department knew that the appellant
was acting under a misapprehension. (2) Cur courtshave oioarly held that a party to a contract whichhas been breached by the other party may secure a
substitute to complete the contract when the
contract so provides. Appel Media here was clearlygiven a reasonable time to complete its contract by
correcting the deficiencies in its work. The
original completion date was in February of 1970
and complaints about the results of Appel Media's
work were voided from that time through to the
month of October.
Kramer
,
Judge (dissenting)
;
I respectfully dissent for the basic reason
that the majority opinion perforce must make
its own findings of fact in order to sub-
stantiate the result. I would have little
difficulty concurring if the Board of
Arbitration Claims (Board) had made
findings or conclusions that somehow Appel
Media, Inc. had breached its contract with
the Commonwealth. The problem is that no
such findings or conclusions were made
by the Board.
Jessen Associates v. Bullock was a suit involving
a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Bob Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts, to issue
a warrant on the State Treasury for $2,590.25 for
architectural services performed by Realtor, Jessen
Associates, Inc., for the University of Texas at
Austin. The basis for the controversy originated
14 2
Jessen Associates v. Bullock, 531 S.W. 2d
593 (1975).
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in the senate bill.
The court ruled for colleges and universites
in this case that it held:
Legislature, by rejecting proposal that list-ing of various university construction
projects upon which Board of Regents could
spend funds appropriated elsewhere would
not constitute approval of such construc-
tion projects by legislature, and accepting
rider to general appropriations bill which
expressly empowered board to expend funds
appropriated elsewhere for various university
construction projects, indicated that listing
of such projects did constitute "legislative
approval" within constitutional provision
requiring such approval for university
construction projects.
Facts : Comptroller of public accounts refused
payment to architects for services performed on
university construction project entered into
pursuant to statute which comptroller alleged
was invalid. Architects brought original
petition for writ of mandamus against comptroller
seeking order warranting payment. The Supreme
Court, Greenhill, C.J., held that rider to
General Appropriations Act which empowered Board
of Regents to expend funds appropriated elsewhere
for certain construction project was not "item of
appropriation," and thus Governor's veto was inef-
fective; that rider did not contain "more than
one subject" within meaning of constitutional
prohibition against bills embracing various
subjects; that legislative intent was clearly
to approve expenditures of such funds on such
construction projects; and the duty of comptroller
to pay architects was clear, and thus writ of
mandamus would lie.
Issue : Should the warrant be issued?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : A rider to the latest General Appropri-
ations Act was not subject to the veto of the
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Governor. The Governor has the power to veto anentire appropriations bill; but his power toveto part of an appropriations bill is limitedto vetoing "items of appropriation." This riderauthorizing the construction of certain enumerated
’
projects without the consent of the CollegeCoordinating Board, was not intended by theLegislature
. t
to appropriate funds, and thereforewas not an item of appropriation" which was
subject to veto apart from the remainder of the
The University of Illinois was declared not to be
a party to a contract which was in dispute and had no
duty to indemnify the Illinois Building Authority
for a possible adverse judgment in a breach of contract
sult in Talandis Construction Corp. v. Illinois Building
141Authority
.
Facts : Appeal by State Building Authority from an
order dismissing its second amended third party
complaint against the university for indemnification
for a possible judgment for the contractor who
allegedly was damaged due to delay and work stop-
pages caused by indecision on the part of the authori-
ty and university. The Appellate Court held that
the authority could only prosecute a third party
action based on alleged tortious conduct on the part
of the university, in the court of claims. That
authority was not entitled to indemnification by
university for judgments awarded against it because
of breach affecting construction company based on
lease agreement between authority and university;
and that since university was a stranger to contract
between authority and construction company the
university did not have a duly, express or implied,
to indemnify authority for possible adverse judgment
based upon alleged breach of contract.
143Talandis Construction Corp. v.
Authority, 321 N.E. 2d 154 (1974).
Illinois Building
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Issue: Did the University have a duty to indemnify
the authority for possible adverse judgment based
on alleged breach of contract?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning ; (1) A stranger to a contract between two
Parties cannot be compelled to indemnify one of the
parties for breach of contract absent the stranger's
express agreement to so indemnify. (2) Where Uni-
versity was not a party to construction contract
between state building authority and plaintiff
contractor which was executed after lease agree-
ment between building authority and University,
the University, being a stranger to the construction
contract, did not have a duty, express or implied,
to indemnify authority for possible adverse judgment
based upon alleged breach of contract on theory that
University was in reality a party in interest in
construction of animal clinic for use by the Uni-
versity under the lease.
The question of the power of the Board of Trustees of
the University of Connecticut to enter into a contract
which subjected classified state employees presently em-
ployed in the food service operation at the University to
elimination of their positions was the issue in Connecticut
State Employees Association et al. v. Board of Trustees of
144
the University of Connecticut et al .
Facts: State employees association, a chartered
affiliate of the association consisting exclusively
of state employees at the University of Connecticut
and a group of individual food service employees at
the University brought action to enjoin Board of
Trustees of the University and various other state
officials from entering into a contract with an
144 Connecticut State Employee Association v. Board of
Trustees of University of Connecticut, 345 A, 2d 36 (1974).
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independent food management contractor for provi-
sion of food dispensing service at the University
and from dismissing individual plaintiffs and those
similarly situated, claiming that proposed agreement
violated state civil service law. The Superior Court
County, Parskey, Jr, entered judgment forplaintiffs, and defendants appealed. The Supreme
Court, MacDonald J., held that State Personnel Act
fa- reasons of economy and efficiency, did not pre—
elude Board of Trustees of University of Connecticut
from entering into a contract with an independent
food management contractor, thereby subjecting clas-
sified state employees presently employed in food
service operation at University to eliminination of
their positions.
Issue: Does the State Personnel Act, chapter 67
of the General Statutes, preclude the Board of
Trustees of the University of Connecticut from
entering into a contract with an independent food
management contractor, thereby subjecting the 240
classified state employees presently employed in
food service operations at the University of
Connecticut to the elimination of their positions?
Decision: No.
Reasoning : (1) State Personnel Act did not preclude
Board of Trustees of University of Connecticut from
for reasons of economy and efficiency, entering
into a contract with an independent food management
contractor, thereby subjecting classified state
employees presently employed in food service opera-
tion at university to elimination of their positions.
(2) Statute giving board of trustees of University
of Connecticut power to make rules for government of
university and to determine general policies of uni-
versity was intended to clothe the board with sole
jurisdiction over the university in all phases.
(3) Statute giving board of trustees of University of
Connecticut power to make rules for government of
university and to determine general policies of
university was intended to grant to the board
authority to exercise complete direction and re-
straint over the actions of those connected with
university, including the teaching staff, employees
and students. (4) Under statute giving board of
trustees of University of Connecticut power to make
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rules for government of university and to determinegeneral policies of university, the board has
authority to make policy decisions regarding status
of food service system.
The issues of a waiver of contract or estoppel were
two of the legal issues in Board of Regents of the Univer -
sity of Texas v, S. & G. Construction Company. ^
^
Facts: Builder brought action against the University
Board of Regents to receive additional compensation
after completing construction of married students'
apartments pursuant to contract with Board. The
126th District Court, Travis County, James R.
Meyers, J., awarded builder $837,674.90 in damages,
plus interest, and also awarded builder the $] 2,000
portion of contract price withheld as liquidated
damages for late completion of project, and Board
appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Phillips,
C.J., held that failure of Board to provide builder
with "correct plans and specifications and additional
instructions and detail drawings as were necessary
to carry out the work" was a breach of contract
entitling builder to recover its additional costs,
that builder's decision to stay on the job despite
Board's breach of contract was not a waiver or
basis for an estoppel to assert builder's claim for
damages for such breach, that judgment permitting
builder to recover its additional costs did not
constitute "extra compensation for services rendered"
pursuant to a valid written contract or constitute
"a gift or donation" in violation of state consti-
tutional provisions, that amending of a written charge
to jury by changing definition of certain phrases
was proper, that certain rule did not preclude
trial court from correcting an error in a charge after
oral argument, that builder could be awarded interest
on judgment from date project was completed and
that award to builder of the sum withheld as
liquidated damages was proper.
145Board of Regents of the University of Texas v. S. &
G, Construction Co., 529 S.W. 2d 90 (1975).
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IjSsue: Did Appellant breach the contract?
Decision ; Yes
.
Reasoning
: ( 1 ) Builder's decision to stay on the30b despite breach of contract, in failing to pro-
vide builder with "correct plans and specifications
and additional instructions and detail drawings as
were necessary to carry out the work" as required by
contract was not a waiver or basis for an estoppel
to assert builder's claim for damages for such breach
and (2) If a party breaches its contract, the other
party is put to an election of continuing or ceasing
performance; any action indicating an intention to
continue will operate as a conclusive choice, not
depriving injured party of his cause of action for
breach which has already taken place, but depriving
him only of any excuse for ceasing performance on his
own part.
A proposal to accept an offer which contains terms
differing from the offer is a rejection of the offer. This
was the rule of law in Board of Governors, Etc, v. Buildings
146Systems, Etc
.
Facts : In May of 1972 the board of governors of the
university authorized the construction of a 257-unit
apartment structure to be built on the campus. Bids
were solicited and received. The scheduled closing
time for receiving bids was 2 p.m., July 25, 1972.
The defendant Building Systems submitted the low bid
of $4,824,000. In accordance with the plaintiff's
advertisements, Building Systems submitted a surety
bond executed by American Insurance Company in the
amount of five percent of the bid. On August 10,
1972, the board of governors passed a resolution
awarding the general contract to Building Systems
"subject to review and concurrence by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) , and to the
sale and delivery of bonds***." That same day a letter
146Board of Governors v, Building Systems Housing Cor-
poration, 233 N.W. 2d 195 (1975).
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nt to
.
Build ing Systems informing it of theboerd s decision including the two conditions.The letter stated further:
As soon as the University receives approvalfrom the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in the award of this contract,
we will be in touch with you to make the
arrangements for executing the necessary
contract documents.
Although Building Systems advertised for the sub-
mission of subcontractor bids, it thereafter decided
not to continue with the project. By a letter dated
August 30 and received August 31, 1972, Building
Systems informed the board that it was withdrawing
its bid 'pursuant to the terms of the bid proposal
and the advertisement for bidders.' At that time,
the University had not received approval of defendant's
bid from HUD.
Thereafter, the plaintiff almost immediately informed
Building Systems that it considered the corporation's
conduct to be an anticipatory breach of the contract.
On September 8, 1972, the board awarded the general
contract to the second lowest bidder for $5,090,000.
Subsequently, the University demanded payment from
defendants of $266,000 damages measured by the dif-
ference between the defendant's bid and that of the
next lowest bidder. Upon a refusal to pay, the
plaintiff instituted this suit. On April 19, 1974,
the trial court entered an order granting final
summary judgment in favor of the defendant surety,
American Insurance Company, and partial summary
judgment in favor of defendant Building Systems.
From this order, plaintiff appeals.
Issues : 1. Was the bid an offer impliedly proposing
that the University make a conditional
promise as part of its acceptance?
2. Was the "withdrawal" of Building Systems
bid a breach of contract?
Decisions: 1. No.
2. No.
Reasoning: (1) In order to establish a valid contract,
the offeree's acceptance must:
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evfry resPect correspond substantially withidentical offer made
. The acceptance mustbe absolute and unconditional, and, if condi-tions are attached or it differs from the offer,the transaction amounts only to a proposal and a
counter proposal. 1 '*'7
(2) A proposal to accept an offer which contains terms
varying from that of the offer is a rejection of the
offer. The surety contract provided for the termina-tion of the surety's responsibility if the bid shouldbe rejected or if the bid was accepted and a formal
contract was executed. The offeree's acceptance was
conditioned upon, at the least, the sale and delivery
of financing bonds, constituted a counter—proposal
and thus a rejection.
The court held that an agreement by the Utah State
University to purchase common stock with public funds in its
possession and to pay a commission to a broker was ultra
vires and unenforceable, in First Equity Corp. of Florida v .
Utah State University
.
14 8
Facts : Plaintiff is a stock broker who brought action
to recover commissions and other money lost as a
result of the refusal of state university to accept
and pay for common stock ordered by the Assistant
Vice President of Finance of Utah State University.
Lower courts granted summary judgment for the Univer-
sity. Plaintiff appeals.
Issue : Does the University have the power to purchase
common stock with public funds in its possession?
Decision: No.
^^Marshall Manufacturing Co. v. Berrien County Package
Co.
,
257 N.W. 714 (1934)
.
148 First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University,
544 P 2d 887 (1975)
.
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Reasoning: USU according to the court had no powerto enter into an agreement for the purchase of common
stock. It held that "the agreement to purchase andpay commissions thereon are ultra vires agreements
and unenforceable,"
The court further pointed out that municipal corpora-
are not bound by contracts made without authority
or in excess of the power of the corporation. 'One
who deals with a municipal corporation does so at his
peril.
'
Action for damages to college campus allegedly loaned
under contract with City of New York for use by model cities
project could not be defeated on ground that executive order
of mayor which created model cities administration called
for approval of all contracts by mayor, in view of fact that
City, in its own suit papers, spoke of having "contracted"
with college was the holding in Barber-Scotia College, Inc .
149
v. City of New York .
Facts : The plaintiff in this action, Barber-Scotia
College, Inc. ("Barber-Scotia") contracted with
Central Brooklyn Model Cities ("CBMC") to make
available Barber-Scotia ' s North Carolina campus for
a summer educational program in 1972. Pursuant to
the agreement, CBMC sent more than 200 students and
faculty members to Barber-Scotia from June 28, 1972
until August 18, 1972. This suit was begun to
recover the cost of repairs for damage allegedly
done to the college during the course of the summer
program. The defendant, City of New York, has moved
to dismiss the complaint. The City argues that
plaintiff's failure to file a notice of claim with
the Corporation Counsel within 90 days of the alleged
injury forecloses the action on the tort count of
149Barber-Scotia College, Inc. v. City of New York, 390
F. Supp, 525 (1975)
.
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the complaint. The plaintiff contends that itsfailure to file a timely notice of claim is no barto its action since the defendant is estopped, by
reason of its settlement representations, from
asserting the failure. Moreover, plaintiff contendsthat the purpose of the statute has been met since
the defendant received prompt actual notice of the
claim.
Issues ; 1
.
2 .
3.
Is failure to file a timely notice of
claim a bar to plaintiff's action?
Was the purpose of the statute met?
Did Mayor have to approve contracts?
Decisions : 1. No.
2. Yes.
3. No.
Reasoning : (1) It is clear from the communications
and actions that took place in August and September
1972 that representatives of the City were aware of
the claim. Further, they indicated that they were
processing the claim. Clearly the City had both
prompt notice of and an opportunity to investigate
the claim so that the legislative purpose of Section
50-e has been accomplished. (2) Moreover, the
acknowledgment of the damage by CBMC's on-site repre-
sentative and the September 14th letter from CMBM
were clearly relied upon by plaintiff as indications
that the matter would in fact be settled. For this
reason, the plaintiff, which was unaware of any
claim-filing requirement, did not even engage an
attorney until much later when it became apparent
that the City was not going to pay for the damage.
Representations by City agents, on which plaintiff
relied, that the matter would be resolved, estop
the City from now asserting the plaintiff's failure
to file as a defense to the action. (3) The City
also tried to defeat the contract count on the ground
that the Executive Order of the Mayor (No. 8 dated
April 15, 1970), which created the Model Cities
Administration, calls for approval of all contracts
by the Mayor. This argument was raised as an after-
thought in a late addition to the City's reply memor-
andum. The argument fails since in its own papers
the City speaks of having "contracted" with the
plaintiff.
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In Curator of University of Missouri v. Nebraska
Prestressed Concrete Co., the court defined "quantum meruit"
as as much as he has deserved
.
f^cts: Quantum meruit action by plaintiff subcon-tractor against defendant subcontractor, general
contractor as principal on performance bond, and in-
surance company as surety, for work performed in
constructing fieldhouse. The City of St. Louis
Circuit Court St. Louis City, Michael J. Scott, J,
,
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff subcontractor
for $67,000 and defendant subcontractor appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Gunn, J.
,
held that evidence
was sufficient to support finding that defendant sub-
contractor, which had contracted with plaintiff sub-
contractor for installation of precast concrete
exterior wall and seating units in fieldhouse and which
had obligation to provide suitable access work areas
for material and trucks, breached contract; that
plaintiff subcontractor was therefore entitled to
recover reasonable value of work and labor furnished;
but that award was excessive
Issue : Was plaintiff subcontractor entitled to
recover the reasonable value of work and labor
furnished for breach of his contract?
Decision ; Yes. Judgment for plaintiff on issue of
liability affirmed. Issue on damages remanded.
Reasoning : (1) A quantum meruit action brought by
contractor, if contractor was prevented from completing
contract because of owner’s breach, contractor is
entitled to recover reasonable value of work and
labor furnished and in a quantum meruit action
brought by defaulting contractor, contractor's
recovery may be reduced, under proper pleading and
proof, by amount of damage his breach of contract may
have occasioned to owner; contractor may not recover
in excess of contract price in such a case.
(2) Merely walking off a job is not breach of contract
as matter of law. When owner, or someone standing in
150Curator of University of Missouri v. Nebraska Pre-
stressed Concrete Co., 526 S.W. 2d 903 (1975).
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his stead
,
prevents contractor from completing per-formance/ contractor's failure to complete work is
excused, and he is not regarded as having breached
a contract; contractor, under such circumstances,
has right to sue on contract or in quantum meruit
for reasonable value of labor and work furnished.
The State University Construction Fund of New York
awarded a single rather than separate contracts for the
erection of a building at the State University campus at
Stony Brook. In Hvac and Sprinkler Contractors Ass'n, Inc .
v. The State University Construction Fund
,
the court upheld
the discretion of the Construction Fund to issue a single
. . 151
contract.
Facts : Plaintiff brought Article 78 proceeding chal-
lenging action of the State University Construction
Fund in seeking bids on entire building contract
rather than soliciting separate bids for each of the
specific subdivisions of work to be performed. The
Supreme Court held that the sections of the Education
law specifically permitting the Fund to award one
contract for all the work to be performed controlled
over the prior general statute which required the
state to solicit separate bids for each of the three
specific subdivisions of work. It also held that the
Fund did not abuse its discretion in choosing to
award a single rather than separate contracts on the
theory that in a large size contract single contract-
ing is prejudicial to small contractors.
Issue: Is Education Law 376 (7), L196 2c 251 void
because it conflicts with State Finance Law Section
135?
Decision: No. Motion Dismissed.
^^Hvac and Sprinkler Contractors Ass'n., Inc. v The
State University Construction Fund, 364 N.Y.S. 2d 422
(1975)
.
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Reasoning ; The court reasoned that it is a matterof hornbook statutory interpretation that if two actscannot be read m harmony with each other, a priorgenerai statute must yield to a later specific one.The legislature m approving Education Law section
J
.
b (/) in 1962, certainly was aware of StateFinance Law Section 135. By enacting the Education
le9islature created a specific instance
which is controlling here.
!n Green v , Richmond
,
the following concept of the law
of contract was held where there is disputed evidence as to
the terms or performance of an orgal agreement, or meaning
of words used by the party, this matter should be left for
the jury.
Facts : An action in the nature of quantum meruit
against the personal representative of the estate
of decedent to recover for services rendered by the
plaintiff in reliance on the decedent's oral promise
to leave a will bequeathing his entire estate to her.
The Superior Court entered judgment for plaintiff and
defendant appeals.
Issue : Was the oral agreement illegal on the theory
that it included sexual intercourse or cohabitation
as part of the consideration?
Decision; No.
Reasoning : The court indicated that the oral agree-
ment involved a promise to make a will, and as such
was not binding. However, if the oral agreement was
legal and not contrary to public policy, the plaintiff
could recover the fair value of her services. From
the totality of the evidence, the jury was warranted
in inferring that the illicit relations were not part
of the contract, and were not more than an incidental
part of the plaintiff’s performance.
152Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 691 (1975).
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In Board of Trustees of Howard Community College v.
John K. Ruff, Inc.
,
the court held that the Board of
Trustees of community college was agency of state and
therefore doctrine of sovereign immunity applicable to state
was also applicable to board; however, General Assembly
directly waived sovereign immunity of Board, but sovereign
immunity would still be defense, despite waiver, to suit
brought for money judgment in assumpsit under contract
against board unless funds were appropriated for that pur-
pose or board could provide funds by taxation.'*' 5 '*
Facts : Early in April 1974 the Board invited gen-
eral contractors to bid on the construction of a
Nurse Education Facility for the College under
designated terms, conditions and specifications.
Ruff was among those who responded to the invitation,
and its fixed-sum bid of $2,088,100 was accepted.
Thereupon, the Board and Ruff entered into a written
contract on 28 June 1974, using the American Insti-
tute of Architects standard form of agreement between
Owner and Contractor where the basis of payment
is a stipulated sum. Included in the enumerated
documents was "Project Manual for General Construc-
tion Work for Nurse Education Facility, Howard
Community College, dated April 1, 1974, in its
entirety." In establishing the fixed-price amount
of its bid, Ruff did not include any sums represent-
ing Maryland sales tax on the purchase of materials
for the construction of the facility, and the sub-
contractors who agreed with Ruff to perform part of
the work covered by Ruff’s contract with the Board,
did not include any such sums in their bids. Pur-
suant to Specification 1.24.-02 the Board gave Ruff
Exemption Certificate No. 08798. It had been issued
153 Board of Trustees of Howard Community College v.
John K. Ruff, Inc., 366 A. 2d 360 (1976),
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by the Comptroller of the Treasury on 13 April 1970
and authorized exemption from payment of sales tax
on those purchases of taxable personal property or
services purchased for use in carrying on the work
of the Board, The construction of the facility
began.
Xt appeared thereafter that the facility construction
project was not exempt from Maryland sales tax. The
Comptroller of the Treasury so informed Ruff and its
subcontractors. On 23 September 1975 the State filed
a tax lien against Ruff for sales tax due from
23 September through December 27, 1974, plus penalties
and interest, and the subcontractors, complaining
that they had bid on the basis of sales tax exemption,
demanded that Ruff adjust their contracts to include
additional sums for sales taxes paid and to be paid
by them. The Board refused to increase the contract
sum to cover the sales tax paid and payable to com-
plete the work under the contract. On 2 October 1975
Ruff instituted the declaratory judgment action against
the Board, After Answer by the Board, Ruff moved
for summary judgment. The court below granted the
motion and on 19 April 1976 made its declaration of
the rights of the parties. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity was not considered.
Issues ; 1. Was there a breach of contract?
2. Is money available to the Board in an
amount sufficient to satisfy a money
judgment for the sales tax?
Decisions : 1. Yes.
2 , Unknown - Remanded
Reasoning : (1) The agreement called for Ruff to
perform certain work for the Board at a stipulated
sum, arrived at by Ruff and accepted by the Board
on the Board's assurance written into the contract,
that no sales tax would be payable by Ruff on
materials purchased to perform the work, The charge
on Ruff to pay sales tax on such materials breached
the contract. Ruff was entitled to damages payable
by the Board in the amount of the sales tax paid by
Ruff to the State or to its subcontractors for the
sales tax they were obliged to pay on such materials
.
(2) If funds are available, the waiver of sovereign
immunity is complete , and an action for a money
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judgment for breach of the contract would lie.n the other hand, if funds are not available,
such action would be precluded by the application
°L t^? 1
d0<
:
tr:Lne ° f sovereign immunity. As we arenot able to resolve the issue on the record before
us, we remand the case under Rule 871 a for furtherproceedings as if no appeal had been taken.
Where plaintiffs contracted for right of first refusal
for five years and vendors then accepted offer from college
to purchase but, when college learned of agreement with
plaintiffs, offer of sale and acceptance were withdrawn by
mutual consent and college then leased premises for term
which would extend until plaintiff's right of first refusal
had expired, and for $10,000 college was given exclusive
option to purchase, this $10,000 payment to be credited on
purchase price, there was contract denominated lease in
hope of circumventing plaintiff's right, and plaintiff's
right of first refusal was activated; specific performance
was appropriate remedy was the holding in Quigley v.
^ i
154Capalongo .
Facts : Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court
in favor of defendants, entered March 26, 1975 in
Tompkins County, upon a decision of the court at a
Trial Term, without a jury. In July, 1967, the
defendant-owners sold to the plaintiffs certain
land in the City of Ithaca, and, pursuant to the
agreement, it was further provided with respect to
the property presently in dispute that if defendants
receive a bona fide written offer for the purchase of
this property during a period of five years, they
154Quigley v. Capalongo, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 935 (1976).
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would offer the property to plaintiffs on the same
terms and conditions. In April, 1968, defendant-
owners accepted an offer from Defendant Ithaca
College to purchase the property in question for
$47,000. However, when the College learned of the
agreement with plaintiffs, the offer of sale and
acceptance were withdrawn by mutual consent.
With the agreement with plaintiffs in mind, the
owners and the College entered into a lease of the
premises for a term running from July, 1968, to
June 30, 1973. The term of the lease was thus to
run until after the plaintiffs' right of first
refusal expired. Ithaca College was further given,
in consideration of the sum of $10,000 paid by them
upon execution of the lease, an exclusive option to
purchase the premises between January 1, 1973 and
the end of the lease for $47,000, against which the
$10,000 payment would be credited. The lease called
for rental of $1,000 per year and contained a cove-
nant that the owners would not sell or transfer the
premises to anyone other than the College during the
term of the lease. It is conceded that plaintiffs were
never notified of any of these transactions. The
College exercised its option in June of 1973, but
prior to transfer of title, plaintiffs commenced this
action seeking specific performance of the agreement
to give them the right of first refusal.
Issues: 1. Was there a breach of contract?
2. Should specific performance be decreed
in favor of the plaintiff?
Decisions: 1. Yes.
2. Yes.
Reasoning: (1) A right of first refusal is an option
to buy conditioned on the seller's willingness to
sell. It is not an absolute agreement to sell to
the optionee, but merely an agreement that should the
owner receive a bona fide offer to purchase the
property during the term of the option, he will not
accept the offer without giving the optionee the
right of first refusal. There was a breach of
contract. Defendant-owners, as the court found,
desired and intended to sell their property to Ithaca
College, a willing buyer, in 1968 and were foreclosed
from doing so only by the contract with plaintiffs.
241
While plaintiffs' right to purchase the property
5
1
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ht
J
neVer have ripened into an absolute one,defendant-owners owed them the obligation of dealinqin good faith. Defendants breached that obligation
y entering into a contract, denominated a lease inthe hope of circumventing plaintiffs' rights, but
which, upon examination of all the facts and circum-
stances of this case actually reduced the defendants'present intention of selling the property to a con-tract under which the actual transfer of title wouldbe postponed. (2) In the circumstances of this caseit formalized defendant-owners' intention to sell
the premises in response to the offer by defendant
Ithaca College, thus activating plaintiffs' right
first refusal. Since the College participated in
these transactions with full knowledge of plaintiffs
'
rights, specific performance, upon tender by
plaintiffs of such amounts as have been paid and
would be required to be paid by the College, is an
appropriate remedy.
In Trustees of Stigmatine Fathers, Inc
.
,
the court
ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying motion for relief from judgment, declaring that
contract for purchase of plaintiff's land and building by
state for educational purposes was valid, and that neither
the Governor nor the Secretary of Administration and Finance
was authorized to decline, as matter of discretion, to allot
necessary funds, on ground that appraisal of property was
insufficient, when no issue was raised with respect to such
appraisal until a year after the trial and then was asserted
155
as an afterthought.
Facts ; Plaintiff filed a bill in equity seeking
enforcement of a contract for purchase of his property
by the state for educational purposes, when the
155Trustees of Stigmatine Fathers, Inc. v. Secretary of
Administration and Finance, 341 N.E, 2d 662 (1976).
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Secrecy of Administration and Finance refused toallot appropriated funds in contravention of adeclarin9 that the contract was validand that neither the Governor nor the Secretary ofAdministration and Finance was authorized to decline
?und.
mat
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he SuPerior Court entered judgment for theplaintiffs. The defendant appealed raising for thefirst time the issue that the appraisal report
was not acceptable on its face.
Issue: May an issue be raised for the first timebefore the Supreme Judicial Court?
Decision : No
.
Reasoning : The court held that an issue may not be
raised for the first time before the Supreme Judicial
Court, The appraisal in the present case was re-
quired by statute in connection with a voluntary
purchase rather than a taking by eminent domain,
and rules of evidence and damages are not directly
applicable to it. The purpose was to provide a
check on the judgment of the acquiring agency to
verify the reasonableness of a negotiated value.
We think it was sufficient if the appraisal pro-
vided the kind of evidence on which reasonable per-
sons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
serious affairs.
The Refrigeration Company which assertedly had not
been paid for air-conditioning unit which it installed on
premises of college was not entitled to punitive damages in
absence of evidence sufficient to establish that persons
who purported to act for the college had actual or apparent
authority to contract for the college was the holding in
156
Tuskegee Institute v. May Refrigeration Company, Inc.
156Tuskegee Institute v. May Refrigeration Co., Inc.,
344 So. 2d 156 (1977) .
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Refrl9eratlon Company installed anair conditioning unit at Tuskegee Institute butwas never paid for it. Nevertheless, Tuskegee
Tuskegee and i?^
"ae
?
lfc * May filed suit againstK ts agents. A jury awarded $2 975compensatory damages, and $3 500 punitive damaaesTuskegee appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals'
to
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ef-^h°rity t0 bind ita Plaintiff con-
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hfflt/U^1Shed an air ”conditioning systemr the defendant, Tuskegee Institute, said air-conditioning system having been contracted for inwriting by and between plaintiff and defendant,
^
hel1
'
an employee of Tuskegee Institute;that the defendant, Tuskegee Institute ratified theaction of the defendant, Wiliam B. Shell, in various
ora
.
conversations between representatives of theplaintiff and representatives of the defendant,
Tuskegee Instiute, including but not limited to, thedefendants, William B. Shell and T. J. Pinnock.
Plaintiff further contends that all work, labor
and materials agreed to be furnished or performed
by the plaintiff have been furnished or performed
in full. Plaintiff contends that the defendants,
William B. Shell, T. J. Pinnock and Tuskegee Institute,
have conspired to defraud the plaintiff; and in
fact the defendants, Shell, Pinnock and Tuskegee
Institute, never intended to pay the plaintiff for
the air-conditioning system provided by it.
Issue ; Could plaintiff ratify Pinnock and Shell's
acts even though the evidence was 'insufficient to
show' that they had "actual or apparent authority to
bind him"?
Decision : Yes.
Reasoning : It is apparent that this Court, In City
Stores
,
recognized that if a principal has knowledge
of acts performed on its behalf, even though un-
authorized, then the principal can ratify those
acts, was the reasoning of the court. Where a person
acts for another who accepts or retains the benefits
or proceeds of his efforts with knowledge of the
material facts surrounding the transaction, such other
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take ^
6 benefit of the contract, he mustit tamed as it may be with such practices.
Where court annulled award of contract for amusement
games for Community College, award of the contract to
petitioner as the only other bidder would have been an
improper usurpation of administrative role by prohibiting
Community College and Faculty Student Association from
exercising their discretionary power of rejecting all bids
and readvertising was the holding in DeBonis v. Hudson Valiev
1 c 7Community College
.
Facts: The Faculty Student Association of Hudson
Valley Community College (hereinafter FS A ) advertised
for bids on "skill and amusement games." The "In-
formation for Bidders" with respect thereto provided
that bids would be received by the Board of Trustees
of the Hudson Valley Community College (hereinafter
HVCC) ; that bids should be addressed to James J.
Fitzgibbons, President of HVCC, and that no con-
tractor to whom the contract was awarded could as-
sign, transfer or otherwise dispose of his right,
title or interest therein without the previous
consent in writing of HVCC. Both the "Information
for Bidders" and the advertisement for bids provided
that the Board of Trustees reserved the right to reject
DeBonis v. Hudson Valley Communtiy College,
389 N.Y.S. 2d 647 (1976) .
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and to waive all formalities
theVdrf* ^ f°rm to be utilized requiredbidders to fill in the percentage of the
revenues from the amusement games which they would
T
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ln * Petitioner filled in 39 percent while
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ing business as Lewis Amusements,the only other bidder, filled in 50 percent and
added at the bottom of its bid that it wouldguarantee FSA a minimum of $14,000 per year. The
contract was awarded to Lewis and petitioner beganthis proceeding to have the award of the contract
annulled and to have itself declared to be thelowest responsible bidder within the meaning of
section 103 of the General Municipal Law and, there-
> the successful bidder. Special Term annulled
the award of the contract and remanded the matter
to HVCC and James Fitzgibbons as president of FSA.
Issue : Is the award of the contract governed by
section 103 of the General Municipal Law?
Decision ; Yes.
Reasoning ; HVCC so united itself with the FSA in the
advertising for bids and awarding of the contract that
section 103 applies. While section 103 mandates
the contract being awarded to the lowest responsible
bidder, where a bidder substantially varies his bid
from the specifications it cannot be considered in
determining the lowest responsible bid. While General
Municipal Law section relating to award of public work
contracts mandates the contract being awarded to low-
est responsible bidder, where bidder substantially
varies his bid from specification it cannot be con-
sidered in determining lowest responsible bid.
In conclusion, eighteen of the 100 cases were in
the area of institution related cases. These cases in-
volved issues in six out of the eight areas of contract.
Thus, the related area with the fewest cases (having four
cases less than the student related cases) covered the
largest number of areas in relation to the areas of the law
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of contract in issue. it involved one more area than the
student related ones, leaving the areas of Fraud, Mistake
and Duress, and the Statute of Frauds as the only ones
not so treated (Re: Table 3, page 247).
A graphic representation of the distribution of the
percentage of student issues, in the 100 cases in higher
education as briefed in this chapter, to the areas of
contract is found in Figure 3, page 243.
Massachusetts General Laws
Public Higher Education
Public higher education as one segment of the
governmental system in the Commonwealth is a creature
of statute. As such, the financial basis for its
operation is found in the Massachusetts Constitution,
Article 63, sec. 1. All revenue collected through an in-
stitution of public higher education with the exception
of its trust funds are paid into the general fund.
Restrictions on administrative officers in government
and institutions of public higher education in making a
permanent contract are set forth in Ch. 29, sec. 27.
M.G.L.A., Ch. 29, sec. 29 provides for Interchanging
Funds. Section 29A provides for: Rules and regulations
regarding employment and compensation of consultants; forms;
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TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OP 18 INSTITUTION-RELATED CASES ACCORDING TO
THE AREAS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN ISSUE
Source: 100 Cases
248
Figure 3. Distribution of the percentage of
institutional issues in the 100 cases.
Legend
:
1. Expressed or Implied
2. Offer and Acceptance
3. Consideration
4. Capacity
5. Fraud, Mistake, Duress
6. Illegality
7. Statute of Frauds
8 . Performance and Breach
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contracts; payments; and restrictions. The payment of
faculty salaries and annuity contracts as part of the
employment contract are set forth in section 31 of
Chapter 29.
Department of Education—Board of Higher Education
M.G.L.A.
,
Ch. 15, sec. 1 establishes the Depart-
ment of Education in the Commonwealth. in this depart-
ment, section 1A of this Chapter establishes the Board of
Higher Education while section ID defines its purpose,
powers and duties. Subsequent sections of Chapter 15 set
forth the organizational structure of public higher
education.
Universities
University of Massachusetts . Chapter 75, sec. 1,
of the M.G.L. sets forth the status and governing body
of the University of Massachusetts. This section creates
autonomous authority in the University. The power of the
trustees of the University of Massachusetts are set forth
in section 2. The administrative functions of the Board
of Trustees are set forth in sections 3 and 3A. Section
3A provides for the delegation of the trustees' authority
or of any portion of it to the president or other officers
of the University. This signatory power to contract may
be delegated by the trustees to the president or other
officers of the University whenever in their judgment such
250
delegation may be necessary or desirable.
Southeastern Massachusetts University
. Chapter
7 5B * ' sec * 1 of the M.G.L. sets forth the educational
programs; degrees; status; and governing body of the
university. Section 3 provides for the delegation of
authority by the trustees to the president or any
officer of the university whenever in their judgment such
a delegation may be necessary or desirable. Thus, the
trustees have the statutory power to delegate the
contractural right to the president or other officer of
the university.
University of Lowell. Chapter 75A.
,
sec. 1 of the
M.G.L. sets forth the purposes; status; and governing
body of the University of Lowell. Section 1A provides
for the delegation of authority of the Board of Trustees.
This section provides for the general delegation of their
authority to the president or any officer of the univer-
sity whenever in their judgment such delegation may be
necessary. Therefore, their contractual rights may be
delegated
.
State Colleges
Chapter 73 of the M.G.L. provides for the State
Colleges. Section 1 of this Chapter defines the manage-
ment; administration of the State College System. It pro-
251
vides for the delegation of contractural authority to
the Director of the Division of State Colleges or to the
officers of the State Colleges whenever in their judgment
such delegation may be necessary or desirable. Section
14 defines the contractural power of the Board of
Trustees
.
Regional Community Colleges
Chapter 15, sec. 27 of the M.G.L. provides for
the establishment of the Massachusetts Board of Regional
Community Colleges in the Department of Education.
At the same time, it removes the Board from the control of
the Department of Education. Section 29 delineates the
duties of the Board and vests contractural power within
it as this section provides for self-governance by the
Board of Regional Community Colleges and the exercise
of such authority customarily and traditionally exercised
by governing boards of institutions of higher learning.
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Law of Contract
A contract may be defined to be a transaction between
two or more persons, in which each party comes under an obli-
gation to the other and each reciprocally acquires a right
to whatever is promised by the other. 158 it is a promise
or a set of promises to which the law attaches a legal obli-
159gation
. The "requirements of a bargain" under section 19
of the Restatement, Contract now provide that "the formation
of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a mani-
festation of mutual assent to the exchange and a considera-
. . ,,160tion .
"
The essential elements of a contract are a(n):
(1) offer and acceptance (mutual assent); (2) capacity of
the parties to contract; (3) valid (sufficient) considera-
tion; (4) legal agreement (not declared void by statute or
common law); (5) writing, if required by the Statute of
„ , 161Frauds
.
Contracts, traditionally, have been classified as:
(1) "formal" and (2) "informal."
162
"Formal" contracts are:
158
159
16 0
161
162
Dartmouth College v. Woodward
Restatement, Contracts
,
sec.
Ibid., Restatement , sec. 19.
Ibid
.
1
.
4 Wheat
.
518 (1819) .
Ibid
. ,
sec . 7-11
.
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(1) contracts under seal; (2) recognizances (certain under-
takings such as bail bonds); and (3) negotiable instru-
16 3
ments. All other contracts are "informal" contracts. 164
The intent of the parties to a contract must be deter-
mined from the fair construction of the contract as a whole.
Justice, common sense and the probable intent of the parties
are guides in the court's construction of a written agree-
ment. If the words of a contract are plain and free from
ambiguity, they must be construed in accordance with the
ordinary and usual meaning. 165
The construction of words in a carefully drawn docu-
ment may be affected by various use of words in another part
of the document. If there is a question in ambiguous
language, it is a question of law for the court to deter-
If general words come after specific words in enumera-
tions describing a legal subject, the general words will be
construed to include only the subjects similar in nature to
16 7those objects listed by the specific words. The literal
163 Ibid
.
164 Ibid
165Fried v. Fried, 368 N.E. 2d 1222. (1977),
166Fried v. Fried.
167 Dickinson v. Riverside Iron Works, Inc., 372 N.E
2d 1302 (1978) .
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interpretation of any word or phrase in a contract may be
qualified by the context in which it appears. This includes
the general purpose manifested by the entire contract and by
the circumstance existing at the time the contract was
168executed. when a provision with a well-established mean-
ing is contained in a contract, that clause, rather than any
supposed intentions of the parties gleaned from an analysis
of the other provisions, determines the obligations of the
parties
.
169
Generally, the law existing at the time an agreement
is made enters into and becomes part of the agreement. Laws
enacted after the execution of the agreement are not common-
ly considered to be a part of the agreement unless its pro-
visions clearly establish that the parties intended to in-
corporate subsequent enactments into their agreement. 170
When the words of a contract are clear, they alone de-
termine the meaning of the contract. When the contract term
is ambiguous, the meaning of the contract is ascertained from
the intent of the parties as manifested by the contract's
171terms and the circumstances surrounding its creation.
16 8
Dickenson v. Riverside Iron Works, Inc.
109Erhard v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 372 N.E. 2d 1277
(1978) .
17
°Feakes v. Bozyczko, 369 N.E. 2d 978 (1977).
171Merrimack Valley National Bank v. Baird, 363 N.E.
2d 688 (1977) .
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Generally, a writing is construed against the author of the
doubtful language if the circumstances surrounding its use
and the ordinary meaning of the words do not indicate the
intended meaning of the language. The author of the am-
biguous terms is generally held to any reasonable interpre-
tation which is attributed to the term which is relied upon
by the other party. 172
Rules of construction of a contract are designed to
elucidate the intent of the parties to the written instru-
173
ment. Where the contracts are openly and fairly arrived
at, the enforcement of them will not be denied because of
hardship to one of the parties. 174
Expressed and Implied Contracts
An expressed contract is a contract which results from
the words expressed either orally or in writing by the par-
175ties. It is an agreement between two or more competent
parties for a consideration to do or not to do a lawful
17 6thing. Common law has repeatedly held that an express
172Merrimack Valley National Bank v. Baird.
171Emery v. Crowley, 359 N.E. 2d 1256 (1976).
174Lydon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 359 N.E. 2d 316 (1977).
175M.G.L. Ch. 259, sec. 1.
176 Segal v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 285 Mass.
106 (1934).
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contract results from the "meeting of the minds" of the
parties, i.e., it must appear that the parties have agreed
to do some specific thing. 177 However, it should be noted
that a person who signs a written agreement, which he has not
read, and, therefore, who is ignorant of the contents, may
in the absence of mutual mistake or fraud, be held liable
according to the terms of the writing. The acceptor of a
negotiable bill of exchange may be held to pay the bill by
the nolder who negotiated the bill before it was accepted.17 ^
Contracts which the law requires to be in writing are:
(1) checks, (2) bills of exchange, (3) negotiable notes,
(4) deeds, (5) bills of lading, (6) negotiable warehouse re-
ceipts and similar instruments. Under M.G.L.A. ch. 259
sec. 5, the promise part of the will agreement is required to
be in writing.
In an expressed contract, the mutual assent is demon-
strated in words, oral or written, "Mutual assent" is com-
monly referred to as a "meeting of the minds" of the parties
to the contract. In other words, the parties to the contract
are both agreeing to the same thing at the same time.
177Lydon v. Allstate Ins. Co.
17
^McNamara v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 83 N.E. 878
(1908) .
17
^Arpin v. Owens, 3 N.E. 25 (1885).
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By meeting of the minds" of the parties to the con-
tract, it is meant that usually one party has made an offer,
sufficiently definite to be understandable and performable,
intending contractual responsibility. 180 This offer, while
s *-iH outstanding
,
has been accepted in all substantial par-
ticulars by the offeree within a proper time. 181
Implied contracts arise from the conduct of the
parties. There are two types of implied contracts:
(1) implied in law and (2) implied in fact. 182 There are
legal duties created or fixed by law which one person may
owe to another for the violation of which the plaintiff's
remedy is by an action of contract. These are the implied
in law contracts, e.g., if a person supplies to a minor
child necessaries, which the parent being able has refused
or neglected to supply to the child, he may recover from
the parent the fair value of the necessaries in an action
18 3
of contract. The reason here being that the law imposes
the duty on the parent to pay for the necessaries, regard-
184
less of the parent's will or intention. There are other
180 M.G.L. cc. 105, 106 and 108.
181 Kelley v. Weiss, 102 N.E. 2d 93 (1951)
.
18
2
National Shawmut Bank v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 61 N.E.
2d 18 (1945)
.
188 Stinson v. Meegan, 67 N.E. 465 (1946).
184 Broman et al. v. Byrne, 78 N.E. 2d 616 (1948).
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certain circumstances under which, either to prevent the
unjust enrichment of a person at the expense of another or
as a matter of policy, the law implies a contract. Such
instances in which a contract has been held to be implied
m law are: (1) a situation in which there was a voluntary
185payment of money; (2) where an agreed purchaser has been
allowed to enter and occupy the premises pending the execu-
tion of a deed and the real property is destroyed without
the fault of either party so that the contract is dis-
* , 18 6 , _
.
charged; (3) a situation in which the person waived the
18 7tort and sued in contract; and (4) a situation in which
there was liability for the value of property conveyed or
services rendered under unenforceable contracts. 188 M.G.L.
ch. 198, sec. 1 charges the expense of funeral and last
sickness against the estate of the deceased person. 189
"Implied in law" contracts are sometimes called quasi
contracts
. They are referred to as quasi contracts because
there is no "mutual assent" but to avoid inequities and
unjust enrichment, the law implies a promise to pay for the
18
^Sciaraffa v. Debler, 23 N.E. 2d 111 (1939).
186Butterf ield v. Byron, 27 N.E. 13 (1891).
18
^Welsch v. Palumbo, 73 N.E. 2d 844 (1947).
188Cromwell v. Norton, 79 N.E. 433 (1906).
189Counelis v. Counelis, 54 N.E. 2d 177 (1944).
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benefits or services rendered even though no such promise
190was ever made. "Implied in fact" contracts are real con-
tracts. The promises of the parties are inferred from their
acts or conduct alone, not in the spoken or written word.
The "mutual assent" is based on conduct rather than words. 191
The plaintiff who seeks to be paid for a benefit conferred
on the defendant under an "implied in fact" contract has the
burden of proving that at the time of conferring the benefit
he expected to be paid for it and that the defendant expected
to pay, or, as a reasonable person, ought to have expected to
pay 192
If a party supplied to another party labor and ma-
terials under a supposed express contract which does not
exist because of mutual mistake, an action of contract may
be maintained to recover the fair value of such labor and
193
materials. Cooper v. Cooper (17 N.E. 892) is a case
where a woman went through a marriage ceremony which she
thought was legal. She cohabitated with her spouse and
performed the duties of her relation. On his death, she
learned that he had a wife at the time of their marriage.
l 90
Butterfield v. Byron, 27 N.E. 667 (1891).
191
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 5.
l92 Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495 (1893).
l91 Lonquist v. Lammi, 134 N.E. 255 (1922)
.
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The court held that she could not recover the fair value
of her services.
Offer and Acceptance
The primary requirement of a contract is that the
parties to it show their mutual assent to the same bargain
at the same time to each other. This manifestation is
usually in the form of an offer and an acceptance . ^ An
offer may be defined as a proposal by one party to the other
thereby demonstrating an intention to enter into a valid
contract, and creating a power in the offeree to create a
contract between the parties by an appropriate acceptance.'1' 95
There are three essential elements of a legally sufficient
offer. They are: (1) manifestation of a present contrac-
tual intent; (2) certainty and definiteness in terms; and
196
(3) communication of the offer to the offeree. The per-
son who makes the offer is known as the offeror. The person
to whom the offer is made is termed the offeree.
The conduct or words used in the offer must be words
of offer rather than mere words of preliminary negotiations,
194
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 22.
^^Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (1909).
196 Michael Chevrolet Inc. v. Institution For Savings,
72 N.E. 2d 514 (1947)
.
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i.e., invitations to the second party to make an offer.
The words themselves must evidence a present intent to
197
contract. The offer must be more than an advertisement
or an offer to negotiate. It must be outstanding and unre-
voked when the acceptance is attempted. 198
If the offer does not state a time in which it can be
accepted, it will remain open for a reasonable time. 199
What is a reasonable time is relative to the nature of the
contract and the circumstances 9
9
The surrounding circum-
stances may indicate that the words used did not manifest
an intent to contract, e.g., extravagant proposals made in
fun or in a state of emotion obvious to the recipient of
the proposal do not manifest a contractual intent even if
the words used would otherwise be sufficient words of an
201
offer. The more definite the proposal, the more likely
it will be construed to be an offer. The terms of the offer
must be sufficiently clear and complete so that the court
may determine what the parties were intending and can fix
197
Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E. 2d 299 (1945).
198
Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co., Inc., 115 N.E. 2d 461
(1953) .
199 Boston & M. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224 (1849).
^"Loring v. City of Boston, 7 Mete. 409 (1843) .
^ 91Thurston v. Tornton, 1 Cush. 89 (1854).
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damages in the event of a non-performance. 202 There are
four essential terms to a valid offer: (1) parties to the
contract; (2) subject matter; (3) time for performance; and
(4) price. These essential terms must appear either in the
express agreements of the parties or by reasonable implica-
tion .
An offer is enforceable even if it doesn't spell out
the essential terms, if it makes reference to some objec-
tive standard to fill in the missing terms. 202 This is
said to be an offer capable of being made certain.
The offer must be communicated to the offeree. It
is the communication of the offer which generates the power
204
of acceptance in the offeree.
The offer may be revoked at any time prior to accep-
2 05tance. The revocation must be communicated to the offeree.
If the offer states a time in which the offer will remain
open, it may still be revoked as long as the revocation is
206
communicated to the offeree. If the offer is under seal,
it may not be revoked in violation of such an agreement.
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 32.
203
U.C.C. sec. 1-203.
20
^Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 23.
202Brauer v. Shaw, 46 N.E. 617 (1897).
206 Sears v. Eastern R. Co., 14 Allen 433 (1867).
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This is also true if, instead of a contract under seal, the
offeror has agreed to keep the offer open for a considera-
. . 207tion.
Acc_eptance may be defined as a voluntary act on the
part of the one to whom the offer is made, through the
medium of which the offeree exercises the power to create a
contract which was conferred upon him by the offeror. 208
An offer may be accepted only by the offeree (the person to
whom the offer is made)
. Offers made to specified persons
are personal to the offeree and may not be transferred to a
209third person. An offer made to the public may be accepted
by anyone. Two exceptions to the requirements for a valid
acceptance are: (1) options, and (2) undisclosed principles.
An offer is revocable until accepted, but a paid-for option
is not.
A paid-for option is treated as a completed contract
in which the offeror has bound himself not to revoke for a
given period. If the offeree has given any consideration
for the offer (normal value), it becomes an option. This
option is a completed contract in which the offeror has
?D7
O'Brien v. Boland, 44 N.E. 602 (1896).
2 08
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 52.
2°°Putnam v. Grace, 37 N.E. 166 (1894).
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bound himself not to revoke the offer and this effectively
destroys his right and power to do so. 210 Such a contract
is not terminated by the death of the offeror. A gratuitous
option (no consideration paid or recited) is treated as an
ordinary offer, revocable by the offeror at any time, even
though he expressly promises not to revoke.
A recital of consideration is not conclusive, however,
the modern tendency is to construe the recital as a promise
to pay the sum stated, e.g., "in consideration of $5.00 in
211hand paid, receipt of which is acknowledged."
The acceptance must conform to the terms of the
212
offer. If the acceptance varies substantially from the
terms of the offer, it will fail as an acceptance and serve
213
as a rejection of the offer. This attempted acceptance
214
may serve as a new offer (counteroffer) . The offer once
215
rejected cannot be revived by an attempted acceptance.
An acceptance will not be insufficient because it adds some
addition to or modification in the offer, if it appears
210
Ibid., Restatement , sec. 47.
2^ Ibid
. ,
Restatement
,
sec. 89B(1).
212 Putnam v. Grace.
213
Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 140 N.E. 803 (1923).
214
Champlin v. Jackson, 58 N.E. 2d 757 (1945)
.
215 Peretz v. Watson, 324 N.E. 2d 908 (1975).
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from the acceptance that the offeree intends unequivocally
to accept the offer according to the terms of it, whether
his suggestions are acceded to or not by the offeror. 21 ^
McCullough v. Eagle Ins. Co. in 1822 held that when an
offer was sent by mail, and an acceptance was mailed by the
offeree, the contract was not formed until the acceptance
was received by the offeror. 217
Subsequently the issue of when an acceptance is effec-
tive arose m Brauer v. Shaw . ° In this case, it was
unnecessary for the court to decide on the facts, whether
or not the acceptance took effect when sent. However, the
court said it took the view of the Supreme Court in Taylor
219
v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co . In this case, the court
stated
:
The unqualified acceptance by' one of the terms
proposed by the other, transmitted by due course
of mail, is regarded as closing the bargain ac-
ceptance .220
It is believed that this dictum has generally represented
21
^Nelson v. Hamlin, 155 N.E. 18 (1927).
217McCullough v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 278 (1822).
218 Brauer v. Shaw.
21
^Taylor v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 13 L. Ed. 187
(1850).
220Taylor v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co.
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the law of the Commonwealth. 221 However, the issue is not
clear. In Lenox v. Murphy
,
the court said:
There is no universal doctrine of the commonlaw, as understood in this Commonwealth, that
acceptance of an offer must be communicated in
order to make a valid simple contract.
^
Parties in some instances may agree on the essential terms
of the contract but also agree that the binding contract
shall await the subsequent formal written expression of
their agreement. The language used by them and their inher-
ent intent will determine whether they are instantly bound
or whether they have post-enforceable rights and obligations
until a formal contract is drawn up and executed by them. ^3
The doctrine of substantial performance applies only
to bilateral contracts in which the parties have agreed to
exchange performances without making either performance
expressly conditional upon the other or in the occurrence
_
. ? 94
of a particular event.
The act of acceptance which is called for by the offer
may be either an overt act on the part of the offeree, or
the giving of a promise to perform. Historically, contracts
9 91xBishop v. Eaton, 37 N.E. 665 (1894).
^^Lenox v. Murphy, 50 N.E. 644 (1898).
223
Louis M. Herman Co. Inc. v. Gallagher Electrical Co.
Inc., 138 N.E. 2d 120 (1956).
^^Creed v. Apog, 376 N.E. 2d 154 (1978) .
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have been defined as: (1) "unilateral" and (2) "bilateral."
fe-e .s -ta ten\ent , Second , abolishes this categorization but most
courts still utilize the terms. A unilateral contract may
be defined as a contract in which the offer requires the
P®^ fomittance of an act as the bargained— for consideration.
Such an offer can usually be accepted only by doing the act.
In an unilateral contract, once the offeree accepts, all
the executory duties are on one side (the offeror's)
. After
an acceptance, if there are executory duties on both sides,
then the contract is what is termed a bilateral contract.
A bilateral contract is where the offer calls for the giving
of a promise as the bargained-for consideration. A bilateral
contract gives immediate rights as well as complete protec-
tion to both parties, since a contract arises as soon as
the offeree gives the counter promise. The offer for an
unilateral contract does not mature into a contract until
the requested act is completed. Until then, there is no
binding contract to protect the parties' rights. A rejec-
tion by the offeree terminates the offer. The offeree's
power of acceptance is at an end when he rejects the offer.
If the offeree attempts to accept following his prior rejec-
tion, his "acceptance" is a mere counteroffer. A rejection
must be communicated to the offeror. It is ordinarily only
2 25
effective upon receipt by the offeror.
225 Ibid., Restatement, sec. 39.
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Consideration
Consideration may be defined as an agreed— for exchange
which the law holds sufficient to support contractual rights
and obligations. This agreed-for exchange may consist of an
act, a promise to act or a mere forbearance to act. In the
common law it has been held that consideration consists in
a detriment to the promisor or a benefit to the promisee. 226
Recent case law has defined consideration in terms of a
legal right . . . the giving up or agreement to give up a
2 27legal right. Therefore, when issues of consideration
arise, two essential elements must appear: (1) that some-
thing must have been bargained for between the parties; and
(2) that something must have a legal value. It must appear
that both parties were intending to enter into a contract.
They both were willing to incur legal rights and lia-
2 28bilities. There is no consideration if either party
2 29intended to confer a gift. In doubtful cases, the courts
tend to find a bargain intended, rather than a gift. The
policy being to uphold the contractual expectancies wherever
possible
.
226 Torrey v. Adams, 149 N.E. 618 (1925).
22
^Wit v. Commercial Hotel Co., 149 N.E. 609 (1925).
228 Peck v. Requa, 13 Gray 407 (1859)
.
229 Ibid., Restatement, sec. 75.
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Mere non-payment of the dollar agreed upon for con-
sideration would not show conclusively that there was no
consideration. It would be sufficient if it could be shown
that the dollar was bargained for and that the parties in-
tended that it would be paid in the future or there was some
other valuable consideration transferred. 230
Promises made out of a sense of moral responsibility
or honor are not enforceable in the Commonwealth and in most
231
states. This is because the court reasons that the test
of moral responsibility varies with the individual. Past
consideration is not sufficient. Gratuitous promises or
those promises based entirely on moral or past considera-
tion may be enforceable if the promisee has materially
changed his position, in detrimental reliance on it. Within
limits, detrimental action or forbearance by the promisee,
in reliance on a promise, has been held to constitute a sub-
stitute for consideration and renders the promise enforceable.
The promisee's detrimental reliance is held to be sufficient
reason to estop the promisor from asserting the lack of con-
sideration. The promisee's detrimental reliance also
23 0
Johnson v. Norton Housing Authority, 375 N.E, 2d 1209
(1978)
.
7 31
Conant v. Evans, 88 N.E. 438 (1909).
7 7 7
Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207 (1825).
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operates as a substitute for "mutual assent" (in a gift
promise, there is no offer and acceptance). This is known
as the doctrine of promissory estoppel
.
233
A promisor will be estopped from denying the enforce-
ability of his promise if the following elements are present
(1) the promisor made a promise which, though gratuitous,
was the type of a promise which might forseeably induce the
promisee to rely on it or to take some action on it; (2) the
promisee did in fact rely on it, and his reliance was
reasonable under the circumstances; (3) as a result of his
reliance the promisee has suffered a substantial economic
detriment and (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing
234
the promise. Consideration must be legally sufficient.
Insufficient consideration is no consideration. Doing what
one is already bound to the other party to do, or promising
235to do it, is not a valid consideration for a promise.
However, if that which is promised or done was required
under the contract with a third person, there is considera-
tion for the defendant's promise and the contract is valid
236
and enforceable. Cases of contingent consideration have
233
234
235
(1902)
236
Ibid
. ,
Ibid
.
Burgess
Pool v.
Restatement
,
sec. 90.
Sulphite Fibre Co. v. Broomfield,
City of Boston, 5 Cush. 219 (1849)
62 N.E. 367
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been held to be sufficient consideration
.
If a party to a contract is no longer bound to ful-
fill it because of the default of the other party either a
promise by the injured party to resume performance of the
contract or the actual completion by that party is suffi-
cient consideration to support a promise to pay made by a
... , 238third party.
Forbearance to sue (if one has a valid claim against
another) is valid consideration for a promise by such other
239person. In a situation where parties to a disputed claim
have agreed to settle, their promises are consideration for
each other and the compromise settlement is a valid con-
240
sideration. Mellen v. Whipple held that there must be
privity of contract and that a stranger to the consideration
could not recover on the contract though it was made for
. . .
241his benefit.
24 2Consideration need not be adequate. It is enough
that the consideration is valuable. Gross inadequacy may
237
Abbott v. Doane, 40 N.E. 197 (1895)
.
23 8
Sheraton Service Corp. v. Kanavan, 357 N.E. 2d 20 (1976).
2^0'Connor v. National Metals Co., 58 N.E. 2d 153 (1944)
24® Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co., 4 Mete. 270 (1842).
24-*-Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray 317 (1854).
24
^wither ington v. Eldredge, 162 N.E. 300 (1928)
.
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be evidence of fraud. 243 Inadequacy of consideration may
be the reason for the failure of a bid for specific per-
formance under the rule that such bills are addressed to
the discretion of the court. 244 No consideration is neces-
sary to make a sealed option agreement binding on the
245parties.
Capacity
In order to have a valid contract, the parties to the
contract must have capacity to contract. A contract, in
other words, cannot be made by nor can it be enforced
against, a person who does not have the capacity to con-
246tract. Thus, certain persons are under a disability to
make a valid contract. This disability may be total or it
may be only partial.
Classifications: Contracts
Contracts may be classified according to the contrac-
tual capacity of the parties. Contracts, therefore, may be
classified as: (1) valid and enforceable, (2) void, and
(3) voidable. A void contract means a contract to which
243Nickerson v. Bridges, 103 N.E. 939 (1914).
244Forman v. Gadouas, 142 N.E. 87 (1891).
245Johnson v. Norton Housing Authority.
246 Ibid.
,
Restatement
,
sec. 13.
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there is a total absence of legal effect. A void contract
imposes no liability on the parties thereto. A contract
made by a person who has been judicially declared insane is
no contract, just an event to the party. It is void. A
voidable contract" may be defined as a contract as to
which one or more of the parties to it has the power either
to (1) avoid the legal relation created by the contract by
a manifestation of an election to do so or (2) extinguish
the power of avoidance by ratification. 247 A "voidable
contract" is valid and enforceable until and unless it is
legally disaffirmed or the liability thereon is legally
avoided, e.g., a contract made by an insane person, an in-
fant or a drunk person is prima facie valid and enforceable.
Disaffirmance and avoidance are matters of defense.
A party to a contract which is voidable, having
avoided it, may still be liable in quasi contract for the
reasonable value of the goods or services if the goods or
services are necessaries. A "voidable contract" may not be
set aside when it is inherently fair to both parties and it
has been executed so far that the other party cannot be put
back in a statu quo ante. A "voidable contract" may be
ratified. A void contract cannot.
247 Ibid
. ,
sec . 13
.
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Thus, no one can be bound by a contract who does not
have the legal capacity to incur at least voidable contrac-
tual duties. The capacity to contract may be partial and
its existence in respect of a particular transaction may
depend upon the nature of the transaction, or upon other
248circumstances. a natural person who manifests assent to
a transaction has full legal capacity to incur contractual
duties unless he is: (1) mentally ill or defective; (2) an
infant; (3) under guardianship and (4) intoxicated. 249
Insanity
A person who has judicially been declared insane or
bereft of reason because of idiocy may not make a contract
which will bind them or their property. They are under a
total disability to contract. Thus, a person who has been
declared insane cannot make a contract and a contract so
made by such a party cannot be enforced against the party.
The contract is voidable. The right to disaffirm the con-
tract does not depend on knowledge or nature of the insan-
250lty by the other party to the contract.
248
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 18.
249
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 18.
2
^Sutcliffe v. Heatley, 122 N.E. 317 (1919).
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Insane persons are liable for necessaries purchased
by or furnished to them. This liability is based on an
implied contract for the fair value of the necessaries, not
on an express agreement to pay. 251 in Krasner v. Berk, the
Supreme Judicial Court agreed in substance with the rule
stated in Restatement Second, Contracts
, s. 18c(l)(a). The
court held:
A person incurs only voidable contractual duties
by entering into a transaction if by reason of
mental illness or defect ... he is unable to
understand in a reasonable manner the nature and
consequence of the transaction
.
Even where there is sufficient understanding
a contract may in some circumstances be voidable
by reason of failure of will or judgment, where a
person contracting by reason of mental illness or
defect, is unable to act in a reasonable manner in
relation to the transaction and the other party
has reason to know of his condition.
A contract made by a person having legal capacity to
contract is valid, even though such a person has a power
to disaffirm or avoid the agreement. An insane person who
has not been judicially declared to be insane may thus dis-
affirm or avoid the contract.
2
^‘*'Belluci v. Foss, 138 N.E. 551 (1923).
252
Krasner v. Berk, 319
253
Krasner v. Berk.
N.E. 2d 897 (1974)
.
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Minority
A minor's express contracts are voidable by him or
his guardian subject to certain exceptions. The disability
of a minor to contract is for the protection of the minor
against improvidence. It is in the nature of a privilege
personal to him or his guardian. This is true even as to
an expressed contract for necessaries. The liability for
the expressed contract for necessaries is on an implied
contract for the fair value of the necessaries
. The
researcher points out that an adult dealing with a minor
may be held to his contract though the minor may disaffirm
255it. Massachusetts General Law, Chapter 231, Section 85P
provides
:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by
law, any person domiciled in the Commonwealth
who has reached the age of eighteen shall for all
purposes, and any other person who has reached
the age of 18 shall with respect to any transac-
tion governed by the law of the Commonwealth, be
deemed of full legal capacity unless legally
incapacitated for some reason other than insuf-
ficient age.
A minor may not have specific performance of a contract to
n r r
sell his real property against an adult purchaser.
254
Drude v. Curtis, 67 N.E. 317 (1903).
255
Dellamano v. Francis, 33 N.E. 2d (327).
^^Freeman v. Fishman, 139 N.E, 846 (1923).
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his
Among the exceptions to the rule of avoidance of
contract by a minor are:
( 1 )
( 2 )
(3)
(4)
Statute provides that a minor over 15 years ofage is bound by a contract, for life insurance
or an endorsement plan, of which a husband,
wife, children, mother, father, brother, or
sister is the beneficiary
.
An executory contract to form a partnership
is voidable by a minor. However, if hebecomes a partner, his right in firm assets
is to share in the net balance after all
obligations are paid. The minor may
not disaffirm to the extent of depriving
firm creditors of that part of firm capital
contributed by the minor; oco258
Statute provides a "female minor who has be-
come eighteen may join with her guardian in
making certain ante-nuptial contracts" and
for this purpose "the guardian and the ward
may convey her real and personal property to
the trustees approved by the probate court,"
and "such conveyances shall have like effects
as if said never were of full age",- __
25 9
By statute "the signature of a married woman
who is a minor affixed by her to any instru-
ment relating to the conveyance of land of
her husband shall have the same effect as if
she were of full age"; 26Q
(5) U.C.C. Article 2 provided that a minor may
not disaffirm a sale of his goods as against
an innocent purchaser for value from the
minor's vendee;
257
M.G.L.A., Ch . 175, sec. 128.
2 58
Pettelier v. Couture, 19 N.E. 400 (1889).
259
M.G.L.A., Ch. 209, sec. 27.
2 fi D
Ibid., Ch. 189, sec. 6 as amended by St. 1973 Ch. 925,
sec. 65.
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( 6 )
(7)
( 8 )
By statute, any minor sixteen years of aqe or
r^r ' shall be deemed competent to contractfor a mot°r vehlc ie liability policy or bondor for a policy of motor vehicle liabilityinsurance to the same extent and to the sameeffect as though he had attained his full
age;
261
By statute, "Residents of this Commonwealth
who are veterans of World War II and are
entitled to the benefits provided by thefederal law known as the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944, and also called
the G.I. Bill of Rights, may participate
in such benefits notwithstanding that they
are under twenty-one years of age, and for
said purpose such minors shall have full legal
capacity to act in their own behalf in the
matter of contracts, conveyances, mortgages
and other transactions, and with respect to
such acts done by them they shall have all
of the rights, powers and privileges and be
subject to the obligations of persons of
fuil age."
262
A person who has attained the age of
eighteen shall have full legal capacity
to act in his own behalf in the matter of
contracts and shall be liable in any civil
action for breach thereof.
2 6 3
A minor may disaffirm his contract while still a minor
°f after he becomes of age. The right of disaffirmance is
personal to the minor or his guardian. The right of
disaffirmance is not conditioned upon a return or tender of
261 Ibid
. ,
Ch. 175, sec.
Ch. 925, sec. 59.
262 St. 1945, Ch. 408.
263 Ibid., M.G.L.A., Ch.
1973, Ch. 925, sec. 74.
^^Chandler v . Simmons,
113K as amended by St. 1973,
231, sec. 850. Added by St.
97 Mass. 508 (1867) .
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what the minor got under the contract. The party to the
contract may recover back what property the minor did
acquire and still holds under the contract. 265 if the
minor sues to rescind a contract it is an unequivocal re-
pudiation of the contract. 266
A minor may ratify his contract when he becomes of
age. Ratification has been defined as an act(s) or conduct
of the minor which demonstrates an intention to be bound by
the contract, e.g., treating property as his own, using it,
selling it or otherwise dealing with it, constitutes suffi-
cient evidence on which ratification may be found. 267
Intoxication
Drunkenness and insanity involve degrees of mental
aberration. If the mental derangement reached such a point
that the person obviously does not understand the nature of
what he is doing when making a contract, then he does not
have capacity to contract and there is no contract. If
such a condition exists the person should be treated as
though he has been judicially declared insane. A contract
265
Tracy v. Brown, 163 N.E. 885 (1928).
266
Stanley v. Westwood Auto Inc., 322 N.E. 2d 768 (1975).
267
Chamberlain v. Employer Liability Assur., Corp.,
194 N.E. 310 (1935)
.
268
Ibid., Restatement, sec. 18.
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made by a person while he is so drunk as to be incapable
of understanding its nature and effect is voidable by that
person at his option.
Spendthrifts
Spendthrifts were capable of entering into valid
2 fi Qcontracts at the common law. if a guardian has been
appointed for a spendthrift or a person of advanced age who
is incapable of managing his property, such persons are de-
prived of the capacity to contract except for necessaries.
Their liability for necessaries stands on the same footing
27 0as that of minors and insane persons.
Necessaries
The liability for necessaries is a question of fact,
depending upon the condition in the life of the person, his
habits, what people in like circumstances are accustomed
to as well as upon the nature of the articles furnished.
As a general rule, food, clothing, shelter, education and
• 271
medical expenses have been held to be necessaries.
269
O'Donnell v. Smith, 8 N.E. 350 (1886)
.
270
M.G.L.A., Ch. 201, sec. 1 - 10.
271
Moskew v. Marshall, 171 N.E. 477 (1930) .
281
Married Women
At common law, a married woman could not make a con-
tract. Today, a married woman may contract with her
husband. She may make contracts (oral and written— sealed
and unsealed) as if she were sole. A married woman may
also sue in the contract made with her husband. 272
Fraud, Mistake and Duress
Fraud
Fraud as used in the law of contracts means: (1) a
misrepresentation known to be such; (2) a concealment; or
(3) a non-disclosure where there is not a privilege to
withhold the information. Since a valid express contract
results from the voluntary agreement of the parties, if
there is fraud practiced by one party which induces the
other party to contract, no valid contract results. Fraud
may consist of fraudulent misrepresentation of fact which
induces a person to make a contract, the nature of which he
understands and which he intends to make. This is termed
"fraud in the inducement" or "antecedent fraud." If the
fraud consists of a fraudulent misrepresentation as to what
272
M.G.L.A., Ch. 209, sec. 2, 6, 882. as amended by St.
1963, Ch. 765.
273
Ibid., Restatement, sec. 471.
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the instrument is, i.e., that the instrument is something
other than what it really is, it is called fraud in the
essence of the contract or fraud in the nature or being of
the contract. 274
One kind of fraud is as fatal as the other to the
validity of the contract induced by it. The exception to
this rule is the cases in which the question is whether a
defense of fraud is available in an action on a negotiable
instrument brought by a holder in due course under the
Uniform Commercial Code. Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
fraud in the execution is a real defense but fraud in the
inducement is not, e.g., when a literate person has had
full opportunity to read a negotiable instrument and does
not, he cannot successfully assert the defense of fraud in
the execution against the holder in due course. There-
fore, if one party defrauds the other into executing the
contract there is no real consent, and the contract is
276
voidable by the innocent party.
274 Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E. 2d 551 (1941).
275 Bruchett v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp., 396 P. 2d 186
(1964) .
27
^Long v. Inhabitants of Athol, 82, N.E. 665 (1907).
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When due to fraud, a contract or conveyance fails
to express the agreement that the parties intended that
it express, the defrauded party may seek a decree of
reformation (equity). A decree of reformation is: (1)
available only with respect to written instruments and
contracts; (2) an alternative remedy to recission and
(3) limited by the State of Frauds. 277
Mistake
Mistake may be a defense to the formation of a
contract. Mistake may be: (1) mutual or (2) unilateral.
Mutual Mistake . There is no contract, if both
Par"ties enter into an agreement based upon mutual mistake
as to the existence or identity of the subject matter, or
material or essential facts, or as to the nature of the
contract itself. If both parties are mistaken as to
the terms of a contract because of ambiguous language
innocently used, then no contract is formed because there
279has been no mutual assent. However, one is bound by
the language used if a mistake exists as to only one par-
28 0
ty. Mutual mistake may be pleaded as a defense to an
277
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 491.
27
^Neel v. Lang, 127 N.E. 512 (1920).
27
^Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass 247 (1909).
2
^Goldstein v . Darcy, 201Mass 312 (1909).
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action at law brought to enforce the contract or in an
action in equity in which the legal remedy is not plain,
complete and adequate. 281 if each party makes a different
Ei£take as to the true facts, it does not detract from
the fact that they were both mistakes. 282
Unilateral Mistake
. if one party is mistaken,
and the other party is not chargeable with knowledge of
the mistake, there is an enforceable contract. The mis-
take is no defense.
Duress
Duress consists of any act which overcomes the will
of the other party and coerces the party to enter into
the contract. Stevens v. Thissell in treating of
duress held that "it is of no consequence how the domina-
tion over the mind was acquired; it is enough that it
2 83
was acquired." Duress of goods is sufficient grounds
for avoiding the contract. 8 ^ Neither party can compel
the consent of the other for the purpose of contracting.
Duress may be shown as a defense or grounds for recission.
2 81Martin v. Jablinski, 149 N.E. 156 (1925).
2 8 2
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 503.
2 8 3
Stevens v. Thissell, 134 N.E. 398 (1922).
284
Freeman v. Teeling, 194 N.E. 677 (1935).
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This is also true in reference to contracts induced by
threats of blackmail or extortion
.
^5
Economic Duress
. Economic duress may be a
defense where A is in some way responsible for the bad
economic situation in which B is placed. Economic
duress has been held to be a valid defense to the en—
forcement of a contract where the following elements
appear: (1) a wrongful or illegal act by one party;
(2) placing the other party in a position in which his
property or finances are seriously jeopardized or impair-
ed; (3) no othe adequate means available to avoid or pre-
vent the threatened loss other than entering into the
contract; and (4) the duressed person was acting as a
2 8 6
reasonable prudent person under the circumstances.
Undue Influence . Undue influence as a defense has
been limited by the courts to cases involving contracts
between persons in fiduciary or confidential relationships
(trustee-beneficiary, husband-wife) whereby one has taken
unreasonable advantage of the other. Ordinarily two
elements must appear: (1) promisor was vulnerable to the
influence of the promisee and (2) the promisee used ex-
o o c
Ibid., Restatement , sec. 495.
^^Ibid.
,
Restatement
,
sec. 493 .
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cessive pressure in overcoming the will of the
promissor
.
287
Illegality
A contract is illegal if its formation or per-
formance is: ( 1 ) criminal, (2) tortious or (3) contrary
to public policy. A contract may be illegal either
because it has been made so by statute, or because it
is against public policy as declared by the courts. 288
A contract based on illegal consideration is also illegal
and not enforceable. 239 The reason that illegal contracts
are not enforceable is not for the protection of the
interests of the defendant who is often a party to the
illegal agreement, but is that the law will not lend its
aid to one who seeks to enforce alleged rights based upon
his own illegal conduct. 290 Where the acts required by
the contract are not morally wrong but are merely pro-
hibited by law, either party may disaffirm the contract
while it is still executory and may recover back any
money paid or property delivered under the contract. Where
a contract is partly legal and partly illegal and the ille-
287 T , „ n _Ibid.
,
sec . 497
.
288.,., cinIbid
. ,
sec . 512
2 8 9
Love v. Harvey, 114 Mass. 80 (1873).
290 Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
816 (1923).
139 N.E.
287
gal part has been disaffirmed by the Plaintiff, he
may recover for labor and materials furnished under the
legal part of the contract. 291 Where the facts regarding
the illegality of the conduct of the contracting parties
were substantially beyond dispute, the consequence was to
be decided as a matter of law. 292
If the legal contract has been executed, neither
party may recover back money paid or property delivered
under the illegal agreement. 92 A contract to commit a
crime will not be enforced in Massachusetts even indirectly
through an action in quantum meruit. Massachusetts has a
strong public interest in ensuring that its rules governing
marriage are not subverted. Then, even if, at the time of
the contract, the parties to the contract did not mean the
services to be rendered included illegal conduct, there
can be no recovery if that performance was in fact illegal,
and the illegality was serious and not merely an incidental
294part of the performance of the agreement.
291Eastern Expanded Metal Co. v. Webb Granite Co.,
81 N.E. 251 (1907) .
292Harness Tracks Sec., Inc. v. Baystate Raceway,
Inc.
,
373 N.E. 2d 353 (1978)
.
292 Buccella v. Schuster, 164 N.E. 2d 141 (1960).
29
^Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 902 (1975)
.
288
There are a variety of common types of bargains
which have been held to be illegal. They are (1) bar-
gains in restraint of trade if the restraint is unrea-
295
sonable, (2) gambling or wagering bargains (merely be-
cause a contract
, such as one for the purchase of securi-
ties or commodities on margin, is highly speculative, it
does not make it a wagering contract); 296 (3) bargain und-
er the terms of which one party gains a profit greater
than that which is permitted by law is paid, or is agreed
to be paid by, or on behalf of a debtor, for a loan of
money, or for extending the maturity of a debt is usurious;
usury is illegal. The illegality exists in either paying
the interest or promising to do so; 297 (4) bargain tending
to obstruct the administration of justice are illegal; 298
[to constitute a champertous act, it is not enough that an
attorney is to look to the thing recovered for his compen-
sation but there must appear the future element that the
claim of the attorney for his services shall not constitute
295
296
297
298
Ibid.
,
Ibid
.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Restatement, sec. 513-19.
sec. 520-525
sec. 526-537.
sec. 540-558,
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a debt owed to him by the client, if no debt is created
and the attorney is to be compensated by a share in what
is recovered, and he is to look to that alone for his
compensation, the agreement is "champertous" ]
;
299
( 5 )
contracts which violate a public or private fiduciary duty
are illegal, e.g., except statutory arbitrations, contracts
to submit an entire dispute to arbitrators, without re-
strictions and indicating that the findings of the arbitra-
tors shall be binding on the parties and final, is ille-
gal as an agreement to oust the courts of jurisdiction; 300
(6) contracts in restraint of trade or restricting the in-
dividual to do business, earn a livelihood or enjoy the
fruits of his incentive, industry and abilities; 301 (7)
contracts to use influence or pressure upon the conduct of
public officers or for fees procuring legislation when the
10 2party does not have a valid claim against the government;
299Gill v. Richmond Co-op Ass'n, 34 N.E. 2d 509
(1941).
3
°°Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 56 N.E. 2d (1944).
301United Shoe Marline So. v. Kimball, 79 N.E. 790
(1907)
.
302
M.G.L.A. Ch. 3, sec. 39-50.
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(8) bargain to pay a person to influence another person
to let alone a will which the other person had made and
not to execute a new will; 303 (9) bargain between a
creditor and a debtor that the creditor shall receive
more than other creditors—all creditors being party to
the composition agreement; 304 (10) contracts to pay a
witness compensation in excess of the legal fee for tes-
tifying in a case so that the party may prevail.
Party to a sham contract runs the risk that the
court may accept the contract at its face value and decline
to believe that it was intended by all parties as a sham. 3(^ 3
Sunday Contracts
The Lord's Day Act (M.G.L.A. ch . 136) provides that
contracts made on Sunday are illegal. Contracts for nec-
essaries or for charity are excepted. Contracts for activ-
ities which have been legalized by the granting of licenses
are also excepted. In terms of a contract made on a Sunday
in the Commonwealth: (1) if goods were sold on Sunday and
delivered the same day, the seller may recover the goods
back, since the buyer may not rely on an illegal contract
303 Pike v. Pike, 165 N.E. 5 (1929).
304 Brown v. Nealley, 36 N.E. 464 (1894).
30 5
Anderson v. K. G. Moore, Inc., 376 N.E. 2d 1238
(1978) .
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to sustain a claim of title; 306 (2) if goods are delivered
on a day other than Sunday, the seller may recover the
fair value of them on the theory of a contract implied in
fact. He may not recover the contract price unless it is
307
synonomous with the fair value. (3) if a check or
negotiable instrument was given on a Sunday in satisfac-
tion of a debt, such an instrument would be illegal. If
the creditor negotiated the instrument and received the
cash, the receipt of the money constitutes a payment. 308
Conclusion
As a general rule the law does not aid any party to
an illegal contract. In the Commonwealth it is now gener-
ally settled that a defendant may not rely on the illegali-
ty of a contract sued on unless he has pleaded the illegal-
309lty specially in his answer. If the plaintiff's declar-
ation shows that he relied upon an illegal contract, or
where the evidence upon which he must rely shows a contract
o r\ c
Aldrich v. Inhabitants of Blackstone
,
128 Mass.
148 (1879) .
30
^Mayer v. Haycock, 18 N.E. 2d 348 (1938).
308Gorden v, Levine, 83 N.E. 861 (1908).
30
^Adamsky v. Mendes , 96 N.E. 2d 236 (1950).
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which is inherently wrongful or against public policy ob-
jection to a recovery may be entertained, though the il-
, .
. .
310legality is not specially pleaded.
The Statute of Frauds
Oral contracts are valid in the majority of cases.
The law does not generally require formality. By statute,
a few types of contracts are required to be in writing or
to be evidenced by a signed, written memorandum. The
Statute of Frauds enumerates the contracts which, are not
enforceable, if the issue is properly raised, unless the
contract or a memorandum of it is produced to prove the
contract. These statutory requirements stem from the Eng-
lish Statute of Frauds in 1677. The purpose of the Statute
of Frauds is basically to prevent fraud and perjury. It
also serves to provide evidence of the actual terms of the
agreement
.
M.G.L.A. ch. 259, sec. 1 provides that no action
shall be brought: (1) to charge an executor or administrat-
or upon a promise to answer damages out of his own estate
for a debt of the deceased person; (2) upon an agreement
upon a consideration of marriage; (3) upon an agreement
^^National Vinegar Co. v. Jaffe, 58 N.E. 342 (1900).
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that is not to be performed with a year; (4) to charge a
person upon a promise to answer for the debt, default or
misdoing of another; and (5) upon a contract for the sale
of lands, tenements or hereditaments or of any interests
in or concerning them-unless the contract or a memoran-
dum thereby is executed by the party to be charged thereto
by his duly authorized agent.
M.G.L.A. ch . 259, sec. 2 provides:
Consideration need not be in writing—the
consideration of such promise, contract or agree-
ment need not be set forth or expressed in the
writing signed by the party to be charged there-
with, but may be proved by any legal evidence.
The consideration which by this statute may be proved by
parol is the consideration of the promise sued on.^^
Promises of Executors or Administrators
M.G.L.A. ch. 259, sec. 1(1), applies to a promise
by an administrator to pay the amount of the distributive
share of an heir
,
out of his own estate
,
to one who had
purchased the share. It does not apply to a promise by
an executor to pay the plaintiff to forbear to contest the
will under which the executor secured the undisputed title
311Growers Outlet, Inc. v. Stone, 131 N.E. 2d 210
(1956) .
312Bogigian v. Booklovers Library, 193 Mass. 444
(1907) .
^^Hay v. Green, 12 Cush. 282 (1853) .
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to real estate which was denied to him. 314
Contracts Upon Consideration of Marriage
The statute applies to promises to make a payment of
money
,
or a settlement of property, in consideration of
. 315
marriage. It refers to marriage settlement contracts
and pre—nuptial contracts
. It does not apply to mutual
promises to marry between prospective spouses. The breach
of a contract to marry was actionable at common law in
Massachusetts. The "Heart Balm" law provides that:
"Breach of the contract to marry shall not constitute an
injury or wrong recognized by law, and no action, suit or
O I C
proceeding shall be maintained therefor."
Contracts Not to be Performed Within a Year
This refers only to contracts which, by their term,
cannot by any possibility be performed within one year
from the making thereof. The one year period begins from
the date the contract is made, not when performance is
promised. If the contract may be fully performed within a
year it is not within the statute, though it is possible,
and even probable, that full performance will not be had
3 ^ 4Mackin v. Dwyer, 91 N.E. 893 (1910),
315White v. Bigelow, 28 N.E. 904 (1891).
316 Ibid., M.G.L.A. ch. 207, sec. 47A.
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within the year, i.e.:
1. Agreements without specific duration which in
their nature are capable of performance within
a year by the happening of an event, (employ-
's i 7
ment contracts);
2. Agreement to perform upon a condition which
may happen within a year ; 318 and
3. Agreement for alternative performance, one of
which is capable of full performance within one
year . 319
Contracts to Answer for the Debt of Another
Promises to answer for of discharge the debts of a-
nother must be in writing to be enforceable. These are
termed guarantee contracts. The contract to which the
statute applies is to the guarantee promise made: ( 1 ) by
one who is not presently liable for the debt, ( 2 ) to a
creditor or obligee and (3) to discharge the present or
future obligation of a third person. It is an idemnity
. .
320
contract
.
The primary purpose of the idemnity or guarantee
•2 1 7
'Roberts v. Rochbottom Co., 7. Met. 46 (1843).
318Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544 (1897).
319Worthy v. Jones, 11 Gray 168 (1858).
339 Schultz v. Frary, 109 N.E. 2d 134 (1952).
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contract is to secure to the promisee the performance of
another's obligation to the promisee. The statute is
said to apply only to "collateral" promises and not to
primary" promises. if the real contracting was between
the promisor and the creditor, the promise is enforceable
although oral. if the promise is "collateral," when
it appears that the promisor's main purpose in guarantee-
ing the obligation of another was to secure an advantage
or pecuniary benefit for himself
, his promise is enforce-
able even though it is not in writing. 322 This is an ex-
ception to the statute.
The statute does not apply
—
(1) when the consideration for the promise is
furnished to a third person at the promisor's
request, and credit is given to the promisor.
In this case, the debt is that of the promi-
323
sor
;
(2) where the contract is to idemnify the promi-
324
see for an obligation assumed by him;
321Duca v. Lord, 117 N.E. 2d 145 (1954).
322 Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 184.
323 Ribock v. Canner, 105 N.E. 462 (1914).
324Aldrich v. Ames, 9 Gray 76 (1857).
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(3) where the promise is to reimburse the promisee
for paying the promisor's debt; 323
(4) where the promise is to pay a debt the promisor
owes the promisee; 326
(5) where the promisee releases or discharges the
debtor, in consequence of the promise of the
promisor to pay the promisee's debt; 327 and
(6) where the basic purpose of the promise to pay
the debt of another is the promisor's acquisi-
tion of some title, lien, or interest to him-
self. 328
Contract for the Sale of Land
A contract for the sale of land or any interest
therein must be in writing. There is often difficulty in
determining what is an "interest" in the sale of land with-
in the mean of the statute. Liens, fixtures, growing tim-
ber r future interests have been held by case law to be
within the meaning of the statute. The statute has been
held to apply to: (1) an agreement of a mortgage at a
foreclosure, that the mortgagee would hold the property and
325Hill v. Grat, 141 N.E. 593 (1923).
32
^Hill v. Grat.
327Curran v. O'Donnell, 128 N.E. 408 (1920).
328MacDonald v. Stack, 189 N.E. 2d 21 (1963).
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reconvey it to the mortgagor when the mortgagor paid the
sum secured by the mortgage
;
3 2 9
(2) an oral agreement by a
mortgagee to relinquish his interest in the mortgage in
favor of another; 330 (3) an oral agreement to give a mort-
3 31gage or to enlarge one; (4) an oral executory agreement
to let real estate, or to give, take or assign a lease of
332
realty; (5) an oral agreement to create an easement. 333
Within the Commonwealth, the statute has been held
not to apply to: (1) a contract for board and room; 3
3
^
(2) an agreement by which plaintiff was to buy land for mu-
tual benefit, take title in his own name, advance money for
repairs and to sell the property and divide the profits
equally with the defendant; 333 (3) a contract which ere-
O O C
ates a license to use land.
329Downing v. Brennan, 122 N.E. 729 (1919).
330Montuon v. Barlen, 194 N.E. 714 (1935).
331Lane v. Flint, 104 N.E. 570 (1914).
332Chase v. Aetna Rubber Co., 75 N.E. 2d 637 (1947).
333 Estabrook v. Wilcox, 115 N.E. 233 (1917).
33
^White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250 (1872).
333Fencer v. Wills, 156 N.E. 841 (1927).
O O C
Montuori v. Barlen.
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The Memorandum
A memorandum of the essential terms of the contract—
e.g., telegrams, letters, or notations (in one's private
ledgers—books, never communicated to the other) is suf-
ficient to satisfy the statute as long as it contains the
essential terms of the oral contract. 337 The consideration
of this type of a contract need not be set forth or ex-
pressed in the writing signed by the party to be charged
but may be proved by a legal evidence.
A memorandum of essential terms will be sufficient to
satisfy the statute if it contains: (1) the identity of
the contracting parties; (2) description of the subject
matter of the contract; (3) terms and conditions of the
agreement; (4) signature of the party sought to be charg-
ed . 339
If it fails in anyone of these particular, the con-
tract is unenforceable. The signature may appear anywhere
in the memorandum, not necessarily at the end. The signa-
ture may consist of the person's seal, initials or even his
mark. It may be affixed by an authorized intermediary or
337
338
Shayet v. Holland, 73 N . E . 2d 731 (1947).
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 207.
339 Ibid., Restatement.
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an agent. Only the signature of the party sought to be
held liable need appear. The fact that the party seeking
to enforce it has not signed it is immaterial.
Where one of the parties to the contract is acting
by an agent and the memorandum is signed by the agent as
party without disclosing his principals, there is a suf-
ficient designation of the parties, and the principal may
sue or be sued upon the contract. 340 The doctrine of un-
disclosed principal applies to all contracts except those
under seal and negotiable instruments.
One party to the contract cannot be the agent of the
other party for the purpose of signing the memorandum to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. A third person may act as
agent for both parties. 341 The memorandum may be made at
the time of the agreement or at any subsequent time. 343
The Statute of Frauds must be specially pleaded in
the defendant's answer. Otherwise, it cannot be relied on
343
as a defense. When the Statute of Frauds has been
340Tobin v. Larkin, 183 Mass. 389 (1903).
341Fessender v. Mussey, 11 Cush. 127 (1853)
.
342 Sanborn v. Chamberlain, 101 Mass. 409 (1869)
.
343 .Middlesex Co. v. Osgood, 4 Gray 447 (1855).
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pleaded, the burden of proving compliance with its terms
rests upon the plaintiff. 344 The Statute of Frauds is a
defense which is personal to the maker of the contract
and cannot be set up by a third person who is not a party
346to it. The contract is not void but merely unenforce-
able. If the Statute of Frauds is not set up as a defense,
the contract may be enforced. As against third persons
such a contract is binding even though the statute is not
satisfied
,
Substituted Performance
A written contract and a contract under seal may be
modified by a parol agreement made subsequent to the execu-
tion of the contract. The parol evidence rule has no ap-
plication to such subsequent agreements. 34
"^
Where written contract concerning a subject matter
within the Statute of Frauds has been subsequently modified
by an oral agreement, the contract, partly oral and partly
344Weiner v. Slovin, 270 Mass. 392 (1930)
.
345Weiner v. Slovin
.
346 0 ,,Hoffman v . Charlestown Bank , 231 Mass. 324 (1918)
347Hastings v. Lovejoy, 2 N.E. 776 (1885) .
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written
,
is within the statute, and the writing is not a
su ^^-*- c ^-ent memorandum under the statute."^ 3 Where the
subsequent agreement is not a modification of the original
contract otherwise than as to the mode of performance, the
case is not within the statute, and an action may be main-
tained, but it must be brought on the original contract in
.
. 349
writing.
New Promise by Insolvent Debtor
M.G.L.A. ch. 259, sec. 3 provides "no promise made
by a debtor who has been discharged in bankruptcy, shall
be evidence of a continuing contract so as to deprive the
debtor of the defense of the discharge in bankruptcy, un-
less such promise is made by or is contained in a writing
signed by the debtor or his authorized agent."
The statute only requires evidence of a continuing
promise in some writing signed by the debtor. No precise
form is necessary. The intention and the obligation of
the debtor must be interpreted from the phraseology he
chose to use. If the promise is sufficient, no considera-
tion other than the discharged debt is necessary to bind
.u j v.4. 350the debtor.
^^Ryan v. Gilbert, 71 N.E. 2d 219 (1947).
^^Cummings v . Arnold, 3 Mete. 486 (1842).
^~^Howard v. Zilch, 190 N.E. 2d 77 (1963)
.
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Performance and Breach
Performance
Once it has been determined that there is a valid
contract in effect and the questions of third party rights
and duties under the contract has been considered, the
scope of each party's duty to perform is next to be de-
termined.
Performance is the usual and normal way by which
parties discharge their contractual obligations. There
are nine methods of discharging contractual obligations,
i.e.f (1) agreement, (2) merger, (3) novation, (4) estop-
pel, (5) accord and satisfaction, (6) cancellation, in-
tentional destruction or surrender, (7) release or cove-
nant not to sue, (8) discharge by avoidance of voidable
duties and occurrence of a condition subsequent. 351 A
simple contract may be discharged orally or by a writing
even though the original written contract is within the
Statute of Frauds. If the discharge of a contract within
the Statute of Frauds is by a substituted contract as op-
posed to an absolute discharge by recession a writing is
352
required.
3 51 Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 385.
35
^Ibid.
,
Restatement
,
sec. 406.
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It is essential that each promise and provision of
the contract be analyzed
_separately to determine whether
it creates or conditions the duties or obligations of
either party. Once the contractual provisions have been
construed, the issue is whether the duties created under
the contract have been performed. if not, whether there
is some legal justification or excuse for their new per-
formance
.
Problems of performance of a contract are concerned
with determining which party is in breach of the contract.
In order to find a person in breach of a contract, it must
appear that he was under an obligation (absolute duty) to
perform, and that he failed to do so. The problem is to
determine when a promisor' s duty to perform has become abso-
lute. This demands consideration of the type and legal
effects of conditions in a contract. If the duty was only
a conditional one, the promisor is bound to perform only
sfter the condition occurs (condition precedent or concur-
rent)
,
or only until it occurs (condition subsequent). 353
One who prevents the performance of a contract cannot take
advantage of its non-performance. 35 ^ In approaching the
353 Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 257.
354 Frank Fitzgerald, Inc. v. Pacella Brothers, Inc.,
310 N.E. 2d 3 (1974) .
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problem of performance of a contract, the provisions of
the contract must be examined to determine whether it is
a condition or a covenant. It is possible that a given
provision may be both a condition and a covenant.
Breach of contract is the violation of a contrac-
tural duty which one person owes to another. it is
the failure to perform for which a legal excuse is lack-
356 Breach of Contract" is confined to a wrongful
doing. Non-performance of a contract is failure to per-
form the whole or a material part of a contract, whether
or not the party failing to perform was, under the cir-
cumstances existing at the time, legally bound to render
performance. Non-performance of a contract by a party to
it may not constitute a breach of the contract by him,
because under the circumstances, the party is not bound
3 57
or has ceased to be bound to perform it.
A party to a contract is not bound to perform it
if he was led into it by fraud, mistake or duress of the
other party, or where the contract is illegal or unlawful.
355Andre v. Maguire, 26 N.E. 2d 347 (1940).
3 56 Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 312.
3 57 Realty Developing Co. v. Wakefield Ready-Mixed
Concrete Co .
f 100 N.E. 2d 2 (1951)
,
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An insane person or a minor is not bound to perform his
contract. He is entitled to disaffirm it. 358
Excuse for Non-Performance. The general rule is that
where a contract calls for the performance of an act not in
itself unlawful, the party who is to perform is not re-
leased from his obligation by the fact that in consequence
of unforeseen accidents, the performance of his contract
has become unexpectedly burdensome or even impossible.
Unless provided against in the in the contract, unforeseen
difficulties
,
no matter how great, will not excuse per —
3 59formance
.
Destruction of Subject Matter . Where there is a val-
id written agreement to convey real estate and there is no
stipulation in such an agreement where the risk of the loss
shall lie, a substantial destruction of the realty, without
the fault of either party
,
between the time of the agree-
ment and the time of performance will terminate the con-
tract and neither party can enforce it. Under such circum-
stances since the parties to the contract did not provide
for the emergency, there is an implied condition that the
building shall continue in existance until the conveyance
and the destruction of it without the fault of either party
338Butler v. Prussian, 147 N.E. 892 (1925).
3
~^Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419 (1907).
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will excuse performance of the contract, and leave no
right of recovery in favor of either party against the
3 60
other. if, however, the destruction of the property
is slight, that is, there is no substantial destruction,
then the contract is not terminated and the vendor may
compel the vendee to accept the conveyance or the vendee
may compel the vendor to perform specific performance in
equity or damage at law. 361
In Massachusetts, if the realty is destroyed with-
out the fault of either party between the time of the
agreement to convey and the time of performance, the loss
falls on the party who is the legal owner, i.e., the a-
greed vendor. The loss in other states falls on the a-
greed vendee for the reason that when there is a valid
written agreement to convey real estate, the agreed ven-
dor, between the time of the agreement and the time of
performance, holds the property merely as a constructive
trustee for the agreed vendee. The agreed vendee is there-
fore, the beneficial owner and should suffer the loss.
Massachusetts recognizes the agreed vendor as holding the
realty as constructive trustee for some purposes but holds
36
^Allyn v. Allyn, 154 Mass. 570 (1891).
361Wells v. Callman, 107 Mass. 514 (1871).
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that the losses resulting to the realty pending such
agreement falls upon the party having the legal title,
the agreed vendor. 362 where the destruction of the realty
is caused by the fault of one of the parties, the party at
fault has no rights but the party not at fault may sue for
damages at law or compel specific performance in equity.
Destruction of Subject Matter (Contractor Contract).
Where a party agrees to do work on a certain chattel or
building already in existence, there is an implied condi-
tion that the chattels or buildings shall continue in ex-
istence and a destruction of it without the fault of
either party will excuse performance. Under such circum-
stances, if the party who was to do the work had not as
yet done anything, the destruction of the subject matter
terminates the contract and leaves no right of recovery of
damages in favor of either party against the other
.
363
if,
however, the party who was to do the work has partly per-
formed work and the chattel or building then is destroyed
without the fault of either party, the party partly perform-
ing cannot recover on the contract but may recover in
362 tLibman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221 (1920).
O C O
Lord v. Wheeler, 1 Gray 282 (1854)
.
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quasi-contract for work, labor and materials up to the
time of its destruction. 364
A person who agrees to build a house on the land of
another is not discharged by the destruction of the house
by fire before its completion; but where one agrees to
repair another's house already built, such destruction of
the house puts an end to the contract and the contractor
may recover in quasi-contract for his work, labor and
materials
.
365
Impossibility Caused by the Act of One of the Par-
ties. Where a party agrees to work on certain chattel or
building already in existence and it is destroyed through
the fault of one of the parties, the party at fault is
liable to the other for damages. 366
Death or Disability
. Where a contract depends on
one's own personal services, the death or disability of
such a person will excuse non-performance
.
3
6
^
364
,
.Cleary v. Schier, 120 Mass. 210 (1876).
365
„
,
.Cleary v. Schier.
3(
^Hawkes v. Kehoe.
3 67 Cutler v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 274 Mass.
34 (1931).
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Impossibility Created by Law
. if the non-performance
of a contract is caused by an act of the law, this furnish-
es a valid excuse for non-performance. 368
Covenant
. A covenant may be defined as an absolute,
unconditioned promise to perform. No conditions are at-
tached to this contractural promise. A failure to perform
a covenant is a breach of the contract per se.
Conditions
. A condition may be defined as a fact or
event, the happening or non-happening of which creates or
extinguishes an absolute duty to perform on the part of
the promisor. Failure of that which is merely a condition
is not a breach of the contract. Conditions are important
in bilateral contracts. The performance of the bargained
for act in a unilateral contract leaves all the executory
duties on the promisor (offeror)
. These duties are usually
absolute because the offeror ' s promise of performance is
generally a covenant. In a unilateral contract, after per-
formance on the part of the offeree, it is possible that
the offeror's duty to perform could be conditional.
The determination of whether a given contractual pro-
vision is a condition or a covenant (or both) may decide
whether the promisor is in breach of contract. It will al-
so fix the right and duties of the factors to the contract.
368 Hughes v. Wamsutta Mills, 11 Allen 201 (1865).
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Whether a particular provision is a covenant or a condi-
tion is dependant on the intent of the parties. Generally,
doubtful provisions will be construed as covenants, rather
than conditions. 369
Conditions create or extinguish the absolute duty to
perform the contract depending on the time of their oc-
currence
.
^ condition precedent is a condition which must oc-
cur in order to create an absolute duty of performance.
There is no enforceable duty owed until the fact or event
happens. The burden of proof as to the occurrence of con-
ditions precedent is always on the plaintiff.
Within the Commonwealth, contracts to be performed
to the satisfaction of another may be divided into three
classes: (1) where the questions of operation, fitness
or mechanical fitness is involved; (2) where the con-
tract does not in any form of words require that the per-
formance of the work to be done or the services to be
rendered shall be to the personal satisfaction of the
371promisor, and (3) where fancy taste, sensibility or
369 Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 261.
3
^Weinstein v. Miller, 144 N.E. 287 (1924).
3 71Lockwood Mfg. Co. v. Mason Regulator Co., 66
N.E. 420 (1903) .
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opinion is involved.
If the contract is subject to the personal satis-
faction of the promisor, if the work was performed in a
manner that would be satisfactory to a reasonable man in
view of all the circumstances, the mere fact that the
promisor was not satisfied is not conclusive against a
right of recovery. There is read into the contract, the
rule that, that which the law says a party ought to be
satisfied with, the law will say he is satisfied with
373
personal taste or other elements are not of the
essence of the contract, if a promisor has agreed to per-
form to the personal satisfaction of the other party, he
will be held to his agreement
.
Conditions concurrent are conditions which are mu-
tually dependent performances capable of near simultaneous
execution and which exist only when parties to the con-
tract are bound to under performance at the same time.
372Freid v. Singer, 136 N.E. 609 (1922).
37 3
C. W. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 85
N.E. 446 (1949) .
374Weinstein v. Miller.
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The legal effects of a condition concurrent is that if the
condition occurs, the other party's duty to perform be-
comes absolute. If it doesn't, the other party's duty
never arises.
A condition subsequent is one in which the occurence
of the condition subsequent cuts off and extinguishes the
legal obligation of the promisor. The burden of allegation
and proof of the happening of all the conditions subsequent
is upon the defendant-promisor.
An expressed condition is a condition manifested or
expressed in so many words by the parties. The parties
can, subject to the limitations of the statute and public
policy, make their obligations as dependent or independent
as they choose and can spell out as many or as few condi-
tions as they wish and they will be given effect by the
courts
.
Implied-in- fact conditions refers to the "necessary"
conditions or "conditions of good faith and cooperation."
These are the conditions that the parties would probably
have agreed to had they thought about it. The law implies
whatever conditions are inherent in the promise given and
375
necessary to the performance of the contract.
37 5
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 262.
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The test for an implied-in fact condition is: would a
reasonable man have felt that the parties were contract-
ing with the understanding, though not expressly stated,
that certain facts would exist? The existence of these
facts will be an implied condition to the promisor's duty
to perform.
The contract may have been entered into upon the im-
plied understanding that, upon the happening of a certain
contingency, the contract is to cease and both parties are
relieved of their obligations under it. 376 if the con-
tract is not upon an implied condition of the continued
possibility of performance, the promisor is not relieved
of the contract nor excused from performing it because it
was originally or had subsequently become impossible to
377perform it.
Implied-in lav; conditions— "constructive condi-
tions"—are certain conditions which are not expressly pro-
vided by the parties. They are not of a type which the
parties would have agreed upon. However, they may be
376Goldstein v. Katz, 91 N.E. 2d 237 (1950).
377Conner v. Tewksbury, 63 N.E. 609 (1945).
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implied by the courts in the interests of fairness and
justice
.
378
The legal effect of occurrence or non-occurrence of
a constructive condition is usually the same as an express
or implied-in fact condition. it is subject to the possi-
ble exception of the doctrine of substantial performance
which is generally held to imply only to constructive con-
ditions. There may be one or more conditions in a given
contract.
Dependent and Independent Promises
Dependent promises operate the same way as do con-
current conditions. One has no right to performance on
the part of the other until and unless he has offered or
tendered performance.
Independent promises are those which must be per-
formed by the promisor without getting any performance in
return for it. The issue of whether specific words in a
contract create a condition or a promise, and what is their
effect in the contract, is a question of interpretation.
Whether a particular breach is or is not material depends
on the circumstances of the given case. If the contract
deals with live subject matter, which fails to come into
3 7 8 Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 253.
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or which dies, or is seriously impaired before the date of
performance, neither party is liable on the contract. This
principle also applies to a party who agrees to perform
personal services.
Aleatory Promise
An aleatory promise is a conditional promise based on
the happening of a fortuitous event or an event considered
by the parties to be fortuitous. A fortuitous event is one
that is dependent on chance. Wagering agreements fall
within the scope of aleatory contracts and unenforceable
because they are illegal. Insurance and suretyship con-
tracts are aleatory. They are not illegal. Insuring and
carrying others' risks are established businesses and such
contracts are enforceable. Both promises may be condition-
al on the same fortuitous event. Although aleatory, the
performances are regarded as the exchange for one another
and are enforceable. 000
Divisible Contracts
A contract is termed divisible where: (1) perform-
ance of each party is divided into two or more parts;
379
Ibid., Restatement
,
sec. 291.
380
ibid
. ,
sec . 292.
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(2) the number of parts due from each party is the same,
and (3) the performance of each part by one party is the
agreed exchange for a corresponding part by the other
3 81party. A contract for the delivery of goods in specif-
ic installments is a typical example of a divisible con-
tract. This type of a contract generally sets forth the
price to be paid for each installment when delivered.
Excuse of Conditions
Where either party's duty to perform is subject to
a condition precedent or concurrent, that party cannot be
held in breach of contract" until the conditions occur
or are legally excused. The party seeking to enforce the
contract always has the burden of pleading and proving the
occurrence, or excuse of each condition upon which the
other party's duty was dependent.
If the condition was only a condition, and not a
covenant, the failure of the condition is not a breach of
contract. It prevents the duty to perform from arising.
If the condition was a covenant then its non-performance
constitutes a breach of contract per se. The following
have been held to be an excuse for non-performance of a
condition
:
3 81
Ibid,, Restatement
,
sec. 266.
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(1) impossibility to perform personal service; 382
(2) impossibility of performance caused by other
party; 383
(3) prevention or hindrance of performance by the
other party in wrongful manner. 384
(4) receipt of part performance as full perform-
ance ;
(5) substituted contract;
(6) waiver of performance of conditions; and
(7) retaining benefits knowing of non-performance;
(8) destruction of subject matter. 385
Breach
Def init ion-Introduction
A breach of contract is an unjustifiable failure to
perform all or some part of a contractual duty; (2)
repudiation or (3) one party's hindering or preventing
performance by the other party. A breach of a contract
may be total or partial. Failure of one party to perform
3 8 2Culter v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 274 Mass.
34 (1931).
383Wills v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514 (1871).
384Hills v. Wamsutta Mills, 11 Allen 201 (1865).
385
J. J. Newbury Co. v. Shannon, 268 Mass. 116
(1929) .
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at a time expressly or impliedly promised may constitute
a substantial breach and thereby discharge the other
party from his contractual duty. The party so discharged
from the contract may be entitled to damages for total
breach.
Anticipatory Breach. The general rule is that if
one of the parties to a bilateral contract repudiates
it before the day of performance, the other party may
institute an action for breach of contract, without
waiting for the time of performance to arrive. This is
known as the doctrine of "anticipatory breach." This
rule is followed in most states in the Union and in the
Federal Courts. However, the doctrine of "anticipatory
breach- is not recognized in Massachusetts, and no action
on the executory (bilateral) contract can be maintained
until the date specified for its performance has gone
. 386by.
There are two exceptions to the Massachusetts
rule on "Anticipatory breach"
:
(1) At common law in a contract to marry, there
was an implied condition that in the time before
the date set forth for the marriage, neither
3 8 6Daniels v. Newton, 144 Mass. 530
(1974) .
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party should become engaged or married to
another, there was a present breach of the
implied condition and suit might be brought
at once. Today, by statute breach of contract
to marry does not constitute an injury or
wrong recognized by law, and no action, suit or
proceeding can be maintained therefore 387 and
(2) where a vendor has been deprived through the
exercise of eminent domain of power to perform
his contract the vendee need not wait until the
time for performance arrives but the vendee may
seek relief at once. The reason being that the
taking by eminent domain placed the title en-
tirely beyond the control of the vendor and it
would be impossible for him to get it back at
the date set forth for performance. 388
Anticipatory Repudiation
. Anticipatory repudiation
of a contract may be defined as an announcement of an
intention by a promisor that he will not render his future
promised performance. It is restricted to executory bi-
lateral contracts involving mutual and dependent condi-
tions. It may be committed by: (1) a positive statement
o o 7
Ibid., M.G.L.A., Ch. 207, sec. 47A.
,
inserted
by Acts 1938, Ch. 308, sec. 1.
388Gillis v. Bonelli-Adams Co., 284 Mass 176 (1933).
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by the promisor to the promisee that he will not or
cannot substantially perform the contract or (2) any
voluntary act that makes it impossible or apparently
impossible for the promisor to perform his contract. 389
Anticipatory repudiation of a contract may be
nullified by retraction of it and communication of
same to the promisee before the promisee sues or changes
his position in reliance on the repudiation. 399 The
legal rights of the promisee after the promisor's antici-
patory repudiation are:
(1) promisee may ignore the promisor's repudiation
and urge him to perform;
(2) promisee may sue immediately to recover damages
for the value of the promisor's performance;
(3) promisee may treat the repudiation as an excuse
for not rendering his own promised performance
and wait until the due date of the promisor's
performance to sue and
(4) promisee may treat the promissor's repudiation
as an offer of mutual recission and accept it
in discharge of his contractural obligation--
at the same time he may recover for his own
performance in restitution.
339
Ibid., U.C.C., Ch. 2, sec. 610.
390
Ibid., U.C.C., Ch. 2, sec. 611.
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Under the Uniform Commercial Code, either party
to a contract for the sale of goods has the right to
demand "adequate assurances of performance" from the
other party if reasonable grounds exist for believing
the other party's performance may not be received (in-
solvency). Until such assurances are given the first
party has the right to suspend any performance due by him.
An unjustified failure to comply with the demand for such
assurances for a period in excess of 30 days constitutes
a repudiation of the contract as a matter of law. 391
When either party repudiates the contract with
respect to a performance not yet due the loss of which will
substantially impair the value of the contract to the
other, the aggrieved party may:
(1) for a commercially reasonable time await per-
formance by the repudiating party; or
(2) resort to any remedy for breach even though he
has notified the repudiating party that he would
await the latter's performance and has urged
392
retraction
.
39
‘*'Ibid.
,
sec. 2-609.
3 9 2
Ibid., U.C.C., sec. 2-610.
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After repudiation with respect to a performance not yet
due, the aggrieved party in a sales contract may imme-
diately resort to any remedy he chooses, provided he
moves in good faith.
Dependent and Independent Promises
Where the stipulations of the contract are dependent,
the failure or refusal of one party to perform the acts
so promised, without excuse, will relieve the other party
from the obligations of the contract. 393 In the case of
independent promises, the promisor has to perform his
promise, and if he does not get what he pays for, his
394remedy is by a crossaction. The general rule is
that when performance under a contract is concurrent one
party cannot put the other party in default unless he
is ready, able and willing to perform and has demonstrated
395this by some offer of performance. The law does
not require a party to tender performance if the other
party has shown that he cannot or will not perform. If
the promises or terms of the contract to be performed by
each party are independent of those to be performed by
393 Dale System, Inc, v. Wichroski, 69 N.E. 2d
241 (1903).
3
9
^ International Textbook Co. v. Martin, 108 N.E.
469 (1915).
395Vander Realty Co., Inc. v. Gabriel, 134 N.E. 2d
901 (1956).
324
the other, the failure or refusal 396 of one party,
without excuse to perform the promise to be performed
by him, will not relieve the other party of the obliga-
tion to perform his agreement. His remedy is an action
of contract against the party breaking the contract. 397
Entire and Divisible Contracts
In an entire contract, a breach by one party as to
a part performance will constitute a breach of the entire
contract excusing performance by the other party and
entitling him to an immediate right of action. 398
If the contract is divisible, the breach of a part
will not constitute a breach of the entire contract. 399
In this situation, the other party may have a right of
action for the breach but not for breach of the entire
contract. He will not be excused from further performance
of his part of the contract. In this situation, it may
396Leigh v. Rule, 121 N.E. 2d 85 (1954).
397Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.
2d 831 (1976) .
1QQ
Barrie v. Quimby, 92 N.E. 451 (1910).
399Lander v. Samuel Heller Leather Co., Inc.,
50 N.E. 2d 962 (1943) .
^"National Machine and Tool Co. v. Standard Shoe
Machine Co., 63 N.E. 900 (1902).
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appear that from the contract, a failure to perform as
to a part was held to be of such importance as to go to
the root of the contract so as to excuse the other party
401from full performance, he is still not excused.
Exculpatory Clause
A general clause in a contract which purports to
exonerate a person from all liability for breach may be
invalid, because of repugnancy, or as depriving the
agreement of mutuality of obligation. However, a stipu-
lation to that effect, as to some particular term in an
_
. , 402
agreement, has been sustained.
Commenced Contract
Where the contract is not executory but is a con-
tract that has already commenced, an action for wrong-
ful breach may be maintained at once for both past
J 403
and future damages.
Termination of Contract
A party to a contract is justified in treating a
contract as broken and terminated: (1) where the other
401Lander v. Samuel Heller Leather Co
.
402 Barrett v . Carney, 150 N.E. 2d 276 (1958)
403 Dalton v. American Ammonia Co .
,
236 Mass
.
105 (1920).
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party's breach goes to the essence of the contract 4 ^* 4
or (2) where the other party's breach is willfull. 405
If the breach goes to the essence of the contract, it makes
no difference whether or not it is willful,
if the breach is willful, it makes no difference
whether or not it went to the essence of the contract.
If the breach is not willful and does not go to the
essence of the contract, the other party is not justified
in treating the contract as broken and terminated. 406
Substantial Performance (Building Contracts)
In Massachusetts, the rule is that in order for a
party to recover on a building contract, there must be
complete performance of it. The contractor who has failed
to fully perform a contract to erect a building does not
407have a right of action upon the contract itself. If,
however, the contractor has attempted in good faith to
perform and has fallen short of complete performance but
has substantially performed
,
he may recover on an implied
contract, in no case more than the contract price less
,
.
. ,
408
damages (a count in quantum menut) .
4 ^ 4Johnson v. Walker, 115 Mass. 253 (1892).
405 Homer v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 1 (1900)
.
406 Douglas v. Lowell, 194 Mass. 268 (1907).
4
^Divito v. Uto , 253 Mass. 239 (1925) .
4
^Bowen v. Kimball, 203 Mass. 364 (1909).
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The contractor must act in good faith and sub-
stantially perform the contract. Lack of good faith even
though there is a substantial performance will bar his
right to recover even in implied contract. 409
Substituted Agreement or Performance
Parties may agree subsequent to the making of the
contract substituting new terms or a new contract or a new
or different performance or the contract may have been
waived by an agreement of the parties. In these situa-
tions, non-performance of the terms of the original con-
tract would not constitute breach of it. 410 Ordinarily,
a written contract, before breach, may be varied by a
subsequent oral agreement, may enlarge the time of per-
formance, or may vary any other term of the contract, or
may discharge it altogether. This rule applies to both
411
sealed instruments and simple contracts.
An oral modification of a purchase and sale
contract governed by the provision of M.G.L.A. Ch. 106,
Article 2, is valid and binding regardless of whether it
412
is supported by consideration.
409 Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick. 180 (1828)
.
410 Dean v. Skiff, 128 Mass. 174 (1880).
411Costonis v. Medford Housing Authority 176 N.E.
2d 25 (1961)
.
412 Skinner v. Toben Foreign Motors, Inc.,
2d 669 (1963)
.
187, N.E.
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Excuse for Non-Performance
A party to a contract, in some circumstances, is
not bound to perform it because the other party has broken
410
the contract.
Accord and Satisfaction
When the contract has been broken by one of the par-
ties and there is an effort to settle their differences,
the parties enter into a new and valid agreement in which
the party in default is to do some other act in lieu of
performance of the contract. This new agreement, though
still executory is an accord. When the agreement is
performed there is an accord and satisfaction, 414
An accord followed by a satisfaction may be pleaded
in discharge in an action on the original contract, and
. 415if proven, will bar such an action. An unexpected
accord will not operate to discharge liability in an
action on the original contract, if it appears that the
parties intended that the new agreement shall have that
. . 416
effect—the accord will discharge the liability.
4
^^Dale System v. Wichroski , 69 N.E. 2d 241 (1903).
4 ‘*" 4 Coragulain v. Rudd, 184 N.E. 717 (1933).
4
^^Marr v. Heggie, 58 N.E. 2d 1 (1944 ) .
4
^Sherman v. Sidman, 14 N.E. 2d 145 (1938) .
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Remedies
There are three basic remedies for breach of con-
tract, namely: (1) damages; (2) restitution and (3) speci-
fic performance. Damages has been held to mean a sum of
money, awarded as a compensation for injury caused by a
breach of contract. It is a remedy aimed at placing the
injured party in as good a position financially as he would
have been if the other party had performed the contract.
Restitution means recovery of a specific thing, which has
been delivered in performance, or recovery of the value,
in money, or a performance rendered by one party and re-
ceived by another. The purpose of this remedy is to
restore the injured party to the postion he occupied be-
fore he entered into the contract. The measure of recovery
417is the reasonable value of the plaintiff's performance.
Restitution is available only when there has been a total
breach by the defaulting party. If there is only a
418 . .
partial breach, the remedy is in damages. Specific
performance may be defined as the rendering as nearly as
is practicable of a promised performance. This is a dis-
cretionary remedy available only where the remedy of
419
damages would be inadequate.
417
418
419
Ibid.
,
Ibid.
Ibid
.
Restatement
,
sec . 347-357
.
327-346.
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In addition to the requirement of inadequacy of
damages, the following limitations also exist so that
specific performance will be refused is: (1) the
terms of the agreement are unfair, if the agreement was
induced by some sharp practice, misrepresentation or mis
take or if enforcement will cause unreasonable or dis-
proportionate hardship or loss; (2) the performance is
impossible, tortious, criminal, or a violation of the
rights of third parties which are superior to the rights
of the plaintiff; (3) the performance sought in personal
service; (4) the court cannot supervise the performance;
and (5) the plaintiff himself is guilty of a material
420breach. If the plaintiff, in a mistaken but good faith
effort, pursues a remedy which is not available, it is not
a bar to a suit for a different remedy. Damages and
421
restitution are alternative remedies. Only one of them
will be given as a remedy for any given breach of con-
Damages
The aggrieved party is entitled to sue for damages
for breach of contract. Plaintiff is entitled to be placed
in as good a position as he would have occupied if the
420 T , . ,Ibid.
,
Restatement
421 T . • ,Ibid
.
sec. 383.
422 T , . ,Ibid. sec. 384.
367-379.
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defendant had fulfilled his contractual obligation.
This result is achieved by an award of compensatory dam-
423
—
A plaintiff, in an action for damages for
breach of contract, cannot recover damages which after
notice of breach, he could have avoided. 424 The general
rule regarding the quantum of damages is
:
Upon any breach of contract, whether of warranty
or otherwise, the defendant is liable for what-
ever damages follow as a natural consequence and
the proximate result of his conduct, of which
may be reasonably supposed to have been within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the con-
tract was made as a probable result of a breach of
lt
* 425
Liquidated damages
,
when provided for in a contract
for its breach, may be recovered if the amount is rea-
sonable and bears a reasonable relationship to the actual
damages caused by the breach. If the plaintiff has not
suffered a pecuniary loss or his injury is too specula-
tive, nominal damges are recoverable for invasion of the
plaintiff's legally protected interests. Punitive or ex -
emplary damages are generally not recoverable in a breach
of contract action.
Damages for breach of contract are limited to those
which the defendant could reasonably foresee at the time
ao'k
Ibid
. ,
sec . 329
.
4 2 4
Ibid
. ,
sec . 336
4
2
^Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., 82 N/E. 682 (1907).
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Of the making of the contract as the probable result of
such a breach. Unusual or consequential damages can be
recovered only when the defendant has been made aware
of the probable occurrence of them. In the absence of
a specific contract provision to the contrary, a party
to the contract may recover damages caused by delay in
the commencement of completion of performance, if it can
be shown that the delay was a breach of the contract. 426
Assignment
An assignment of what is due, or is to become due,
under a contract, is not an assignment of both the duty
of performing the contract and receiving payment for it
—
is the law in this Commonwealth. If the contract as a
whole is assigned, there is no separation between the
benefits and the burdens. 427
Summary
Faculty and administrative personnel in public high-
er education do not have the legal authority to enter into
a contract on behalf of their respective institutions
unless delegated the right by the statutory authority.
426
St. Germain and Son
,
Inc. v. Taunton Redevelopment
Authority, 340 N.E. 2d 916 (1974).
427Chatham Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Angier Chemical
Co., Inc., 196 N.E. 2d 852 (1974).
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Basic concepts of the law of contract were identified
and synthesized in pages 252-332 . This study presents
basic concepts from the law of contract relevant to
faculty and administrative personnel in public higher
education using the technique of school law research.
This content is a reference for faculty and administra-
tive personnel in public higher education for use in
negotiating contracts and the substance for the content
in the cognitive domain of needed auasi-legal training
in the education program.
An analysis of case law in the 1966-1977 period
which relates to higher education and the law of con-
tract may be categorized into three areas: (1) student,
(2) faculty, and (3) institutional. These cases included
decisions from both state and federal courts. Litigation
is voluminous. For the purpose of this research one
hundred cases were briefed and presented herewith. The
legal reasoning and basic legal concepts set forth in the
three nineteenth centruy cases are commensurate with those
of the present court's decisions in the seventy-eighth
year of the twentieth century.
In selecting the one hundred cases for briefing,
preference was given to the most recent decisions, as well
as those which relate to issues in higher education in the
334
Commonwealth
. This additional research was undertaken
to identify the major areas of the law of contract which
were in issue and to determine the most frequently litigated
areas of contract law, thereby identifying primary domains
of needed quasi-legal training for the education profession.
Appendix II lists the case citations according to
the major law of contract area in issue in each case.
Many cases have multiple issues, which necessarily include
one or more of the other areas of the law of contract, but
for the purpose of this inquiry only the major issue was
classified. Table 4, page 335, shows a comparison of
the analysis of 100 cases in higher education by related
constituents to the area of the law of contract which is
in issue.
Figure 4, page 336, shows a comparison of the per-
centage of issues in relation to the Area of Expressed or
Implied Contract between student, faculty and institution
related constituencies in the 100 cases in higher education.
This figure demonstrates that in this area, there were
twenty-two percent of the student issues, nine percent of
the faculty issues and twenty-eight percent of the institu-
tional issues while Figure 5, page 337, shows that in the
area of Offer and Acceptance, there were twenty-eight
percent of the student issues, twelve percent of the faculty
335
TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF 100 CASES BY RELATED CONSTITUENTS ACCORDING
TO THE AREA OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN ISSUE
Source 100 Cases
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Figure 4. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Expressed or Implied Contract
between student, faculty and institution related constitu-
encies in the 100 cases.
Legend: Student
Faculty
Institution
337
Figure 5. Comparison of the percentage of issuesin relation to the Area of Offer and Acceptance in the law
of contract between student, faculty, and institution
related constituencies in the 100 cases.
Legend: Student
Faculty
Institutions
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issues, and seventeen percent of the institutional
issues
.
In the area of Consideration, there were no issues
involved in the student and faculty areas, while five
percent of the institutional issues were in this area
(Re; Figure 6, page 339).
Issues as to the Capacity of the parties to con-
tract arose in five percent of the student issues, zero per-
cent of the faculty issues and eleven percent of the
institutional issues (Re: Figure 7, page 340 ).
Figure 8, page 341/ indicates that zero percent
of the student issues, five percent of the faculty issues
and zero percent of the institutional issues were in
relation to the area of Fraud, Mistake and Duress while
Figure 9, page 342/ demonstrates that five percent of
the student issues
,
zero percent of the faculty issues and
eleven percent of the institutional issues relate to the
area of illegality.
The Statute of Frauds was not an issue in any area
as shown by Figure 10, page 343 .
Figure 11, page 344, in comparing the percentage of
issues in relation to the area of Performance and Breach
of Contract identifies that forty percent of the student
related issues were in this area while the faculty had
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Figure 6. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Consideration in the law of
contract between student, faculty, and institution related
constituencies in the 100 cases.
Legend: Student
Faculty
Institution EM
340
Figure 7. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of capacity in the law of contractbetween student, faculty and institution related constitu-
encies in the 100 cases.
Legend: Student
Faculty
Institution
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Figure 8. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Fraud, Mistake and Duress in
the law of contract between student, faculty and institution
related constituencies in the 100 cases.
Legend: Student
Faculty
Institution
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Figure 9. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Illegality in the law of
contract between student, faculty and institution related
constituencies in the 100 cases.
Legend
:
Student
Faculty
Institution
YULIA
343
100
90
80
E-«
2
W
U
«
w
Cm
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
(0%)
F\ W W ^
(0%) (0%)
\//////\ ITOVM
Figure 10. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of the Statute of Fraud between
student, faculty and institution related constituencies
the 100 cases.
Legend: Student
Faculty
Institution
in
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Figure 11. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Performance and Breach in the
law of contract between student, faculty and institution
related constituencies in the 100 cases.
Legend: Student m3
Faculty
Institution
345
seventy-four percent and institutions twenty-eight
percent. Figure 12, page 346, shows a comparison of the
distribution of the percentages of student, faculty and
institutional issues, in the 100 cases in higher educa-
tion to the areas of the law of contract.
A reinforcement to the analysis of the case law
is the survey of the literature in higher education, which
shows that in studying the college's response to student
litigations, college administrators and attorneys have
been unprepared to answer issues raised by students. The
organizational behavior of the institutions of public
higher education became that of crisis management with
minimum knowledge of legal parameters.
As the promotion of health through health education
may in essence prevent disease, the investigator conducted
this research in order to provide the informational base
which could serve to promote the health of our educational
institutions and consequently prevent the incidence of
so much litigation in public higher education, i.e., the
"instances of erroneous and unwise misuses of power by
those invested with powers of management and teaching in
the academic community, as in the case of all human
,,428
fallible institutions.
428United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri, 45 R.R.D. 133.
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Figure 12. Comparison of the distribution of the
percentages of student, faculty and institutional issues
in the 100 cases to the area of the law of contract.
Legend: Areas of the Law of Contract According to
Issue
.
1. Expressed or Implied
2. Offer and Acceptance
3. Consideration
4. Capacity
5. Fraud, Mistake, Duress
6. Illegality
7. Statute of Frauds
8. Performance and Breach
Student
Faculty
Institution
1
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We are indeed in a period of time in the Commonwealth
in which educators must be knowledgeable about basic con-
cepts of the law in order to formulate sound educational
decisions
,
which not only respect the dignity of the
human person, but protects and inculcates his legal rights.
Prophylaxis negates the inconveniences and stigma of the
litigation process.
348
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Restatement of the Problem
The premise or implicit hypothesis of this study is
that faculty and administrative personnel in public higher
education need to know basic concepts of the law, but the
majority of them have not had formal educational prepara-
tion in the field of the law. Thus, a marked dichotomy
exists between what is and what should be. This is the
problem that this research has addressed.
Current trends in the Commonwealth bring into sharp
relief the need for faculty and administrative personnel
to possess a working knowledge of the law of contract.
The evolution of institutions of higher education into
massive business enterprises, while at the same time re-
taining the practice of selecting administrators from the
academic ranks, has exacerbated the problem. The alterna-
tive mode—recruiting as institutional managers individuals
trained for management— is not for one reason or another in
widespread use. In view of prevailing conditions, which
are characterized by the juxtaposition of accountable man-
agers without legal training and an upsurge of dependence
on court ruling as the measure of accountability, the task
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of equipping administrators with a basic understanding of
law is inescapable.
The observation of this need is the essence of the
implicit hypothesis of this study. Yet, since the propo-
is judgmental, it could not be validated by conven -
tional means. The only recourse was to determine whether
or not the literature contained authoritative corroboration
of the researcher's thesis, which indeed it did.
Having dismissed the most obvious recourse to legal
training—enrolling in law school--as impracticable, the
researcher searched the literature for clues to what the
substance of a quasi-legal education for administrators
should be. The preponderance of contract litigation in
higher education suggested that the bare bones of quasi-
legal education lay in this domain. The substantive por-
tion of this study is an analysis of 100 cases drawn from
the voluminous contract litigation in higher education.
The purpose was to inform the selection of content for the
quasi-legal education of faculty and administrative person-
nel in higher education.
Summary of Findings
The source of data for the purpose of this research
was the "conscious testimony" or the primary source of the
law. This historical research applied the scientific
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method to the description and analysis of past court liti-
gated issues in actions in contract. Thus, the data were
drawn from the observations and experiences of others. The
investigator used logical inferences to supplement this
type of research. The case analysis is compatible with the
consequences of the implicit hypothesis and the implicit
hypothesis is confirmed. Major findings of the study are:
1. Contract litigation in higher education and the
law of contract goes back to the early nineteenth
century (1819)
.
Discussion
. Three nineteenth century cases, namely
429
(1) Middlebury College v. Chandler
, (2) People v. New
430
York Law School
,
and ( 3 ) Sterling v. University of Michi -
431
gan
,
bear out that various issues relative to the law of
contract and higher education have been litigated since the
nineteenth century in the United States.
In Sterling v. University of Michigan
,
the court dealt
with an issue relevant today: Did the legislature have the
constitutional right to interfere with or dictate the manage-
ment of the University? This case indicates that issues
4 2 9
Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vermont 683 (1844)
4
People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893)
431
Sterling v. University of Michigan, 68 N.W. 253
(1896)
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relative to the fiscal autonomy are not new. It refers
to the State College in Massachusetts, which had been a
failure under management by the state, and cited the need
for an organizational structure in public higher education
which would utilize a board of regents to control the man-
432
agement system.
Middlebury College v. Chandler held that a college ed-
ucation was not a "necessary" under the law. Therefore, a
minor student was not responsible for his tuition bills un-
der the theory of an implied contract. 433 Table 1, page 95,
indicates that twenty-three percent of the issue emanences
in the student-litigated cases were in the area of "Express-
ed or Implied" contracts. It would seem that students are
still raising issues of implied contract.
The academic freedom of faculty, which in 1978 is un-
der attack in the current focus on the "tenure system," was
litigated back in 1893. In People v. New York Law School
,
the court determined that it was within the academic prerog-
ative of the faculty to make academic decisions, e.g., rec-
434
commend candidates for a degree.
432 . • , •Sterling v. University of Michigan.
433Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vermont 683
(1844).
4j)4 People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893).
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2. There are some recurrent issues within the law of
contract that have deep historical roots.
Discussion
. Chapter II shows the historical develop-
ment of the Law of Contract in the United States. It veri-
fies the sequential theory of the layering of case law and
contributes to a longitudinal perspective of the development
of the law of contract over two centuries.
The definition of a contract, as in the Dartmouth Col-
lege Case (1819), still controls in the Commonwealth in 1978.
Case law presently, as well as over the years, consistently
upholds the separation of the academic decisions and the
courts, when the faculty are not arbitrary or capricious in
435their judgment ( People v. New York Law School )
.
3. Sixty percent of contract litigation according to
this sample, emanate from faculty. The other for-
ty percent are almost evenly divided between stu-
dents (twenty-two percent) and institution-initi-
ated (eighteen percent) actions.
Discussion . The analysis of the 100 cases in higher
education showed that sixty percent of the cases were faculty
related (Figure 13, page 353). This sixty-to-forty ratio may
reflect the advent of collective bargaining and has served as
an awareness exercise, and it is consequently reasonable to
assume that more and more educational issues will go to the
courts for ajudication.
4 ^ 5
People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893)
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Figure 13. Ratio of issue emanence constituent
category by percentage, in 100 cases in higher education
which involve legal issues relative to the law of
contract
.
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The sixty-to-forty ratio is important for faculty be-
cause they are twice as likely as students or institutions
to be participants in litigation. It is important for ad-
ministrators because they are likely to have to oppose fac-
ulty in contract litigation. This research informs the task
of quasi-legal education.
4. Fifty-eight percent of the cases involved "Per-
formance and Breach." Of these, fifty-five per-
cent were in a combination of two categories (of
eight) — "Expressed or Implied" and "Offer and
Acceptance .
"
Discussion . Table 5, page 355 , indicates that fifty-
eight percent of the litigations in the 100 cases were based
on issues of "Performance and Breach." This reiterates the
need for substantive information for educational personnel.
The high issue emanence in this category reflects the void
of information relative to accountability for terms previ-
ously agreed upon. A great deal of litigation could be pre-
vented if there were a clear understanding that indeed a
contract existed when it was made. The need for this infor-
mation is further reflected in the predominant issue eman-
ence in the area of "Offer and Acceptance" and "Expressed or
Implied" contracts.
Fifty-five percent of the fifty-eight percent of suits
were in the area of "Expressed or Implied" and "Offer and
" The increase in these two areas of issueAcceptance
.
TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF 100 CASES ACCORDING TO
AREAS OF LAW OF CONTRACT IN ISSUE
Source 100 Cases
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emanence demonstrates a higher incidence of misunderstand-
ings or misinformation. Ignorance of the law may be infer-
red. Since 'Ignorance of the Law is no Excuse" is a ba-
sic maxim of law education in this area is pertinent.
Conclusions
Six major conclusions are derived from this study:
1. Legal history informs on pertinent issues rela-
tive to contract law and public higher education.
Discussion . An understanding of the law of contract
is pertinent in the educational preparation of faculty and
administrative personnel in higher education. This inform-
ational base (quasi-legal) will help them understand the how
and why of the "legalism" of today's society and its educa-
tional movement, which is beginning to be noticeable. In
some instances, the "legalism" of today's society is pro-
liferating critical issues in public higher education. This
knowledge will also assist the educator to evaluate not only
the law, but also the fallacies being presented.
2. The cognitive content of quasi-legal training for
faculty and administrative personnel in higher ed-
ucation should be primarily in seven areas: (1)
Performance and Breach, (2) Offer and Acceptance,
(3) Expressed or Implied, (4) Capacity, (5) Fraud,
Mistake and Duress, (6) Illegality and (7) Con-
sideration .
Discussion . Analysis of the 100 cases in relation to
the area of the law of contract, as delimited for this study
(Table 5, page 355), indicates that issues relative to seven
357
of the major areas of contract law out of eight were in is-
sue. Fifty-eight percent of the issues in litigation re-
lated to "Performance and Breach" of the contract, while
forty-two percent involved all other areas of the law of
contract (Re: Figure 14, page 358) . Not one issue arose in
relation to the "Statute of Frauds." Therefore, the identi-
fication of the issue emanence, with the exception of the
Statute of Frauds, seem to be somewhat directive in the de-
terminant of content of the legal training to which partici-
pants in higher education should be subjected. The fact
that not one issue was litigated in relation to the "Statute
of Frauds" would seem to indicate that this area of the law
of contract need not be included in the quasi-legal training
of educators.
The cognitive content for the quasi-legal training of
faculty and administrative personnel in higher education in
the Commonwealth has been synthesized on pages 252-332.
This research is organized according to the area of the law
of contract delimited for this study and derived from the
researcher's analysis of 550 cases which were actions in con
tract
.
3. Quasi-legal education is needed for all profession
al personnel in public higher education.
Discussion. Ordinarily institutions of higher educa-
tion have litigations as do business or industry.
358
Figure 14. Ratio of litigation due to issues
relative to the performance and breach of contracts
as compared to the other six areas reported in Table 1.
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inherent in the 'modus operande." However, by virtue of
their production, institutions of higher education have lit-
igation in the law of contract which infringe on the profes-
sional personnel and the student body. This is where the
contract litigation in higher education differs from general
business management.
In the faculty-emanated suits in this study, thirty-
eight percent of the judgments were in favor of the plain-
tiff faculty while sixty-two percent were against the facul-
ty. Faculty-based suits may be inferred to be on the in-
crease. To the extent that the sample is representative,
the facts indicate that fifteen percent of the faculty-ini-
tiated suits were in the year 1974, as compared to thirty-
two percent in the year 1975 and forty-six percent in the
1976-1977 period. The 1977 data are combined, since this
research was done early in the spring of 1977. The 1977
figures are not representative of total litigation in 1977.
In Barrett v. Iowa Community College , the plaintiff
was a librarian
.
4
^
^ The football coach was the litigant in
Feldman v. Regents of New Mexico . 4 ~^ On the basis of this
finding, the researcher modifies the thesis from faculty and
4 ^ 6 Barrett v. Iowa Community College, 221 N.W. 2d 781
(1974).
4 Feldman v . Regents of New Mexico, 540 P. 2d 872
(1975).
360
administrative personnel to all professional personnel.
4. Preventive quasi-legal education for all profes-
sional personnel, those who contract with profes-
sional personnel (administrators) and to a lesserdegree, students, would enhance the internal har-
mony of institutions of higher education.
Discussion
. Quasi-legal information should begin to
forewarn institutions of the legal consequences of proce—
dural error and misfeasance. It is patently clear that the
misunderstandings leading to the faculty-emanated suits were
due to misfeasance rather than malfeasance. If faculty bet-
ter understood the nature of a contract, its conditions and
relationships, there is a strong chance that at least one-
half of the cases in the area of "Performance and Breach"
would be eliminated.
5. Quasi-legal education programs should begin to fo-
cus on student-initiated litigation.
Discussion . With the increase in consumer concern, it
is also reasonable to assume that there will be an increase
in the emanence of issues in the courts by students in pub-
lic higher education. To the extent that the sample is rep-
resentative, the research indicates that eight of the twenty-
two student-litigated suits were in 1976. Thirteen percent
were in the early 1977 term. Therefore, in the 1976 and
1977 studied period, fifty-one percent of the student-initi-
ated cases were litigated as compared to a total of thirteen
percent in 1975 and thirty-seven percent in the 1966-1974
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period. It is logical to assume that a complete study of
the 1977 litigations would demonstrate an increase in liti-
gations over 1976.
Colleges and universities today are continually of-
fering students accessiblity to legal services to wade
through the multiple issues they are presenting within the
educational institutions. An analysis of the court deci-
sions in the student-litigated cases indicates that the
students won decisions in sixty percent of the cases and
lost only forty percent, almost a reversal of the faculty
judgments. Student related suits also covered a broader
spectrum in terms of the areas of contract law (issue ema-
nance) involved in litigated issues. Therefore, planners
of quasi-legal education programs need not only to prepare
institutions for a surge of student-initiated litigation
but educate professional personnel for survival in our le-
gal society. Students are now winning twice as often as
faculty.
6. Elimination of misunderstandings of contractural
relationships would reduce both monetary and hu-
man costs.
Discussion . The determination of legal rights or is
sues in the judicial system involves diverse monetary ex-
penditures. Depending on the outcome of the suit the mone
tary expenditures swing from a complete reimbursement for
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the damages to the other end of the pendulum, a complete
loss
.
There is no way to calculate the toll in human rela-
tions. It suffices to say that the human relations between
the two litigants are never again as good. In some cases,
the winner carries for life the stigma of having contended.
Recommendations for Future Research
On the basis of the principal findings arrived at as
a result of this research, the investigator recommends that
further studies be initiated in two areas: (1) collective
bargaining, and (2) student-initiated litigation.
At a time when collective bargaining rights are being
legislated for faculty in higher education, there is concur-
rently a trend toward multicampus systems centrally control-
led. Moreover, the educational delivery system must educate
increasing numbers of students from increasingly diverse
segments of the population. Consumers with diverse needs
are, therefore, increasing in institutions in which there
will be increased demands for educational reform, thus, in-
creasing the potential for increased litigation in the con-
tract areas singled out for future study.
^ 88 Eugene C. Lee and Frank M. Bowen, "The Multicampus
University: A Study of Academic Governance, " The Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education , edited by Lewis Mayhew,
p. 263
.
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While it was outside the purpose of this study to in-
vestigate, it is unmistakably apparent that inquiry into the
most predominant area of litigation in higher education-fac-
ulty contracts must be expanded to incorporate the legal
concepts relating to collective bargaining, since the trend
is toward collective negotiations in regard to faculty con-
tracts. This is in the nature of a concomitant discovery,
since the study excluded collective bargaining from consid-
eration.
Future research should also monitor student-initiated
litigation as a means of determining what proportion of
quasi-legal education it should occupy and to determine what
aspects of the institution-student relationships are at
issue
.
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APPENDIX I
Legal Terms
Acceptance of Offer : Acceptance of an offer may be defined
as an expression of assent to the terms of the offer
while the offer is still open.
Accord and Satisfaction : In order to discharge an existing
cause of action, both the accord and satisfaction must
occur. The accord is a bilateral contract whereas
satisfaction is the performance of such contracts.
Action : An ordinary proceeding in a court by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, the redress of a wrong, or the punishment
of public offense. In common language a "suit," or
"Lawsuit .
"
Action at law: Court action in a law case, as distinguished
from equity.
Anticipatory breach : The doctrine of anticipatory breach of
a contract is that if one of the parties to a bilateral
(executory) contract repudiates it before the day of
performance, the other party may institute an action
for breach of contract, without waiting for the time of
the performance of the contract. This rule is
followed
400
in most states and in the Federal Courts. It is not
followed in Massachusetts
.
Appellant : A party who takes an appeal from one court to
another
.
Appellee : The party against whom an appeal is taken.
Assault : An attempt to beat another without touching him
(see battery)
.
Assignor : An assignor is the person who assigns his right
under the contract.
Assignee : An assignee is the person to whom the right under
the contract has been assigned.
Arrangement : A setting in order.
Avoid a contract : To cancel and make the contract void.
Battery : An unlawful beating or other wrongful physical
violence inflicted on another without his consent.
Battery includes assault.
Bilateral contract : A bilateral contract is a contract in
which there is a promise for an act.
Breach of contract: Failure without legal excuse to perform
part or whole of a contract.
Cancellation
,
Intentional Destruction or Surrender : Con-
tractual duties are discharged by the cancellation or
destruction of the document embodying the contract or
by its surrender to the party subject to the duty or to
someone on his behalf.
401
Civil Action : One brought to recover some civil right or to
obtain redress for some wrong.
Common Law : Legal principles derived from usage and some
customs or from court decisions affirming such usages
and customs or the Acts of Parliament in force at the
time of the American Revolution, as distinguished from
law by enactment of American legislature.
Compensatory Damages : Compensatory damages are damages which
in the eyes of the court will place the Plaintiff in
the position he would have been in if the contract had
not been breached.
Condition Concurrent : A condition concurrent is a condition
which must be performed by one party at the same time
the other party performs. It may be said that the
parties to the contract are to perform specific acts
simultaneously
.
Condition Precedent : A condition precedent is a condition
which must happen, or, a condition which is to be
performed before any contractual liability arises.
Condition Subsequent : A condition subsequent is a condition
referring to a future event. If the future event so
specified happens, it gives one of the parties to the
contract a right to end the contract.
Consideration in contracts: The inducement, usually an
amount of money
.
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Contract : An agreement upon sufficient consideration, to do
or not to do a particular thing; the writing which
contains the agreement of the parties with the terms
and conditions and which serves as proof of the
obligation
.
Contract action : An action brought to enforce rights under
a contract.
Corporate : Belonging to a corporation.
Corporation : Legal entity or artificial person created by
statute who subsists as a body politic, under a special
denomination and is vested by the policy of the law
with the capacity of perpetual succession, and of
acting in several respects, however numerous the asso-
ciation may be, as a single individual.
Creditor beneficiary : A person to whom the promisee owes a
duty, e.g., composition with creditors and business
subscriptions
.
Criminal action: Proceeding by which a party charged with a
crime is brought to trial and punishment.
Damages : Damages means a sum of money awarded as compensa-
tion for injury caused by a breach of contract.
Decree : Order of court of equity announcing the legal
con-
sequences of the facts found.
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Defendant : The party against whom relief or recovery is
sought in a court of action.
Defense ; That which is offered and alleged by Defendant as
a reason in law or fact why Plaintiff should not
recover
.
Discharge by Avoidance of Voidable Duties ; A voidable con-
tractual duty is discharged by the affirmative action
required for the exercise of the power of avoidance.
Donee ; The person receiving the power or gift.
Donee beneficiary : A person to whom the promisee does not
owe a duty, e.g., a promise made to a father for the
benefit of his son; a beneficiary of a trust.
Donor : The person conferring the power or a gift.
Duress: Duress may be defined as any unlawful constraint
exercised on a person so that he is forced to do some-
thing that he otherwise would not have done.
Emancipation of child : Surrender of the right to care,
custody and earnings of a child by its parents who at
the same time renounce parental duties.
Enjoin: To require a person by writ of injunction from a
court of equity to perform, or to abstain, or restrict
from, some act.
Equity : Field of jurisprudence differing in origin, theory,
and methods from the common law.
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Estoppel : An estoppel involves a change of position of the
parties so that the party against whom estoppel is
invoked has received a profit or benefit or the party
invoking estoppel has changed his position to his
detriment
.
Executed contract ; A completed contract.
Executory contract : An incompletely performed contract.
Executor : Person designated by testator to carry out wishes
expressed in will.
Felony : Crime punishable by imprisonment in State prison or
by death.
Fraud : Fraud is defined as a false misrepresentation of a
matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by
false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed.
Holder in due course: A holder in due course is a person
who took a bill (check or note) in good faith and for
value and that at the time it was negotiated to him
he had no notice of any defect in the title of the
person who negotiated it.
Injunction : A judicial process requiring the person to whom
it is directed to do or refrain from doing a particular
thing
.
Intestacy : The condition or state of not leaving a will at
one's death.
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Intoxicated : Intoxicated is defined by case law to mean
under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. Thus,
an intoxicated person is a person under the influence
of an intoxicating liquor.
Law: 1) System of principles and rules of human conduct
which includes decisions of courts and acts of
legislature
.
2) An enactment of a legislature, a statute.
Liability : Legal responsibility.
License : Permission, conferring right to do some act which
would otherwise be illegal.
Liquidated damages : Liquidated damages may be defined as
specific sums of money agreed upon by the parties, to
be recovered by either of the contracting parties for
breach of the contract.
Malice : Intentional doing of a wrongful act without excuse
or just cause.
Malfeasance: Commission of an unlawful act.
Merger : A merger involves a discharge of the contractual
obligation by operation of law.
Misfeasance : Improper performance of a lawful act.
Necessaries : Necessaries have been defined as indispensable
things or things proper and useful for the sustenance
of human life.
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Novation : A novation involves a substitution of a new party
with a discharge of one of the original parties by an
agreement of all these parties. A new contract is
created with the same terms as the original one but
only the parties are changed.
Occurrence of a Condition Subsequent : Where there has been
a breach of contractual duty followed by the happening
of a condition subsequent to the duty of the wrongdoer,
his duty is thereby discharged.
Offeree : The person who accepts the offer is termed the
offeree
.
Offeror : The person who makes the offer is termed the offeror.
Parole-Evidence Rule : Oral evidence as to matters not con-
tained in a written contract or other instrument is
not admissible.
Plaintiff : Person who brings action; he who sues by filing
a complaint.
Police Power: Power inherent in every sovereign state to
enact law within constitutional limits to promote the
order, health, education and welfare of society.
Promisee: One to whom a promise has been made.
Promisor: One who makes a promise.
Promissory
:
In the nature of a promise.
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Promissory Estoppel : That which arises when there is a
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce forbearance or action of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee,
and which does not induce such forbearance or action,
and such promise is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.
Promissory Note : A written promise or engagement to pay
a sum certain within a limited time or on demand, or
at sight, to a person named therein, or to his order,
or bearer.
Quantum meritum : An implication that the defendant had
promised to pay Plaintiff as much as he reasonably
deserved for work or labor.
Ratification : By ratification of a contract is meant the
affirmation or confirmation of an act previously done
either by the party himself or another.
Registered : Entered or recorded in some official register
or record or list.
Release of Covenant Not to Sue : A contractual obligation
may be discharged by a release or covenant not to
sue if under seal or based on consideration.
Rescission of contract : Cancellation or abrogation by the
parties or one of them.
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Repudiation : Repudiation may be defined as a rejection.
In terms of a contract, it consists usually of an
absolute and unequivocal declaration on the part of
the promisor to the promisee that he will not make
performance on the future day that the contract calls
for performance. It is in the nature of an anticipa-
tory breach before the performance is due.
Restitution : Restitution means the act of making good or
giving the equivalent for the loss. The measure of
recovery is the reasonable value of the Plaintiff's
performance. It is available only where there has
been a total breach of the contract. If the breach
of the contract is partial the remedy is in damages.
Right of Contribution : By the right of contribution is
meant the right to reimbursement. It is the act of
co-debtors (here co-promisors) in reimbursing one of
their group who has paid the entire debt, each to the
extent of their liability.
Right under Contract : The parties to the contract have
rights under the contract. There must be a privity
of contract between Plaintiff and Defendant in order
to render the Defendant liable to the Plaintiff on
the contract.
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Specific Performance : Specific performance means the per-
formance of the contract terms in as near as possible
as the way as agreed upon.
Statute: Act of legislature.
Statute of Frauds : The Statute of Frauds is a set of
statutes which was legislated for the purpose of pre-
venting fraud. The Statute of Frauds requires that
specific contracts to be enforceable must be in
writing and signed by the parties to be charged. If
the contract itself is not in writing, a memorandum
of it signed by the persons to be charged must be
produced
.
Substituted Performances: Substituted performance is per-
formance of a contract whose terms were varied by a
subsequent parol agreement which affected the mode
of performance of the contract only.
Testacy : The condition or state of leaving a will at one s
death
.
Testator: Person who makes the will.
Third Party Beneficiary : A person who acquires rights in
a contract entered into for his benefit. He is not
a party to the contract.
Tort : Legal wrong committed upon the person
or property of
another independent of contract.
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Trover Remedy for any wrongful interference with or deten-
tion of the goods of another.
Unconscionable Contract : An unconscionable contract is one
which a person of sound mind would not make. It is
also one in which a fair and honest person would not
accept
.
Unilateral Contract : An unilateral contract is a contract
in which there is a promise for the act.
Ultra Vires : Acts beyond the scope of authority.
Void: Ineffectual, having no legal force binding effect.
Voidable : That which may be voided or declared void.
Will : An instrument by which a person makes a disposition
of his property to take effect after his decease, and
which is, in its own nature, ambulatory and revocable
during his life.
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